Duquesne University

Duquesne Scholarship Collection
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Summer 2014

Nietzsche and Comedy: Provocative Laughter Amidst a Tragic
Philosophy
Michael C. Rudar

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Rudar, M. (2014). Nietzsche and Comedy: Provocative Laughter Amidst a Tragic Philosophy (Doctoral
dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1129

This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne
Scholarship Collection.

NIETZSCHE AND COMEDY:
PROVOCATIVE LAUGHTER AMIDST
A TRAGIC PHILOSOPHY

A Dissertation
Submitted to the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By
Michael Christian Rudar

August 2014

i

Copyright by
M. C. Rudar

2014

ii

NIETZSCHE AND COMEDY:
PROVOCATIVE LAUGHTER AMIDST
A TRAGIC PHILOSOPHY

By
Michael Christian Rudar
Approved May 30, 2014

_________________________________
Dean James Swindal, PhD.
Associate Professor of Philosophy
(Committee Chair)

_________________________________
Frederick Evans, PhD.
Professor of Philosophy
(Committee Member)

_________________________________
Bernard Freydberg, PhD.
Professor of Philosophy
(Committee Member)

_________________________________
Dean James Swindal, PhD.
Dean, McAnulty Graduate School of
Liberal Arts

_________________________________
Ronald Polansky, PhD.
Chair, Department of Philosophy
Professor of Philosophy

iii

ABSTRACT

NIETZSCHE AND COMEDY:
PROVOCATIVE LAUGHTER AMIDST
A TRAGIC PHILOSOPHY

By
Michael Christian Rudar
August 2014

Dissertation Supervised by Dr. James Swindal, Ph.D.
Nietzsche is well known as the philosopher of the tragic view of life. Because we
are part of the world of becoming the tragic view maintains that human beings are given
over to certain limits that we cannot transcend. These include ourselves as finite beings,
the recognition that noumenal knowledge is not possible and, because we are subject to
the flux of existence, that life can be both painful and destructive. However, for
Nietzsche the tragic view of life ought not result in humorless resignation and he appeals
to ancient Greek tragedy to demonstrate how cheerfulness is possible in the face of
pessimism. But Nietzsche is equally clear that comedy and laughter too are ways to
embrace the truth of tragic wisdom. In this work which examines three key texts that span
Nietzsche’s productive life—The Birth of Tragedy, The Gay Science, and Thus Spoke
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Zarathustra—I will argue that comedy and laughter are central to Nietzsche’s endeavor
to surmount pessimism, bring intellectual honesty (Redlichkeit) to Wissenschaft, and
appreciate appearance where we become witness to the wonder and folly of the human
being. Far from being a heuristic device used simply as a tool, the provocative laughter
found in Nietzsche’s texts is the affirmation of amor fati that says “yes” to life,
multiplicity, perspective, and tragic wisdom so that we may counter Schopenhauerian
resignation. It is part of an authentic response of a subject in affirming being here as part
of the world of becoming and, “living in Schein as goal.” In the end I will demonstrate
that Nietzsche’s use of comedy and laughter is a herald that when sounded urges us to
recognize the limits we are all subject to in order to return us to the humble, but noble,
earthbound beings that we are. Set amidst all the serious issues that Nietzsche’s writings
detail—the death of God, nihilism as the terminal sickness of the West, the will to power,
the eternal return—comedy and laughter resound in his thinking so as to yoke the
excessiveness that often attempts to transcend our being human, all too human.
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NOTE ON TEXTS

Because there are now numerous translations of Nietzsche’s texts into English, I will list
not only the page number of the particular text I am referencing but also the aphorism
and/or section number or the title of the aphorism if no number is given. The majority of
my references are from the Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge
University Press) editions of Nietzsche’s works that are themselves based on the now
standard editions of Nietzsche’s Werke edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari.
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Introduction

“Genuine honesty, assuming that this is our virtue and we cannot get rid of it, we free
spirits – well then, we will want to work on it with all the love and malice at our disposal,
and not get tired of ‘perfecting’ ourselves in our virtue, the only one we have left: may its
glory come to rest like a gilded, blue evening glow of mockery over this aging culture
and its dull and dismal seriousness!”
~Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil~

I. The Play of Philosophy and Comedy

One might think it odd that comedy and philosophy share anything in common let
alone be complimentary. The traditional image of philosophy and philosophers is one of
deep thought by somber, pensive individuals who attempt to think through the greatest
questions of humankind. This of course is true. Philosophy does attempt to give accounts
of the most profound questions of human existence. Questions such as: What is the nature
of reality? Are we free? How ought one live authentically? All of this lends a certain air
of seriousness to philosophy that appears to efface anything comical or laughter
provoking. Certainly this serious image of philosophy has held sway through the ages.
However I argue that comedy and philosophy share a deep alliance even if not always
apparent the same way philosophy and serious matters are aligned. More specifically, I
argue that Friedrich Nietzsche understands, appreciates, and exploits this alliance
between comedy and philosophy, an alliance that has until recently been almost
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completely ignored. What then could possibly be the nature of philosophy and comedy?
How do such apparently diverse phenomenon relate?
If one had to distill a single qualifying characteristic of this relationship, it would
be, to quote Bernard Freydberg, one of measure.1 Philosophy and comedy take each
other’s measure. How so? Philosophy and philosophers appear to be paradigms of
restraint and measure, heeding the ancient oracle of Delphi whose advice was moderation
in all things. Philosophical wisdom was attained in part from the knowledge that the
appropriate measure was needed to live a good life in the philosophical sense or even in
everyday, pragmatic affairs. It helped one to deal wisely with any given circumstance,
whether political, social, familial or even concerning more mundane issues such as the
appropriate consumption of food and drink. Moreover, thinking, which is the domain of
philosophy, also requires a certain restraint at times. Socrates has traditionally been the
personification of this since his wisdom lay in the recognition of his limits, that is, of his
ignorance. This phenomenon is perhaps best understood in terms of Socrates’ daimon.
Playing a key role in his pursuit of wisdom, his daimon, ironically, restrained him in
certain contexts and never compelled him to do anything. In other words, pursuit and
restraint are coupled together in the image of Socrates.2 So philosophy armed with
measure appeared as most suited to a well lived life. Accordingly, this image of
philosophy all but excludes and even requires one to, if not purge outright, at least
dramatically temper any disruptive excess. It would seem that raucous laughter and
comedy have no place within philosophic endeavors.
See Bernard Freydberg, Philosophy and Comedy: Aristophanes, Logos, and Eros (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2008), 196-200.
2
Nietzsche of course challenges this view of Socrates, especially in The Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche views
Socrates as a philosopher who is overly consumed and driven by dialectical reason and the quest for
certainty.
1
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Comedy, on the other hand, embraces excess. Comedy attempts to point out, even
ridicule, those moments when human beings have exceeded some measure that would
otherwise call for restraint. In other words, comedy makes a spectacle out of the folly of
human beings who have exceeded delimited boundaries. The spectacle itself in the form
of comedy is a magnification of excess. Situations and people are exploited to show an
excessive movement beyond conventional norms of behavior. Through comic, laughter
provoking images we behold ourselves as the subject of great folly in order that this folly
might be recognized, possibly corrected, and even celebrated in the sense that measure be
restored.
What seems apparent at first glance, then, is that philosophy excludes comedy and
comedy excludes philosophy. To put it more succinctly, philosophy excludes excess and
comedy excludes seriousness. Nothing, though, is farther from the truth. What is true is
that philosophy and comedy reciprocate one another in a timeless play, which is to say
they are not mutually exclusive. This “play” however should not be considered frivolous
but one worthy of the highest seriousness. Why? Because as finite human beings, from
pauper to saint, we are all subject to both wonder and folly.
The question of the relationship of the play of philosophy and comedy, however,
needs to be elaborated. There is a double layering that is composed of four relationships.
First, it is possible, on the one hand, to approach an understanding of this play by simply
taking the perspective of one of these phenomena and focusing it on the other. Thus one
can maintain a foothold within philosophy and do an analysis of comedy. This could take
the form of an historical analysis of comedy as seen from the perspective of philosophy,
tracing the comments philosophers have made about comedy throughout philosophical
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history in an attempt to discern its relative importance to each thinker. To give an
historical overview I will present a short but cogent appraisal of this history below. It
might also take the route of abstraction and attempt to distill the essence of comedy as
well as its essential features. Second, it could also take the converse: from the side of
comedy we can surely see how its sights have been set at times on what are considered
the most serious of matters including philosophy and philosophers. One need only recall
Aristophanes’ Clouds in which he has the usual earthbound Socrates swinging in a basket
examining heavenly phenomena. This layer is one where both elements speak at or about
one another.
There is, however, a deeper relationship between these two phenomena. It is one
that does not make the other an object for inquiry but instead sees the other in itself,
thereby disclosing the true play of philosophy and comedy. This relationship constitutes
the more fundamental layer of this play.
Perhaps the best explanation of this deeper layer is given by John Sallis. In his
Transfigurements: On the True Sense of Art, Sallis acknowledges the first layer and its
two relationships, which he calls “segments,” spoken of above. But he also says, “Yet
comedy not only can address—and be addressed by—philosophy but also can inhere as a
moment within philosophy;...and...it can also happen that philosophy belongs to
comedy.”3 The two key words here are “inhere” and “belong.” What they disclose is a
kinship between these two phenomena and not just a relationship in which a dichotomy
takes place when one sees the other simply as an object to be analyzed. To be sure, much
comedy harbors deep philosophical themes and truths. Yet philosophy itself can exceed

John Sallis, Transfigurements: On the True Sense of Art (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008),
126.
3
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measure in and through its excess and thus become ripe for great laughter. What will
becomes evident is that Nietzsche quite often has his sights set on what he views as
dishonest thought in the history of philosophy. Better yet, it might be best characterized
as hubristic thought, the kind of thought Nietzsche says fails to recognize the limits of
science and our ties to the earth. He excavates this intellectual dishonesty, exposing the
motives behind philosophical thought in order to show an agenda oriented toward
protecting the one doing that thinking. To combat this excess Nietzsche rarely took the
tact of the typical philosopher. He did not respond, for the most part, to his philosophical
nemeses with lengthy, logically solid treatises. Instead as we shall see, to counter such
hubristic thought, Nietzsche many times turns them into laughter provoking, comedic
moments. Occurring not merely to ridicule, these laughter provoking moments erupt in a
way that makes them teachable moments. What they teach more often than not is that
some measure has been exceeded and thus needs restored—all this from the philosopher
who philosophizes with a hammer and revels in transgression. We can begin to see then
the distortion and inversion that begins to happen with this notion of measure when
Nietzsche’s gaze falls upon it.
As we begin to orient ourselves to the upcoming discussion of Nietzsche, what is
important to recognize is that comedy, laughter, and philosophy belong together because
both serious and comedic matters are prominent elements in the constellation of the
human being. It is in and through this play of the serious and comedic that human beings
become fully realized as the earthbound beings that we are.

5

II. Comedy, Laughter, and the History of Philosophy

Why and how is comedy an important aspect of Nietzsche’s thought? Many
philosophers before Nietzsche have commented on comedy. But comedy, although
mentioned by philosophers, has always played second fiddle, or no fiddle, to tragedy.
This is now simply unacceptable. Dennis Schmidt gives voice to this concern stating, “In
the end, the full treatment of the relation of tragedy and philosophy...needs to address the
place of comedy in that relation.”4 Just as philosophy and tragedy take each other’s
measure, so too is comedy to be a measure of both and measured by both. For the most
part, this is what has been absent in philosophical history.
Schmidt’s concern in On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life is
how and why ancient Greek tragedy had been appropriated by great German thinkers
from Immanuel Kant to Martin Heidegger (he begins, however, with Plato and Aristotle
as a backdrop). What is it about Greek tragedy that is so crucial to philosophical thinking
in the West? For Schmidt, tragic art is not simply a spectacle. In other words it is not
something to watch or read on occasion for mere entertainment so that we soon forget it
once the tragedy has concluded. Instead, “tragic art nourishes an ethical sensibility that is
crucial for the formulation of an ethics and politics responsive to contemporary life.”5
This is why tragic art is so important to the thinkers he examines including Nietzsche. Art
allows for a disclosing of nature, a way of letting nature in its flux shine. Other methods,
including science and philosophy and similar modes of reflection, simply can not grasp
the appearing of nature the way art can. As Schmidt says, “Art lets physis shine in the
Dennis Schmidt, On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2001), 19.
5
Ibid., 3.
4
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work. Art is a making that dwells near this origin of appearing and that is why art
always—no matter how old—always has the feel of the new: it lives at the sources, the
origins, of all appearing.”6 Tragedy, art, ethics, and thinking are so deeply intertwined
that how we live, which is to say, how we disclose ourselves and our world, are
profoundly shaped by it whether we are conscious of it or not.
Schmidt’s work, along with Sallis’s and Freydberg’s, presents a mirror that raises
the same kind of questions I am interested in, although my focus is solely on Nietzsche. I
want to bring these same concerns to bear on Nietzsche and the question of critical
philosophy, ethics, comedy, and laughter. What is Nietzsche trying to disclose about
comedy and the kind of laughter present in his writings that allows us not merely to
function and “get by” in our lives but to come to grips and even affirm life here without
illusions—illusions that are often times perpetrated by philosophers? As often is the case
with philosophy, these kinds of questions serve to raise more questions than answers such
as: “How are tragedy and comedy different?” “Is one art more primal than the other?”
“Are there limits to comedy and the role of laughter?” Nonetheless, these are the kinds of
questions to be addressed and there is no better place to begin than at the beginning, a
beginning that still resonates with Nietzsche’s thought and hopefully ours.
Consider the first philosopher of the West, Thales. What is notable about Thales?
When one reads the fragments concerning him, especially for the first time, what stands
out? Of course there are many things that might top a list: his military prowess, the
assertion that water (hudōr) is the first, eternal principle (archē) or the recognition that he
is attempting a logos of physical nature that, for the first time breaks from purely

Dennis Schmidt, Lyrical and Ethical Subjects: Essays on the Periphery of the Word, Freedom, and
History (Albany, SUNY Press, 2005), 186.
6
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mythical accounts. Not withstanding the fruitfulness and importance of these insights and
all the scholarly work done on them since, what still strikes one when reading Thales? I
would assert that it is the comic images that leap from the page.
Take Thales the stargazer. The image we have of Thales, one handed down over
millennia, was of a keen astronomer who spent much time looking at the heavens. At one
point, his undivided attention at the stars caused him to fall into a well eliciting jeers
(aposkōpsai) from a female Thracian servant.7 In other words, what we have at the very
inception of philosophy in the West are its deep ties to laughter provoking images.
Thales, in the very serious business of discerning a logos of the heavens has forgotten his
earthboundness and in forgetting, indeed a forgetting of the kind of being he was, is
returned to earth like a falling star eliciting laughter and jeers. I strongly suggest that this
comic image is what stands out amidst the many serious philosophical enterprises of
Thales.
In Plato’s dialogues, we clearly see the role of tragedy. The focus on tragedy is
evidenced in perhaps his greatest work the Republic where Plato seeks justice both in the
city and the souls of human beings. Part of this justice is the ebb and flow of poetry and
tragedy in the polis and the souls of human beings. For example, at first the guardians
must be “protected” from the influence of Homer’s poetry, specifically Achilles’ thinking
of his own death.8 Here, tragedy and poetry ebbs, inasmuch as their influence recedes in
order to ensure a healthy abundance of courage in the guardians. However, this same
passage resurfaces again later in the dialogue, that is, flows back into those souls that

See Plato, Theaetetus, 174a.
See Homer, Odyssey, 11:489-91. Indeed the very idea of fearless guardians, ready to battle real enemies in
order to protect the polis but needing protection from poetry certainly is, to a degree, laughter provoking!

7
8
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have made the liberating journey out of the cave.9 And although Plato is concerned with
admitting both tragedies and comedies back into the city,10 nonetheless comparatively
speaking comedy appears to play a limited role in the education of the guardians and
hence in the constitution of the polis.
Aristotle comments on the origin and nature of comedy in his Poetics, asserting
that whereas tragedy was rooted in the dithyramb, comedy was rooted in phallic songs.11
However, unlike tragedy with its noble heroes, comedy “is an imitation of men worse
than the average.”12 Hence Aristotle’s major fault line between these two genres rests on
a certain level of excellence (aretē) that tragedy achieves and comedy does not—tragic
heroes being noble and of high virtue (spoudaion) and comic characters engendering
petty motivations and character (phaulon). Moreover, says Aristotle, comedy was not
taken seriously until much later in history as compared to its tragic counterpart. This was
due to its supposed improvised style and lack of definite form. To be sure, Aristotle
values the mimēsis found in tragedy, comedy, and poetry alike, all of which aim at
intellectual pleasure. Moreover, he does not explicitly state that comedy is inferior to
tragedy, but he does appear to suggest that tragic mimēsis, which deals with fear, pain,
and the suffering of noble heroes, does hold the upper hand over comedy’s dealing in the
mimēsis of the ridiculous and those of inferior rank.13
Because Aristotle’s writings were appropriated first among Islamic thinkers
before their European counterparts, many of these philosophers offered their own
See Plato, Republic, 386c and 516d.
Ibid., 394d. I don’t subscribe to what has become the dogmatic assertion that Plato rejects poetry and
wanted it banished from the polis. The work of John Sallis, Bernard Freydberg and others have
conclusively shown this not to be the case. Indeed, this incorrect view of Plato and poetry is itself ripe for
laughter.
11
Aristotle, Poetics, 1449a10.
12
Ibid., 1449a32.
13
Ibid., 1449a32-37.
9

10
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commentary on these writings. Among them was Avicenna who, in his Commentary of
the Poetics of Aristotle, echoed Aristotle’s assertion that comedy was the imitation of the
base although, “not of every thing evil; rather of that genus of evil which is immoral and
is intended for ridicule and mocking.”14 The Arabic word for immoral, yustafhash, as the
translator of this Avicenna text makes clear in a note, means also “exorbitant, indecent, or
shameful.” If we focus on this first word then we see that for Avicenna comedy is an
imitation of that which is exorbitant, that is, it is essentially an attempt to imitate that
which is beyond a given limit. Because the commentary revolves around the ancients, in
this case then the given limit might be the moral and ethical norms of the ancient Greeks.
But to imitate that which lies outside of these limits presents a contradiction and tension
in that imitation (mimēsis) requires an original from which to imitate. That which is
exorbitant and stands outside cannot simply be imitated due to its status as something
other, as something transgressing the very limit that provides the horizon of given social
norms. This contradiction and tension, however, is a fruitful one. The attempt to imitate
that which is other, that which has no original, can give us only the distorted, absurd art
we call comedy. Comedic imitation can only twist and turn what is already given, in this
case ethical deviation, so that appearance itself within limit becomes distorted and absurd
so that its manifestation is indeed exorbitant.
Perhaps the greatest symbol of this exorbitant appearance is the comic mask that
Avicenna goes on to describe as possessing three qualities. The first is ugliness, “because
it is necessary to change from the natural shape to contempt.” Second is bad-temper,
“because it is meant to portray a general lack of esteem towards someone.” Last is

Avicenna, Avicenna’s Commentary on the Poetics of Aristotle: A Critical Study with an Annotated
Translation of the Text by Ismail M. Dahiyat (Leiden Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1974), 82.

14
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freedom, “from any sign of grief.” Hence the mocker’s mask was held up as a mirror
image of that culture, one that was, “neither dispirited, sad, nor pained.”15
Avicenna concludes his commentary of Aristotle and comedy by speaking about
origins. Because the comic imitation of that which is exorbitant lies outside all bounds, its
cultural genesis appears less understood than tragedy. For Avicenna, it seems as though
the mask of comedy somehow never betrayed the kind of delimited origin that the
performance of tragedy supposedly has—“Comedy is, however, different [from tragedy]:
not being a thing that requires the care of serious, virtuous and knowledgeable men, its
provenance was overlooked and its origin and how it began were forgotten.”16 Even
though an outsider to the ancient Greeks and born much later (as we all our today),
Avicenna may well be reminding us that some of the most significant things, even though
they may appear absurd, contemptible, and exorbitant, do nonetheless provide a ruling
image that influenced who the ancient Greeks were 2,500 years ago and who we, as their
heirs, are today.
Scholastic philosophers also commented on comedy and laughter. In St.
Augustine’s The City of God, God’s covenant with Abraham harbors within it the play of
concealing and unconcealing in terms of the old and new. When Isaac was born of the
elderly Abraham and Sarah (100 and 90 years old respectively!) the covenant was
revealed as the new born of the old. Moreover, this play of concealing and unconcealing
in the old and new is expressed most aptly through Abraham’s laughter. Augustine draws
the distinction between the laughter of exultation and the laughter of derision (scorn)
stating, “The laughter of Abraham is the exultation of one who rejoices, not the scornful

15
16

Ibid., 83.
Ibid.
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laughter of one who mistrusts.”17 Abraham laughs not because he doubts, even though
nature surely suggests reason for doubt (his and Sarah’s age), but because he believes. To
mark this occasion they named their son Isaac whose name means “laughter.” As
Augustine relates, “For his father [Abraham] had laughed when he was promised to him,
in wondering delight...”18 From this we see that laughter is the phenomenon that rejoins
one to wonder. For Abraham it is the wonder of belief and religious awe. In the domain
of philosophy, laughter can release one into wonder itself—philosophy’s first principle
from which it never leaves.
Near the conclusion to The City of God in the section titled, “Of the Temporary
Punishments of this Life to Which the Human Condition is Subject,” Augustine makes a
provocative statement about laughter and life. Its relevance not only has to do with
laughter as a subject matter but also its reference to Zoroaster who is, of course, a key
figure in Nietzsche’s thought. Augustine maintains what is certainly contrary to
Nietzsche’s thinking about life asserting, “The very life we mortals lead is itself all
punishment, for it is all temptation....Our infancy, indeed, introducing us to this life not
with laughter but with tears, seems unconsciously to predict the ills we are to
encounter.”19 But then Augustine cites a lone exception, maintaining that “Zoroaster
alone is said to have laughed when he was born, and that unnatural omen portended no
good to him.” Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, as we will come to see, will reverse this.
Zarathustra’s laughter is a key gesture that marks a turn towards the earth and the
Übermensch. This new conception of Zarathustra, then, will act as a palimpsest on the

St. Augustine, The City of God, Vol. I-II, trans. Marcus Dods (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1884), II/141.
We will come to see that scornful laughter plays a role in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
18
Ibid., II/146.
19
Ibid., II/440.
17
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old historical Zoroaster bringing back to the fore provocative laughter that affirms even
the most arduous life.
St. Thomas Aquinas also addresses laughter and folly in his writings. As far as
defining comedy, Aquinas reiterates Aristotle’s claim about the nature of comedy. In his
commentary on Aristotle’s De generatione et corruptione Aquinas says that comedy
concerns itself with, “speech about urbane things (sermo de rebus urbanis).”20 This
distinction extends to the nature of the chorus as well, a key element in both tragedy and
comedy. Commenting on Aristotle’s Politics, Aquinas states that the chorus commented
on the action of the play through song coupled with dancing.21 But the chorus of comedy
is not identical to the chorus of tragedy, however similar their empirical make-up.
Aquinas rests his distinction once again on “kinds.” The kind of low commentary the
chorus of comedy chants makes it qualitatively different than the kind of serious chanting
done by a tragic chorus.22
In the Second Part of the Second Part (Secunda Secundae Partis) of the Summa
Theologica Aquinas addresses ridicule or derision (de derisione), a species of laughter.
Ridicule for Aquinas falls under the purview of sin, and Question 75 with its two articles
inquires into what kind of sin it is, namely, is it a sin distinct from others? And, is it a
mortal sin? Aquinas answers in the affirmative to both questions.
In terms of the second question says Aquinas, ridicule arises when it is directed at
the evil of another and depending on whether the evil is large or small determines the

St. Thomas Aquinas, “In libros de generatione” in the Supplementum to the Index thomisticus of the
Opera omnia, ed. Roberto Busa (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980) 4:50.
21
According to Liddell and Scott’s An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, the word “chorus” from the
Greek Choros means “band of dancers and/or dancing ground.”
22
Aquinas, “Sententia libri Politicorum” in the Supplementum to the Index thomisticus of the Opera omnia,
4:270-71.
20
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gravity of the sin. Directing ridicule at God, “is the most serious thing of all”23 while
ridicule aimed at the just is also grave because, “it prevents men from acting well”24
because the unjust desire what the just possess, namely honor. Aquinas also maintains
that when the aim of ridicule moves from a small, venial sin to target the actual person
then it becomes grave because the humanity of the person is held in “contempt and
dishonor.”25 According to Aquinas it is a mortal sin because, “ridiculing or making fun of
somebody is to belittle him to the point of dismissing his misfortunes and treating them
as a joke. This later sort of derision is a mortal sin.”26
In the first article Aquinas delves into the nature of ridicule itself. Contrary to the
objections raised in this article, ridicule is a special sin and, “is therefore something
distinct.”27 Aquinas differentiates sins according to the harm the perpetrator intends to
inflict on the other. Insults, detractions and whispers (I take “whispers” to mean gossip)
all aim at different effects. Ridicule’s aim is to “make the other blush,”28 which makes it
distinct from the other sins.
What is interesting is Aquinas’ focus on the physiological aspects of ridicule. In
answer to the first objection, that asserts that there is no difference between ridicule,
mockery, and defamation, Aquinas stresses that although mockery and ridicule have the
same aims, unlike mockery, that is done by wrinkling the nose, “ridicule is registered by
the mouth, that is to say through words and laughter.”29 This difference based in their
respective physiological delivery does not represent different species of sin. However,
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, Vol. XXXVIII (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1975), 199.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid., 197.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid., 193.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid., 193-95.
23
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both mockery and ridicule differ from defamation the way blushing differs depending on
the circumstance. As Aquinas states, “Blushing in confusion differs from losing face,
since blushing in confusion is the fear of losing face.”30 As we will come to see, these
notions of ridicule, scornful laughter, and blushing will have special significance as they
occur in the history of philosophy including Nietzsche’s, especially concerning
Zarathustra.
At Question 46 Aquinas broaches the nature of wisdom (sapientiae) and folly
(stultitia). Once again the issue is folly’s status, that is, if it is opposed to wisdom or not,
whether or not it is a sin, and if it is a species of lust. Aquinas answers in the affirmative
to all three. For our purposes the article, “Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?” is most
relevant.
Quoting Pope Saint Gregory I, Aquinas states that “the gift of wisdom [donum
sapientiae] is given to ward off folly [contra stultitiam].”31 Here wisdom is described in
terms of a gift, that is, as something that when it arrives, if it arrives, acts as a bulwark
against the sin of folly. Thus Aquinas keeps faithful the notion that wisdom is not a
mundane occurrence that happens for all but must be pursued and, if achieved, held in
high esteem.
In addition, the attunement of the senses is also at play. One who suffers from
folly appears to be dull, unmoved, pathetic and have diminished senses. As Aquinas
states, “The fool is one who is not moved [non movetur] through dullness [stuporem].”32
What is striking about Aquinas’ notion of folly is perhaps how his understanding has less
to do with our more modern understanding of folly, which is something that is done
30
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actively, that is, as something that we do or fail to do properly. For Aquinas, the human
being that is endowed with sentience and thinking appears to be engaging in folly when
they do nothing. In other words, to have these faculties that if used with a modicum of
care predispose one to at least a certain measure of wisdom, whereas if not used relegates
one to folly. “Folly implies a dull heart and blunted senses,”33 writes Aquinas.
Folly’s opposite, wisdom, savors (sapore) its status as that which can discern a
multitude of things in terms of their nuance. For an Aristotelian, such as Aquinas, what is
most savored by the wise is “discriminating taste about things and causes [rerum atque
causarum].”34 Aquinas is focused on things and causes because by doing so we can
generate knowledge and first principles. His use of “savor,” however, and the
corresponding metaphorical tasting one does, stresses Aquinas’ approach as one fit for a
human being. That is, we must use our senses first and through experience “taste” our
way to the finer things. And this is only accomplished by the wise human being whose
senses are “acute and penetrating.” Indeed, unlike the fool who remains dull and
unmoved, the wise person’s attuned senses and spirit is moved by knowledge and
principles to the unmoved mover or God. Nietzsche will think differently of folly. What
we will find is that folly is something unavoidable for the human being and as such is
connected to wisdom. In other words, many of the greatest achievements of human
beings have their roots in error and not perfection. His Zarathustra states, “For the sake of
folly, wisdom is mixed into all things!”35
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For Hegel, comedy was to be elevated to a respected status at least coequal with
tragedy and philosophy. In Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel, who focuses mainly on
Aristophanean comedy although he was intimately familiar with Shakespearean comedy
as well, places comedy in the section on religion, that is, the section that just precedes
Spirit’s pinnacle of Absolute Knowing. Here, Hegel tries to show how religion through
language attempts to shore up the various elements of a people into a common whole, or
a nation. Achieved through representation, language unites “self-consciousness and
external existence” in the form of the epic, tragedy and comedy.36
Moreover Hegel believes that comedy differs from tragedy and exceeds it.
Tragedy deals with individuals caught in a dualism, which is that of the hero who at one
time knows but does not know, that is, between that which appears and reality itself. Thus
the tension revolves around two equally justifiable positions—that of Fate (or the gods)
and the tragic hero. Tragic heroes are not able to take full measure of this knowledge and
thus are condemned to the tragic fate that awaits them.37
Comedy, on the other hand, synthesizes this duality into a higher form because it
“has, therefore, above all, the aspect that actual self-consciousness exhibits itself as the
fate of the gods.”38 Comedy allows for the actor to play a universal role and yet remain an
individual person.39 How so? Hegel’s insight revolves around the notion of subjectivity
and universality. Unlike tragedy, where the tragic subject (hero) perishes against fate, the
comic hero is aware, at some level, of a universal moral code or good as it relates to an
G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press,
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injustice of his own personal circumstance. The comic actor, however, as always focused
on its own narrow quandaries, is inept in his seeking of justice. The comic hero
perpetually fails, giving rise to comic resolutions and laughter provoking images. In this
sense, comedy provides a counterweight to fate, or the gods, by depicting the human
being in concreto, or in other words, “entangled in an actual existence.”40 If one were to
couch this phenomenon in the abstract language that Hegel utilizes in Phenomenology of
Spirit one would say that in inspired comedy the subject, although aware of some ethical
wrong, is nonetheless fully engrossed in its own particularity thus he or she fails to
account for the wider objective world including the intersubjective in which he or she is
situated thus giving rise to comedic tension. Hegel asserts that when the mask of comedy
is removed we see the Self “in its own nakedness and ordinariness.”41 Consequently
comedy achieves an honor that even tragedy did not achieve for Hegel. Comedy reveals
to self-consciousness that, “it is itself the Fate to which the secret is revealed, viz. the
truth about the essential independence of Nature.”42
Elsewhere Hegel lauds comedy, specifically Aristophanean comedy, for its ability
to disclose in its profound way the matters essential to the Athenian polis and by
extension, I would argue, to any state.43 Moreover, the laughter at the heart of
Aristophanean comedy provided a counterweight to, “reality itself in the madness of its
ruin.” This “ruin” was what Aristophanes perceived as the dissolution of the naturally
evolving state at the hands of such figures as the sophists, Euripides, and Socrates (who,
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we will see, Nietzsche also views as a philosophical nemeses), that is, figures whose
subjective reason and questioning posed a threat to the development of the objective
state. This provokes Hegel to recognize Aristophanes’ serenity in the face of such tumult:
“Of this kind of art an example is comedy as Aristophanes among the Greeks has handled
it without anger, in pure and serene joviality, in relation to the most essential spheres in
the world of his time.”44 Thus Hegel appears as the philosopher who, up to his time,
conferred the utmost respect upon comedy by recognizing its deep affinity with human
subjectivity and the relation to the external world.
Nonetheless for Hegel, comedy, like all other phenomena, falls under the
umbrella of Absolute Spirit. What this ultimately entails is that it must be understood
rationally and, as such, as moments of Spirit’s progression towards absolute knowing.45
To be sure, Nietzsche’s view is diametrically opposed to codifying tragedy and comedy
under the auspices of spirit and reason. Indeed, tragedy and comedy both exceed reason,
marking out its limit. Instead of reason, both tragedy and comedy allow for the showing
of what is terrible and absurd. Thus they arise from a place that is both pre-rational and
pre-linguistic. One might call it chaos. In Nietzschean language it is Dionysian.
In 1900, the year of Nietzsche’s death, the French philosopher Henri Bergson
attempted to distill the nature of comedy in his Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the
Comic. For Bergson, on the one hand, laughter and comedy are something irreducible to
a definition and thus represented “a living thing,” that is something “strictly human”
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possessing “a logic all its own.”46 Conversely, Bergson asserts that what is comic and
laughter provoking is a social phenomenon and as such one “must determine the utility of
its function.”47 Bergson proceeds to examine many comics and comedic devices in this
work, most notably Molière’s. The main utility of comedy, says Bergson, is its ability to
act as a corrective to the often rigid, normative structures of society. Comedy and
laughter then are seen as a sort of societal “remedy” although Bergson does not use this
word. But he is clear in stating that “Laughter is, above all, a corrective....By laughter,
society avenges itself for the liberties taken within it.”48
Then there is postmodernism. I would argue that one proceed with some caution
when speaking of Nietzsche and postmodern thought because this nexus is more complex
than often presupposed. Nietzsche is reacting in large part to Kant, Hegel, and the
tradition of German Idealism that came before him. He does so by often going back to the
ancients in order for us not to copy, but to behold and use as a springboard towards the
will to new knowledge. This locates Nietzsche on a historical fulcrum, one whose
thought looks back while also blazing new perspectives. Thus I would be reticent to call
Nietzsche, strictly speaking, a “postmodern philosopher” or even the “first postmodern
philosopher”49 as if postmodern philosophy demanded this kind of strict hierarchy and
historical positioning in the first place.
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Still, even though there are differences, there are many striking parallels between
postmodern philosophy and Nietzsche’s thought. Moreover the role that laughter and
comedy play in Nietzsche’s thought appears in many postmodern themes, especially
multiplicity. Although multiplicity will be dealt with in more detail below, especially the
chapter that deals with Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, for now we can say that
multiplicity is that which manifests itself as heterogeneity over homogeneity. To be sure,
Michel Foucault dramatically links laughter to the motivation for writing The Order of
Things, one of his earlier works of the “archeology” period. The first line reads:
This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered,
as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thought—our thought, the
thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geography—breaking up all the
ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the
wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and
threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and Other.50
Occurring in the first line in The Order of Things we see that laughter, as response to a
Chinese taxonomy listing in the literature of Jorge Luis Borges, provides the impetus for
Foucault’s own project of thinking language at the limit. Although we shall examine
Nietzsche and laughter through the lens of postmodernism in much more depth below, for
now we can say a few words about this relationship.
The postmodern philosopher Gilles Deleuze, in Nietzsche & Philosophy, offers
his evaluation of Nietzsche and comedy. Although comedy appears only once and
and the will as that which constitutes a perspective on the world. For a good discussion of Nietzsche’s
relationship to postmodernism see Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche On Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990) and Robert Solomon and Kathleen Higgins, What Nietzsche Really Said
(New York: Schocken Books, 2000).
50
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), xv.

21

laughter three times in the body of the text, nonetheless Deleuze’s pronouncements on
these are sweeping and encompass the most overarching themes in Nietzsche’s
philosophy. For example, laughter is connected to affirmation in the face of tragedy as
well as the rejection of ressentiment. Deleuze states, “In relation to Zarathustra laughter,
play and dance are affirmative powers of transmutation:...laughter transmutes suffering
into joy,...laughter, roars of laughter, affirm multiplicity and the unity of multiplicity....”51
Deleuze’s insights, along with Félix Guattari’s, will come to shape the last chapter on
Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra where we will see that laughter is a key phenomenon
if not the key phenomenon by which Zarathustra splinters previous monolithic moral
structures. He shows that they are only a perspective among many while at the same time
affirming his ties to the earth in the very presentation of the Übermensch type.
Zarathustra’s laugh, we can say at least initially, makes manifest the non-delimitable fact
of multiplicity.
The concern in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus is best characterized
as a nontraditional, non-hierarchical metaphysics. In traditional metaphysics different
elements are subordinated to one another in a relationship to an ultimate (usually
transcendent) principle such as “God” or “pure reason.” But Deleuze and Guattari’s
metaphysics is one that escapes those totalizing determinations that lie outside nature
(phusis) that would otherwise determine it. It is as if their metaphysics were a house in
which all changes and repairs that took place were done by using material from another
part of the same house. In this sense Deleuze and Guattari’s project constitutes a radical
materialism in which everything is subjected to the folds and contours of this dynamic
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system that determine all knowledge, relationships, and power structures. To achieve this,
Deleuze and Guattari describe reality in terms of assemblages that are formed through the
dynamic interplay of the plane of consistency and the plane of organization, and their
respective deterritorialization and reterritorialization. An assemblage is a natural event or
happening and as such reality is seen in terms of becoming. There is no eternal Being that
is separate from becoming. Like Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari think being as
becoming, that is, as the perpetual production of heterogeneity. One might simply say
that the only thing that remains the same is change or that there is only becoming within
pure immanence so that no unitary transcendent stands outside of this process dictating
the process.
The engine of the interplay between the plane of consistency and the plane of
organization consists in Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of absolute deterritorialization and
reterritorialization. Here any assemblage in the form of an abstract machine that has
become a concrete some-thing exists on the plane of organization with its own expression
(the play of semiotics) and content (actual things). However, the existence on the plane of
organization is never permanent in the way permanence was supposed in traditional
metaphysics as that which stood outside nature, unchanged. To exist on the plane of
organization is always to already undergo deterritorialization to the plane of consistency
through, for example, lines of flight. This dynamic describes reality in terms of becoming
in which the production of difference is the result.52
With this said, the kinship to Nietzsche is quite obvious. Deleuze and Guattari
indeed owe a great deal of homage to him. The emphasis on becoming, difference, and
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multiplicity have their roots in much of Nietzsche’s thought. To be sure there are many
differences between Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, just as there are
between Nietzsche and postmodernism in general. Nonetheless, in terms of comedy and
provocative laughter, we will see how Nietzsche’s quest to either dismantle “the old
idols” (recall Nietzsche’s hammer) or at least call into radical questioning philosophy is
very similar to the project of Deleuze and Guattari’s dismantling of traditional
metaphysics. To laugh and parody, to mimic comically as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra does,
is to begin this de(con)struction. And this laughter of deconstruction must not be
misinterpreted to mean that Zarathustra is ridiculing simply that which is different
leading to more conformity. It is a laughter of deconstruction that ridicules the kind of
philosophical stance that disavows difference and heterogeneity.
Today, many thinkers in contemporary Continental philosophy have disclosed
how comedy and laughter play a pivotal role in philosophical thought and vice versa.
Looking to retrieve and bring to light comic, laughter provoking moments in ancient
thought that have been ignored or so sedimented by this same history with worn
philosophical approaches, a few philosophers have begun to reverse this trend and mine
this thought with a comedic eye. For example, Sallis in his Being and Logos: The Way of
Platonic Dialogue, reads Plato’s Cratylus as essentially a comedy.53 The comedy
concerns the very nature of logos in terms of its relation to its parts. Logos always
harbors within it the potential to be false. In terms of the Cratylus, this potential is played
out comically as both Hermogenes and Cratylus vie over whether names are natural or
conventional, that is, whether there is a kinship between things and the names that name
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them (Cratylus) or that names are merely arbitrary (Hermogenes). In Sallis’s words,
“[T]his relation as it is brought to light through the unfolding of the comedy proves to be
such that names both serve to make things manifest and, on the other hand, are in need of
being limited by what they themselves first make manifest.”54 Socrates, who is the
mediator between Cratylus and Hermogenes, leads both these characters to affirm the
opposite of their originally stated position. In turn, the comedy that ensues revolves
around the effort to derive names from original forms, that is, the interplay, the
playfulness between these two elements.
Freydberg examines the role of comedy, laughter and philosophy in two
influential works—The Play of the Platonic Dialogues and Aristophanes & Comedy:
Aristophanes, Eros and Logos.55 In terms of Plato, Freydberg asserts that what beats at
the heart of the serious issues within the Platonic dialogues is a playfulness that does not
undermine or take away from the somber issues, but enhances them. Thus he says,
“Playfulness in Plato is never frivolous or merely decorative, but always has
philosophical content. Playfulness is aligned with measure; seriousness loosed from play
also loses its genuine philosophical bearing.”56
Freydberg examines many dialogues to demonstrate the element of playfulness
that is almost always at work in the dialogues. To cite one example, he notes that
Socrates’ daimon has traditionally been understood to signify either his conscience or a
sort of non-rational instinctive insight that serves reason and therefore is subservient to it.
However Freydberg’s hermeneutical exegesis of the texts shows that daimonion, as
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Socrates uses it, denotes one, a mythical mediator between human affairs and divine
affairs such as Diotima’s use of it in her speech to Socrates in the Symposium. It is also
used as an exclamation that signifies an excess or movement beyond what is appropriate
in the human realm such as Socrates’ exclamation, “Ō daimonie” when he addresses the
intense and irascible Thrasymachus at Republic 344d 6.57 Freydberg’s insight is that the
daimonion, as used by Socrates, is a phenomenon that allows Socrates to realize the
necessity of limit and self-questioning that opens up:
...a space within which proper measure may be sought. In the act of entering this
space, the daimonion of Socrates discloses it in its playful character. The comedy
of an instinct which restrains and of a dark flash giving birth to the light of logos
is reflected in the counterimage of tragedy, the danger of hubris against which the
daimonion at play guards by provoking mindfulness of proper measure.58
Indeed, as Freydberg shows, the daimonion constitutes that space where the tragic
activity of philosophical thinking is always coupled with a necessary play.
And as we shall see in much more depth, Nietzsche himself is aware of Plato’s
need for comedy as that which helped make his Greek existence something worth
enduring amidst the tragic turmoil of that age. Nietzsche claims that it was the works of
Aristophanes that Plato secretly found consolation in and not some other literature that
espoused transcendent or other-worldy views.
What is important for this discussion is that, for Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and others
in the philosophical tradition, we do not find comedy and laughter used in the sense that
Nietzsche will use it in his philosophy. For Nietzsche, comedy is not just another
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phenomenon to be analyzed, codified, and subsumed under some category within
philosophy. Indeed, the philosophical enterprise itself for Nietzsche is and must be
intertwined with humor. Moreover, philosophy (and surely philosophers!) can be the
cause of great laughter as Nietzsche shows when he has his sights set on their often
hermit-like behavior that betrays less than noble instincts. I will argue that this is what
sets Nietzsche’s view of comedy apart from other thinkers. Comedy or that which is
laughter provoking is one of the elements Nietzsche utilizes as part of his philosophy so
as to call into question and even dissolve the totalizing edifices that have dominated the
philosophic tradition. Even more to the point, the philosophical exercise itself, not
withstanding its seriousness, is a source of provocative laughter so that for Nietzsche,
philosophy, tragedy and comedy are kindred souls always at play.

III. Taking the Stage: Nietzsche’s Set-Up

We have seen how philosophy and comedy play into one another, how comedy
and laughter can be deeply philosophical in their own way, and how the serious affair of
philosophy can at times be comic and laughter provoking. Furthermore, we overviewed
the way comedy has appeared in the history of philosophy. Of course this is only a sketch
and one could say much more. However, it was only recently that philosophy concerned
itself with the play of the deeper layer mentioned above where both philosophy and
comedy see one in the other. The restricted image of philosophy that has all but driven
comedy and laughter from its space is exactly the image that I would like to challenge,
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and do so through the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche. It is Nietzsche who exploits this
deep alliance allowing for laughter and the whole “comedy of existence” to be displayed
within, and as part, of his philosophy. How then does Nietzsche appropriate the
phenomena of laughter and comedy? What role does it play in his thought and why?
Nietzsche is the philosopher who attempted to articulate the importance of many
phenomena that had become marginalized in the history of philosophy. For example: the
role of music is featured prominently in his thought, especially the early works; madness
is allowed a voice that had been, until Nietzsche, almost silenced by reason; and
physiology, (and not just the mind) was given prominence. To the discerning reader,
comedy and laughter come to play a significant role in his thought. Until now the role of
comedy and laughter had no doubt been relegated to a secondary status compared to the
more well known tragic dimensions of his thinking, and it is true that in terms of volume
Nietzsche speaks much more about tragedy. Nonetheless, comedy is neither superficial
for Nietzsche nor does it represent the impoverished flip side to tragedy. Instead, I argue,
it plays just as an important role and ought to have the same measure accorded tragedy.
Thus, although it may appear more latent in comparison to tragedy, comedy and laughter
constitute, along with tragedy, the same archē that form the basis for Nietzsche’s thought.
To begin to appreciate comedy and laughter it is a necessary first step to
articulate, at least in an initial way, three main concerns that will provide a thread
throughout this dissertation. The first has to do with the nature of comedy and laughter
itself. By this I simply mean that Nietzsche’s use of these phenomena are never limited to
a single understanding. To put it another way, Nietzsche’s employment of comedy and
laughter means different things at different times and almost always requires the reader to
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engage in a nuanced hermeneutical rendering of the text. So we will see that not all
laughter, for example, can simply be said to be the reaction to something amusing. In his
writings laughter takes on various textures that are themselves part of the larger matrix of
his thought. Like one who has become accustomed to enjoying the different courses of
well prepared cuisine, the recognition of these comedic textures allows for a disclosing of
what is essential in human existence.
Furthermore, comedy and laughter are not the same phenomenon hence they are
not reciprocal. Comedies must contain laughter, which is to say they should be laughter
provoking. However not all laughter is comedic. Thus one could say that where there is
comedy there will be laughter, but where there is laughter there is not necessarily
comedy. The provocative laughter Nietzsche often employs overflows any consignment
to a single concept. Laughter then (if one were relegated to Aristotelian language) would
be the genus and comedy would be a species of it. So for example, laughter can be
scornful and indeed Nietzsche is scornful on many occasions and is himself the target of
scornful laughter. Laughter can also manifest itself through discomfort, such as when one
is embarrassed or nervous. It may occur at times as part of self-deprecating humor or to
signify contempt, disinterestedness or ignorance, such as when Zarathustra first attempts
to “go down” and speak to the townspeople in the prologue of Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
There are then myriad examples that arise within his texts. Thus it remains to be seen in
Nietzsche’s writings the many different varieties of laughter as well as how they serve his
larger philosophical goals. To offer an initial remark on comedy that will be elaborated in
the first chapter, comedy represents for Nietzsche an important philosophical function
much the same way tragedy does, although its mode is different.
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Because Nietzsche’s use of laughter is varied careful attention will be focused on
its role. Thus at times it may signal the rejection of some standard as in the laughing lion
who indeed roars, but roars with laughter. Although this also will be examined in much
more detail, we can provisionally state that the lion’s laughter is the rejection of the old
morality founded on “thou shall” commandments. At other times Nietzsche’s
employment of laughter is one of deep scorn as mentioned above. Many times
Zarathustra is not understood, that is, his ideas are rejected because “there are not yet
ears” ready for such ideas, because his arrival on the scene of history is premature. Other
times laughter occurs as the initiation of a deep provocation. In this sense Nietzsche is
attempting to provoke us out of what might be our own dogmatic slumber. On the surface
it may appear at times as if Nietzsche’s use of laughter is there just to denigrate or mock.
To many readers Nietzsche is abrasive (I always recall the looks on the faces of my
undergraduate students who have read Nietzsche for the first time). However, the very
occurrence of any tension in Nietzsche with another philosopher or philosophy almost
always occurs under the guise of the utmost respect. Socrates, Jesus, even Richard
Wagner are his nemeses but they are noble enemies always possessing some elements
that Nietzsche admires, such as Socrates redemption through the art of music-making,
Christ’s courage, and in the case of Wagner an example of genius and a close, albeit
short, friendship.59 Nietzsche may target them for laughter but he does so in order to
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engage them in the agōn of ideas and values. To be engaged with Nietzsche, to have
Nietzsche laughing at you, is a sure sign of an abiding respect even though at the same
time it is one that provokes us into hopefully rethinking a particular viewpoint from a
different perspective from the one whom he is engaging. And this same respect is at play
in the very heart of a noble ethics and the rejection of ressentiment. Simply put,
Nietzsche will attempt to embrace even the scorners. And of course there are the times
when laughter occurs in certain aphorisms simply because something appears to
Nietzsche as being humorous. For example he finds Thomas Hobbes’s lack of reverence
for laughter, itself, laughter provoking stating, “In spite of that philosopher who, being a
true Englishman, tried to give laughter a bad reputation among all thoughtful people,...I
would go so far as to allow myself a rank order of philosophers based on the rank of their
laughter—right up to those who are capable of golden laughter.”60 This does not mean
laughter is without depth. Even here there are layers to be peeled back, layers in which
we almost always find ourselves staring not only into the abyss but many times a kind of
funhouse mirror61 as well.
A second concern is that the occurrence of laughter and comedy in his writing
should remain faithful to Nietzsche’s imperative that one ought to affirm life. To affirm
life is a double calling. It is, on the one hand a call, not merely to recognize, but to hold in
reverence, that is affirm life itself over and above any claims to otherworldly hopes. This
includes, better yet must include, the affirmation of the harshest suffering such as that
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envisaged by the great tragedies. On the other hand it is a call for a revaluation of all
values. To affirm even the harshest suffering on earth as the highest calling is to call into
radical questioning all previously ascribed values. In other words, to consent to this
affirmation of life one must deify this suffering, and by doing so, it is as if one is always
already engaged in the undermining of those values that see life as a problem. Laughter is
exactly that phenomena that gathers, like a bridge, the shores of “no saying” valueless
values (put succinctly, nihilism for Nietzsche) with the “yes saying” to life and the
revaluation of all values so that we may cross that bridge in affirmation of the later. In the
Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche says of this affirmation that it is a, “Saying yes to life,
even in its strangest and harshest problems; the will to life rejoicing in its own
inexhaustibility through the sacrifice of its highest types—that is what I called
Dionysian, that is the bridge…”62 Thus laughter must be seen as a nexus to Dionysian
affirmation.
The third concern has to do with Nietzsche’s notion of ressentiment, which he
treats most thoroughly in On the Genealogy of Morality. To be faithful to this idea,
nowhere can laughter occur as an inauthentic reaction to a rival. Nietzschean laughter
must always retain an authentic nobility that engages and negates but never externalizes
and resents. Nietzsche is clear on the meaning of ressentiment as an antithesis to the
affirmation of his tragic view of life when he states, “Whereas all noble morality grows
out of a triumphant saying ‘yes’ to itself, slave morality says ‘no’ on principle to
everything that is ‘outside’, ‘other’, ‘non-self’: and this ‘no’ is its creative deed.”63 The
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act of laughing, of finding humor where others often times see only seriousness or
external threats is, in part, a key to this “noble morality.” In other words, contrary to
ressentiment laughter is, to a large extent, a “yes saying.” So Nietzsche’s view of laughter
and comedy must be one that finds meaning only in its creative deed of staving off
ressentiment. Both ressentiment and the affirmation of life work together by authentically
engaging with existence that at times can be cruel. In turn this engagement centers around
a coming to grips with this cruelty that in its very destruction harbors its own Dionysian
rebirth. The human being is a bridge, a crossing, and in the very crossing resounds jollity
and affirming laughter as the “eternal comedy of existence”64 perpetually unfolds.
Of course we shall see that there are many more concerns in any evaluation of
comedy and laughter in the thought of Nietzsche. Nonetheless, I believe that the three
outlined here are crucial because they delimit an overarching framework that his thought
always remains faithful to.
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Chapter One: Nietzsche on Tragedy and Comedy—Two Masks/One God

“The writer of comedy is of the higher species, and must do more good than the other,
whether he wants to or not.”
~Nietzsche, Letter to Peter Gast 1883~

I. Nietzsche’s Tragic View of Life

What is meant by the tragic view of life that Nietzsche very much embraces? How
and why is life essentially tragic for Nietzsche? The reason these questions are relevant to
the present study is that understanding this is a necessary first step if one is to
subsequently focus on Nietzsche’s affirmation of life in light of the tragic outlook. This
affirmation often times manifests itself through his view of comedy and laughter. What
will begin to emerge is the close proximity that both tragedy and comedy often have to
one another even though they are distinct phenomena.
The work that most directly sheds light on the tragic view of life is Nietzsche’s
earliest published book, The Birth of Tragedy. However, because this dissertation will
look thoroughly at this work as it relates to comedy, I propose another aphorism from a
later work that encapsulates this view. “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable”
appears in Twilight of the Idols (1888) and, because it appears later in the Nietzsche
corpus, one can avail oneself of its content in terms of how it relates to earlier works
thereby providing a philosophical thread that winds its way through Nietzsche’s thinking.
Accordingly, because of its importance to this study I recount it in full:
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The history of an error
The true world attainable for a man whom is wise, pious, virtuous, - he lives in
it, he is it. (Oldest form of the idea, relatively coherent, simple, convincing.
Paraphrase of the proposition ‘I, Plato, am the truth.’)
The true world, unattainable for now, but promised to the man who is wise, pious,
virtuous (‘to the sinner who repents’). (Progress of the idea: it gets trickier, more
subtle, less comprehensible, - it becomes female, it becomes Christian...)
The true world, unattainable, unprovable, unpromisable, but the very thought of it
a consolation, an obligation, an imperative. (Basically the old sun but through fog
and scepticism; the idea become elusive, pale, Nordic, Königsbergian.)
The true world – unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And as unattained also
unknown. Consequently not consoling, redeeming, obligating either: how could
we have obligations to something unknown?...(Gray morning. First yawn of
reason. Cockcrow of positivism.)
The ‘true world’ – an idea that is of no further use, not even as an obligation, now an obsolete, superfluous idea, consequently a refuted idea: let’s get rid of it!
(Bright day; breakfast; return of bons sens and cheerfulness; Plato blushes in
shame; pandemonium of all free spirits.)
The true world is gone: which world is left? The illusory one, perhaps?...But no!
we got rid of the illusory world along with the true one! (Noon; moment of
shortest shadow; end of longest error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT
ZARATHUSTRA.)65
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It is clearly evident that Nietzsche is working through the history of philosophy in terms
of the devolving meaning of truth, that is, of a supersensible “true world” set opposite of
the sensible world. It is devolving because truth begins as the unconditioned or the
transcendent and as such it is unchanging. However, this world has never really been
knowable, only posited. Indeed, to be transcendent means to be beyond experience. In
this sense, from the side of experience, it is a regulative fiction. Nietzsche traces this
devolving meaning of truth, what he calls the “history of an error,” beginning with
Plato’s ideas, then the otherworldly hopes of Christianity, through Kant’s noumenal (and
therefore unknowable) thing-in-itself (Ding-an-sich) until skepticism of such knowledge
begins to hold sway.
This passage from Twilight of the Idols encapsulates what is certainly a critique of
science. It is a critique not only of science’s aims but also its method and limit, and the
possibility of science at all. If there is to be a science then its form is also called into
radical questioning. These concerns all intersect with the tragic view of knowledge
Nietzsche is emphasizing. In the collection of essays that make up the book Nietzsche,
Theories of Knowledge, and Critical Theory, Babette Babich also recognizes this
inversion stating in her superb essay, “The Culture of Science as Art”:
Nietzsche’s post-Kantian reflection on the possibility of knowledge and truth
includes an irrecusable emphasis on the ‘tragic’ limit of critique itself. Inverting
traditional readings of Kant’s critical program, Nietzsche argues that as an
articulation of the metaphysical or transcendental foundations of all science as of
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all mathematics, ‘it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science
rests.’66
In essence, Nietzsche’s tragic view is a new kind of knowledge that not only
recognizes the limits of an otherwise unrestrained optimism but embraces these limits as
well. It is a special kind of knowledge because it recognizes our limits as finite,
earthbound beings who can never hope to transcend this status. It is the coming to grips
with regulative fictions as regulative fictions by not forgetting that they are posited as
such. This call to honesty (Redlichkeit), especially in its intellectual sense, is perhaps best
stated by Nietzsche in The Gay Science and the same aphorism that Babich references
above:
In science [der Wissenschaft], convictions have no right to citizenship, as one
says with good reason: only when they decide to step down [herabzusteigen] to
the modesty of a hypothesis, a tentative experimental standpoint, a regulative
fiction [regulativen Fiktion], may they be granted admission and even a certain
value in the realm of knowledge—though always with the restriction that they
remain under police supervision, under the police of mistrust [die Polizei des
Misstrauens].67
Here Nietzsche agrees with Kant who, in the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of
Pure Reason, states that knowledge claims cannot transcend “the realm of possible
experience” even though transcendental ideas as regulative fictions are “nonetheless
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indispensably necessary.”68 Nietzsche’s critique of other thinkers often revolves around
their unwillingness to recognize that these illusions are just that, illusions, and Nietzsche
sees himself as providing the necessary “police supervision” that would keep in check
intellectual dishonesty run amok.
In addition, the impetus behind many knowledge claims that move beyond
experience reveals on many occasions the self-serving motivation behind such attempts.
And this is where Nietzsche’s criticism of Kant comes into sharp focus because although
he agrees with Kant that illusions are necessary for life, nonetheless it is Kant’s rigorous
adherence, in this case to ethical duty based on the categorical imperative, that betrays the
fact that he, as one of the most insightful thinkers, is well aware of the illusions that are at
play in philosophical thought. Again in The Twilight of the Idols he states that the
philosopher’s:
[W]hole craft involves allowing only certain truths [gewisse Wahrheiten]: namely
the ones that their craft is publicly sanctioned [die öffentliche Sanktion] to offer, –
in Kantian terms, the truths of practical reason. They know what they have to
prove; when it comes to this, they are practical, – they recognize each other by
their agreement about ‘truths’. – ‘You should not lie’ – this means: beware
[hüten], my dear philosopher, of telling the truth...69
This criticism is stinging, if for no other reason, because it targets the philosopher’s quest
for and relationship to truth. Indeed the very nature of knowledge that reveals the tragic,
truth and its presentation is called into question. But the criticisms leveled at Kant are
also at times laughter provoking such as when he weaves certain kinds of Judeo-Christian
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.,
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imagery into his account of Kant’s call to selfless duty. For example, “Nothing ruins us
more profoundly or inwardly than ‘impersonal’ duty, or any sacrifice in front of the
Moloch of abstraction. – To think that people did not sense the mortal danger posed by
Kant’s categorical imperative!”70 Or when he finds humor in the fact that the very system
Kant created that was to be universally applicable to all minds in the practical sphere was
to those very same minds incomprehensible; “Kant’s Joke. – Kant wanted to prove, in a
way that would dumbfound the whole world, that the whole world was right: that was the
secret joke of this soul. He wrote against the scholars in favour of popular prejudice, but
for scholars and not for the people.”71 In other words non-philosophers could not
understand the very system that was supposed to articulate the moral law they were to
follow! To be sure, the “joke” rests with Nietzsche in that Kant surely did not find his
practical philosophy laughter provoking. It is Nietzsche who sees both the serious and
humorous factor themselves into the presence of tragic knowledge.
However, what is perhaps more compelling is how one understands the
consequences of such a view. One might phrase the question ethically and ask, “What
ought one do in the face of such knowledge?” Although the end of the true world was
always already underway from its beginning, nonetheless Nietzsche signals its finality
when “bon sens” (good sense) returns and “Plato blushes in shame” unleashing the
“pandemonium of all free spirits.” Free spirits then are those who reject outright not only
the true world but also the illusory world that is coupled with it as well. In other words,
Nietzsche’s task is both to break free from what has been traditionally called the
Ibid., The Anti-Christ, 10/11. Moloch refers to an ancient god of the Near East that parents occasionally
sacrificed their children to. Thus a Moloch in literature refers to something that requires a costly sacrifice
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intelligible/sensible distinction and also to exploit the distinction between a “common
sense” view of the world and the philosopher’s view of the world. But secondly,
understanding the ramifications of such a position allows for the true imperative of
affirming instinctual knowledge over against the philosopher’s knowledge. Thus it is not
simply a rejection of the true world (the intelligible realm) in favor of the illusory world
(the apparent world),72 nor is it a simple inversion as if one could simply turn the
hourglass before the last grain of sand slipped through, but a denial of both as understood
in and through each other. For Nietzsche, it is only the sensible world as the sensible
world that is of most significance. This means that the sensible world exists as the only
truth and must be taken up on its own. In light of this inversion Sallis states, “what is now
required is a discourse that would double the sensible—interpret it, as it were—without
recourse to the intelligible. What is required is a discourse that would endure the loss of
the intelligible...”73 Hence Nietzsche’s poetic claim, “Noon; moment of shortest shadow;
end of longest error; high point of humanity.” The long arch of the true world as imaged
by the sun has reached its zenith casting on the sun dial “the shortest shadow.”74 One
might say, remaining faithful to Nietzsche’s imagery, that the sun as it moves on its
vaulting path through the sky is now at noon, its zenith, and thus is ready to begin sinking
into its horizon. The previous expansive shadow cast by the kind of metaphysics that
Nietzsche is calling into question—that of God and science—struggles in its twilight.
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However this horizon is one that the sun, with all its implications, no longer
forms. At this “high point of humanity” the transition occurs, one hardly discernible,
because like all transitions things are never perfectly demarcated especially if one is in
the midst of the transition itself. Hence for Nietzsche, “INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA”
(“Zarathustra begins”) or one might read it as Nietzsche has it at the end of the first
edition of The Gay Science (1882) and before Thus Spoke Zarathustra whose first book
appears a year later: “Incipit Tragoedia” (“The tragedy begins”).75 Zarathustra is the key
figure that clears and occupies this tragic spacing in history. In this regard, it is
humanity’s new undertaking as it must come to grips with and hopefully affirm its new
reality absent of the intelligible/sensible distinction that held sway for so long. Sensible
phenomena must be taken as they show themselves, that is, as they scheinen, hence
Nietzsche’s words in The Birth of Tragedy that he repeats many times, “only as an
aesthetic phenomenon [aesthetisches Phänomen] is being there [Dasein] and the world
eternally justified [gerechtfertigt].”76 What however are the implications of such a view?
First, Nietzsche’s assertion that the true world (the world of reason or the
intelligible world) no longer provides the foundation of our thinking, nor the justification
of our being there is not an epistemological claim. In other words, Nietzsche is not
rejecting this world based on epistemological grounds. He does not provide a lengthy
epistemological argument in favor of sense knowledge as opposed to a priori knowledge
(his early essay, “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” is arguably an exception as
he works through the many stages of sense experience and the language that we use to
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 195/Aphorism 342. See also Kathleen Higgins, Comic Relief: Nietzsche’s
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signify it). Indeed Nietzsche states in Human, All Too Human that the metaphysical
world, understood in its widest sense, is hardly to be disputed, that is, it surely exists.77
Instead, Nietzsche’s interest is in understanding: first, in what motivated certain thinkers
such as Plato and Kant to posit supersensible criteria and second, in how it is that the
“true world” understood in its multitude of historical senses furthered life ascending
values. In other words, what benefit does transcendent or noumenal knowledge mean
existentially for life?
Nietzsche poignantly illustrates this concern again in Human, All Too Human
when he states that, “[K]nowledge [of a metaphysical world] would be the most useless
knowledge of all knowledge: more useless even than knowledge of the chemical
composition of water must be to the sailor in danger of shipwreck”78 Thus Nietzsche is
stressing what I would call the existential invalidity of metaphysical knowledge and of
course this invalidity is a far cry from the kind of validity concerned with logic or
epistemological correspondence; life many times outstrips the metaphysical knowledge
that would otherwise hope to “correct” it. What the positing of God or any transcendent
criteria achieved, claims Nietzsche, is the allowance for a certain kind of life in which the
purveyors of that particular life were protected and allowed to thrive within that
discursive practice. But now this “true world,” which has reached its zenith, is about to
sink like the sun, descending in terms of its hegemony, leaving only the sensible world
and sensible phenomena as that which manifests itself to us as the only meaningful,
existential criteria.
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What, then, is a world given and justified only as an aesthetic phenomena? It is
world in which we are immersed in that which appears to sense. It is a world of images.
This is the meaning of an aesthetically justified life. It is a life in which appearances and
images in their manifold semblance hold sway.79 For Nietzsche, the most powerful
images, images that scheinen, come in the form of art. To be sure, art alone justifies even
the most tremendous amount of suffering that allows us to surmount pessimism and
embrace the tragic view of the world. But this is Nietzsche’s goal as Heidegger makes
clear from what he says are notes from an initial sketch of The Birth of Tragedy, “My
philosophy is an inverted Platonism: the further removed from true being, the purer, the
more beautiful, the better it is. Living in Schein as goal.”80
The implications of such a view are immense and not only because they stress the
importance of those things that have been least important in the history of philosophy.
Hence, whereas until Nietzsche’s time (with some exceptions) “truth” was always
stressed in its relationship to permanence and being, his stress is on change, becoming
and the inevitable effect of having to take up a perspective among perspectives. In other
words the “birds eye view” of truth is inverted. This new emphasis compels him to
emphatically state, “for all life rests on semblance, art, deception, prismatic effects, the
necessity of perspectivism and error.”81 And moreover, this acknowledgement of our
finite condition within becoming and the resulting effects it will have on all science
(Wissenschaft) although to many might be frightful, for Nietzsche it is far from a call to
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resignation and despair. Thus his thinking in many ways echoes David Hume’s claim that
we ought not despair but be happy within the narrow limits of our understanding.
Nietzsche’s rejection of pessimism and the “true world” and the embracing of the tragic
view is one we can celebrate through art, especially comedy, in which we image
ourselves before ourselves in “bons sens and cheerfulness.”82 In the words of William
Shakespeare, who Nietzsche very much appreciates, “All the world’s a stage, And all the
men and women merely players.”83
Keeping all of this in mind as a backdrop is critical and it is precisely why in
“How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable” and “On Truth and Lying in a NonMoral Sense” that Nietzsche’s critique of science is so poignant, not only because he
critiques the very (supposed) grounds of science itself but because of what is at stake. As
Babich has it, “The notion of ‘truth and lie’ is not a moral question but concerns the
relation between art and knowledge as it is also the relation between ancient, tragic
wisdom and modern nihilism.”84 Abandoned to ourselves, comedy as well as all inspired
art, plays a crucial role in Nietzsche’s thought. They provide a relief against the backdrop
of a philosophical history in question and they are a relief in their very expression by
helping fill the void left in the wake of nihilism.
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II. Comedy as a Response to the Tragic View

In ancient Greece yearly festivals, in honor of Dionysus, were held in which both
tragedies and comedies were performed. The Dionysia consisted of what were surely
three soul-taxing tragedies buttressed at the end by a comedy. The plays were performed
as part of a competition in which the winners were awarded a prize, usually a goat—
hence the etymology of the word “tragedy” which means “goat-song.” The word comedy
also betrays its roots in Dionysian revelry and song. In fact, the word comedy from the
Greek komodios means “singer in the revels.” What is evident from these etymological
excavations is that tragedies and comedies, with their roots in Dionysian revelry, have
close ties not only to the earth but to madness as Dionysus was the god (among other
things) of chaos and ecstatic, non-rational experience. In the preface to the second edition
to The Birth of Tragedy (1886) titled “An Attempt at Self-Criticism” Nietzsche affirms
exactly this stating:
[W]here must the origins of tragedy have lain at that time? Perhaps in desire and
delight [Lust], in strength, in overbrimming health, in an excess of plentitude? In
this case what is the meaning (in physiological terms) of that madness
[Wahnsinn]—Dionysian madness—from which both the tragic and the comic arts
emerged?....it was precisely madness which brought the greatest blessings
[die grössten Segnungen] to Hellas...85
In this sense, that is, in the historical sense of ancient Greece, Dionysian madness was the
fertile ground from which tragedy and comedy arose. If we equate this madness with
darkness, as opposed to what will later be called “the light of reason” by many
85
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Enlightenment thinkers, then madness as cruelty and lust was finally allowed a voice to
resound out of this darkness in the form of art. These non-rational beginnings resonate
quite well with Nietzsche’s view that many of the philosophical, moral, and scientific
phenomena that the moderns inherited had “origins” that were much more shadowy and
gray than the certainty of black and white transcendental absolutes.86 Indeed, Nietzsche’s
view (along with that of his friend and colleague Jacob Burckhardt) of ancient Hellas as
one that harbored a great measure of irrationality and madness was a direct challenge to
the thinking of his day where Greece was seen as an exalted state due to its rationality
and serene temperament.87 This dark origin of lust, cruelty, and madness played a double
role in that it was the source of great suffering and pessimism and yet it was the fertile
ground from which humankind could configure their beautiful semblances into art, which
allowed them to live in the face of that abysmal knowledge.
What we are concerned with here then are a number of things. First and foremost
is the manner in which comedy manifested itself out of these darker origins. To use the
phrase, “the manner in which…” is another way of asking the more essential question
pertinent to Nietzsche’s orientation: How do comedies “scheinen”? What is the particular
manner in which comedies appear as shining images? And if they are inspired comedies,
how is it that we become transfigured when we behold them? Secondly, what does the
shining of comedic images accomplish for Nietzsche and us? Why are they important
(always keeping in mind that they are as important as the shining of tragic images)?
Finally, what does Nietzsche perceive as a threat to such comedic shinings? Is there a
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saving power that can be found in the very threat that would allow the turning out of the
threat from within the danger itself? In Nietzsche’s view, there is a danger present in the
thought of Socrates and Plato’s thinking although they also harbor a saving power and
Nietzsche is quick to expose this moment in the history of philosophy. But first there is a
burst of laughter that erupts early in The Birth of Tragedy that heralds a beginning for
these very questions. This is the laughter of the Dionysian reveler Silenus.
As we saw above in the first section of this chapter, Nietzsche’s overall view can
be understood to be a tragic view. This tragic view, with its attendant loss of
traditional/historical values, can result in pessimism. This was demonstrated in the
section of a later work called “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable.” In The
Birth of Tragedy pessimism is given a different configuration and a different voice. Here
the pessimism that is to be overcome through art—preferably through tragedy and
comedy—is given through myth, specifically the image of Silenus. This myth is
important to Nietzsche because in this earlier work he is concerned with how the ancient
Greeks were able to maintain a cheerfulness in the face of their sufferings. This was not
so that us moderns could then copy the Greeks. Nietzsche of course does not want us to
return to an origin in order to copy what has already manifested itself in time as he makes
clear in the Untimely Meditations essay, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for
Life.” Instead, the eternal return of chaos demands that we compose our own desires and
will them into new forms. Thus it is to be used as an example that inspires us and drives
on toward future goals under the guise of our own inspired creations. So, what does
Nietzsche’s inclusion of the Silenus myth tell us not only about the Greeks but ourselves?
And how does art, including comedy, help to overcome this unsettling image?
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A follower and reveler of Dionysus, Silenus was hunted by King Midas who was
finally able to confront him. King Midas demanded that Silenus tell him what is best for
human beings, that is, demanded that Silenus divulge his wisdom:
Stiff and unmoving, the daemon remains silent until, forced by the King to speak,
he finally breaks out in shrill laughter [gellem Lachen] and says: ‘Wretched,
ephemeral race, children of chance and tribulation, why do you force me to tell
you the very thing which it would be most profitable for you not to hear? The
very best thing is utterly beyond your reach: not to have been born, not to be
[nicht zu sein], to be nothing [nichts zu sein]. However, the second best thing for
you is: to die soon.’88
What is clearly evident is the deep alliance between pessimism and laughter. This
particular laughter may not be comic to some. To the ears of modern readers, especially
of the Judeo-Christian heritage, Silenus’s laughter may even seem insulting in the sense
that to be nothing radically dismisses the possibility of otherworldly hopes. This might
lead one to the kind of pessimism Nietzsche hopes to overcome.
But Silenus’s wisdom entails much more than this since it really lies in the space
between two equally harsh options (not to mention the fact that the myth is of a time
before Christianity). On the one hand, Silenus, as an immortal follower of Dionysus, is
condemned to perpetual life. Death is not a possibility for Silenus. And to live forever
means to be subject to the terrors and horrors of existence ad infinitum. On the other
hand, as a worshipper of Dionysus, Silenus can lose himself only temporarily in drunken
excess, escaping the pangs of his own existence to which, when the wine has worn off, he
Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 23/Section 3. Nietzsche’s quote of Silenus in this myth comes from the
surviving fragment of Aristotle’s Eudemos in Plutarch’s Moralia, Consolatio ad Apollonium, Fr. 44.
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is condemned to always return. Ironically then Silenus envies the “ephemeral race” of
human beings who, as beings-toward-death, will at some point not be, and thus escaping
the fate that Silenus cannot. However, from the side of finite mortal beings such as
ourselves, our concern is also between two equally unappealing options. We can either
hope to die soon—wishing to not be born is an absurdity itself since in the very wishing
we already find ourselves born—or we must live a life full of pain and suffering, much
the same way Shakespeare’s Hamlet weighs the “slings and arrows” of being and nonbeing in his play of the same name.89 But living with the wish to die soon is to resign
oneself to the very pessimism Nietzsche seeks to overcome.
What is also notable is that the herald to this wisdom, that is, the antecedent
moment before anything is said by Silenus is a voice but one that sounds forth before
language. It is the voice of “shrill laughter.” Why laughter as the initial response to one of
the most serious questions that can be posed? Because the laughter here is one that
provokes those who hear it, jarring them out of complacency. It also signals in its very
provocation a knowledge that is at once both hard to hear yet truthful and wise. So
Silenus’s wisdom is surely provocative in the deepest sense of the word (L. provocare
“call forth, challenge,” from pro– “forth” + –vocare “to call”). It begins, before any
explanations, conceptualizations, or any discourse whatsoever with shrill laughter that
emerges from silence. To put it succinctly, laughter is what first emerges out of nothing.
If we draw the overarching inference from the wisdom that the myth of Silenus
seeks to convey it is that human beings are given over to a certain measure, indeed a great
measure, of opacity. We are never in full possession of absolute, transcendent knowledge,
on the one hand, but we are not entirely nothing, on the other. This locates us against a
89
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backdrop of abysmal nothingness as a dim light that clears the kind of space proper to a
voice that resounds from this darkness—a mortal human voice. As beings-toward-death
nothingness—one might refer to it as our diminishing finitude—is part of our
constitution. Perhaps the voice is one that laughs before it speaks in recognition of its,
that is of our, essential condition: a laughter that in its very eruption affirms this
condition. We might also say that this very opacity is the measure of us but it is an
opacity that the ancient Greeks embraced in their cheerfulness of the tragic view of life
and one that Nietzsche also finds joyful, celebratory, and like Silenus’s first intimation,
laughter provoking.
Similar to Silenus’s laughter that is antecedent to his language, Nietzsche also
stresses the importance of another phenomenon that occurs before language: music. In
section six of The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche, who is speaking of the folk song of
Archilochus, states that:
[I]n the poetry of folk song we see language straining to its limit to imitate
music [die musik nachzuahmen]...With this observation we have defined the only
possible relationship between music, word, and sound: the word, the image, the
concept seeks expression [Ausdruck] in a manner analogous to music and thereby
is subjected to the power [Gewalt] of music.90
Nietzsche’s point is that music is something primordial with an origin that arises before
concepts and linguistic constructions. Concepts and everyday language are already
symbolic in the sense that words always carry along a significance regardless of how
much meaning might be deferred. Moreover, in terms of images, they, too, are derivative.
Nietzsche claims that the images of the lyric poet strain to imitate the music that is
90
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primordial and antecedent to them. This derivative nature of language and images is
crucial to Nietzsche’s view of art. If language, concepts and images are derivative of
music, what then is music an expression of? Nietzsche, via Schopenhauer at one point,
says that it is the will of the artist, specifically the lyric poet. However, Nietzsche is
careful to point out that music “cannot possibly be Will” otherwise it would never appear
because the will “is inherently un-aesthetic [der Wille ist das an sich Unästhetische].”
Thus music only “appears as Will” and Nietzsche even goes so far as to say that “music
itself, in its absolute sovereignty, has no need at all of images and concepts but merely
tolerates them as an accompaniment.”91 This notion of music is important because it
seems to be the only phenomenon that Nietzsche equates with the Dionysian itself, or at
least its most primal expression, and thus with the tragic sense of life that he wants to
affirm.
So, to confront the pessimism of Silenus, or the meaningless of the inverted
world, the voice of Dionysus was allowed to speak or better yet, sing. How? On its own
the Dionysian is destructive without the imposition of form. Thus it is only with its
necessary coupling to another impulse that it can speak the language of tragedy and
comedy. In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche elucidates these two impulses that give rise to
these two art forms, allowing us to affirm his tragic view of life.
For Nietzsche the two elements at play are the Apollinian and Dionysian. The
Apollinian represents order and harmony. Apollo, Nietzsche says, as the sun god is the
shining one (der Scheinende). As the shining one, the Apollinian impulse allows for
images to image themselves, that is, allows for images to shine (scheinen) forth as they
are. Taken on its own, the individual Apollinian images, such as the images found in
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dreams that Nietzsche claims we take pleasure in, are part of a purely subjective
experience. They are always some individual’s dreams and therefore these beautiful
images are part of an individual subject or psyche. Hence, Nietzsche refers to this
phenomenon as the principium individuationis.
It may also mean the kind of images one has while daydreaming. For example,
Martin Luther King’s “I have a dream” speech in which he brings to light the image of a
multi-racial, peaceful coexistence where everyone has a voice that will be heard. In
essence then, the Apollinian impulse allows for a parade of beautiful semblance to
showcase itself doubly before the individual eye and the “I” as ego. However, in terms of
tragedy the Apollinian plays another role, one that allows for other, more monstrous
images to “burst forth from nature.” What bursts forth and attempts to overflow anything
that would hope to contain it is the Dionysian.
Dionysus, unlike Apollo, is the god of intoxication and disorder, of wine and
revelry, of sexual energy and rebirth. Nietzsche makes this connection of intoxication as
an analogy of the Dionysian impulse in the first section. This impulse can be understood
in two ways. First as what it is and second by what it does or, one might say,
accomplishes. In terms of the first, one might find it problematic to denote it as an “is” at
all. The Dionysian is surely not a thing and, as we shall see in a moment, it is only an
image in a very unusual sense. Thus, as ineffable as it might be to try and posit an actual
definition of the Dionysian, nonetheless I characterize it as that which is without form or
any determinable qualities that signify it as a thing. Indeed it is that very impulse that
attempts the transgression of form, whether it be the form that subjectivity takes on due to
the particular discursive practices of the time or the illusions that constitute a particular
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culture. One might say that the Dionysian, then, is the chaos that dwells behind
appearances. That is why Nietzsche (and the ancient Greeks) set the Dionysian impulse
over and against the Apollonian, which manifests itself in individuation. To be sure,
Dionysian ecstasy requires one to be outside of oneself (ecstasy, from Greek ekstasis, ex-,
“out,” and histanai, “to stand”) in what is essentially a loss of all form. Thus in the very
experience of inspired art—and this experience is crucial because it cannot be taught or
arrived at by way of science, dialectical reasoning or logic—when one is cast under the
awe and wonder of it, the Dionysian accomplishes a displacement of the self in what
Nietzsche calls nothing less than a “contradiction.” It is a contradiction in which, “The
artist has already given up his subjectivity in the Dionysian process...Thus the ‘I’ of the
lyric poet sounds out [tönt] from the deepest abyss of being [aus dem Abgrunde des
Seins]; his ‘subjectivity’, as this concept is used by modern aestheticians, is imaginary.”92
In other words what the Dionysian accomplishes is an ecstatic excess. It exceeds all of
the qualifiers that would otherwise distinguish it as a “this” within the intuitions of space
and time as well as all such applications of pure reason or the thinking ego that exists
because it is aware of itself as an individual subject.
The meeting of these two impulses, what Nietzsche characterizes as a “duplicity”
(Duplizität),93 allow for the expression of tragic art. The Apollonian impulse, through its
yoking of the terrible Dionysian, generates the images that we call tragedy: images that
transfigure ourselves by allowing us to confront the deep abysmal truths of existence. It is
only by way of this special “yoking” that the Dionysian can be imaged at all and given
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creative form. The necessary co-existence of these two impulses is made clear by
Nietzsche who states, “And behold! Apollo could not live without Dionysos. The
‘Titanic’ and ‘barbaric’ was ultimately just as much of a necessity as the Apolline!.”94
However, tragedy is Nietzsche’s primary theme thus the question arises, “What is
comedy’s role and how does comedy achieve the same ends?”
In The Birth of Tragedy, as the crucial section seven nears its close, the image of
Silenus resurfaces as an unsettling image of pessimism that has yet to be surmounted.
This time it appears in direct relation to the saving power of tragedy and comedy as
understood through their correlates the Apollonian and Dionysian impulses. There is
always a certain polemic that revolves around both the Apollonian and Dionysian. The
tension between barbarity and culture, the individual and his/her destruction, and truth
and illusion, is always present. In addition to these types of tension, Nietzsche observes
that behind them lies a more fundamental existential imperative for the individual in the
space between resignation and action. Nietzsche’s claim is that the individual in its daily
life is immersed in the world of illusion and thus is veiled from the terrible truth of the
Dionysian. Every subject is separate from all others and from all other phenomena, such
as the state or society that constitute its particular horizon of existence. However, these
appearances are illusory and temporary. Our fragility as individuals, even within vast
civilizations, is evident with the most cursory glance at history. Perhaps best expressed in
poetry, consider Percy Bysshe Shelley’s poem, “Ozymandias” where the concluding lines
state, “Nothing beside remains. Round the decay / Of that colossal Wreck, boundless and
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bare / The lone and level sands stretch far away.”95 It is less a poem about the
archaeological statue, the king or his empire. It is poem that discloses time in its fullness
in and through the elemental stone that gives testament to it, eternity, and us as the finite
beings subject to it.
With this knowledge how does one live, or better, how can one live in the face of
all that is ephemeral and transient even though things appear as permanent? When one
undergoes the experience of Dionysian tragedy, all particular, individual boundaries
dissolve. In turn the human being experiences a unity with primordial nature that results
in what Nietzsche refers to many times as “metaphysical solace.” It is the knowledge that
behind the becoming and passing away of all appearances that constitute the good and
bad of daily living is the indestructible, abysmal truth of the continually reborn
Dionysian. Even though life is continually unstable it is still indestructible and hence
joyful.
Through the dissolution of the conscious subject, the ecstatic experience of the
Dionysian allows for a temporary reprieve from the terrors of existence. One is
withdrawn out of daily life that can often be harsh and unrewarding. After seeing into the
true nature of things, that is, after having glimpsed the Dionysian, one is tempted,
Nietzsche claims, to remain lethargic:
The reason for this is that the ecstasy [Verzückung] of the Dionysian state, in
which the usual barriers and limits of existence are destroyed, contains, for as
long as it lasts, a lethargic element [lethargisches Element] in which all personal
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experiences from the past are submerged. This gulf of oblivion [Kluft der
Vergessenheit] separates the worlds of everyday life and Dionysiac experience.96
Nietzsche’s concern is that once one has seen into and experienced the ecstasy of the
Dionysian state, in which all the particular individual barriers of daily life are dissolved,
one is tempted to remain in an inactive state of forgetfulness. Indeed the word lethargic,
from lethe “forgetfulness” and argos “idle,” encapsulates just this dynamic. Why?
Because on return to conscious daily life one becomes fully aware of the futility of
action. How could an individual possibly transform the inequities of daily life, wherever
and whatever they may be? How can a singular individual in a single lifetime, a moment,
think they can be of any effect in the long arch of history, in which great nations rise and
fall and countless multitudes of people although immersed in their historically situated
struggles, perish and are forgotten?
A fruitful detour may allow us to shed some more light on this notion of lethargy
when we look at it through an existential lens such as that found in one of Jean Paul
Sartre’s works. In arguably the most famous passage in Nausea, Roquentin is sitting on a
park bench stooped over. Underneath is a “black, knotty mass” of roots belonging to a
chestnut tree. Suddenly this image of the tangled roots facilitates a receding of everything
familiar, including the memory and language that would provide meaning. This is not a
mere episode of forgetfulness on Roquentin’s part, the kind we are all subject to on
occasion. Instead, Roquentin undergoes an epiphany about existence itself. This epiphany
is ironic in the sense that an epiphany usually means that one has come to knowledge in a
positive sense, that is, that one has gained something. But Roquentin’s new “knowledge”
about the root and existence is of a very different kind:
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And then all of a sudden, there it was, clear as day: existence had suddenly
unveiled itself. It had lost the harmless look of an abstract category: it was the
very paste of things, this root was kneaded into existence. Or rather the root, the
park gates, the bench, the sparse grass, all that had vanished: the diversity of
things, their individuality, were only an appearance, a veneer. This veneer had
melted, leaving soft, monstrous masses, all in disorder—naked in a frightful,
obscene nakedness.97
Roquentin suddenly realized that everything he believed constituted the existence of
something, such as the root of the chestnut tree, is a veneer or a deceptive facade. He
believes that essences or attributes that we attribute to a thing through language are not
necessary to the constitution of a thing. Indeed they are not real, in other words, they are
nothing. For Sartre things are only brute existence, are only there, always outstripping
any formal, abstract essence. This is why Sartre, more than once, uses the word
“obscene” to describe this aspect of existence. Things that Roquentin previously
comprehended or perceived with the dignity of their attributes—attributes that had
always proffered an “understanding” of some-thing—now only stand out in their
nakedness as obscene.
As Roquentin continues to meditate about the previous meaning (the qualities,
essences and attributes) attributed to the things around him—better yet of anything—he
further concludes what does exist does so not out of necessity but contingency. What is
here, including himself, is here by chance. Generally speaking, this presents a sharp
reversal from the Western philosophical tradition. There is no necessary being standing
outside of existence guaranteeing one’s existence. Instead, we are given over against a
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radical darkness unsupported by an Aristotelian unmoved mover, God of the Scholastics,
or the Cartesian idea of God, who is the guarantor of our reason.
The consequence of all this is that the gnarled root of the chestnut tree facilitated
a new understanding of existence for Roquentin, which he concludes is the source of his
nausea. When nausea overcomes him it really is the understanding that he is thrown into
an existence without either the implication of a necessary Being, reason, or any
antecedent or subsequent meaning whatsoever. In other words existence is, “the perfect
free gift.”98 When confronted with the reality of the meaningless of existence, that we are
only against the backdrop of nothingness, Roquentin nonetheless decides to embrace his
existence. He can, in a sense, be the canvas in which he freely brings to presence
meaning by the creation of his own essence as if to bring relief against vacuous
nothingness the way an artist brings an image to shine in stone. This idea of destruction
and nothingness is perhaps best expressed in Being and Nothingness where Sartre states,
“It is necessary then to recognize that destruction is an essentially human thing and that it
is man who destroys...But at the same time it is necessary to acknowledge that
destruction supposes a pre-judicative comprehension of nothingness as such and a
conduct in the face of nothingness.”99 Only through an acknowledgement of this play of
destruction and nothingness is being-for-itself [être-pour-soi]100 able to authentically
capitalize on its creativity and ability to impart meaning and create itself out of
nothingness.
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This meaning takes the form of artistic enjoyment (near Nausea’s conclusion
Roquentin starts to appreciate jazz) or creation. Although it is somewhat of a stretch to
suggest that Sartre and Nietzsche’s projects are the same (Nietzsche’s Übermensch surely
does not feel nausea101 for life), nonetheless Nietzsche views destruction and becoming in
much the same way stating:
The desire for destruction, for change and becoming [Das Verlangen nach
Zerstörung, Wechsel, Werden] can be the expression of an overflowing energy
pregnant with the future (my term for this is as used above and elsewhere is
‘Dionysian’); but it can also be the hatred of the ill-constituted, deprived, and
underprivileged one who destroys, and must destroy because what exists, indeed
all existence, all being [alles Sein], outrages and provokes him.102
This difference ultimately lies in the fact that whereas Sartre’s focus is on consciousness,
Nietzsche appropriates the image of Dionysus to illustrate this essentially
destructive/creative impulse in terms of the need for art as the supreme aesthetic
phenomena that justifies the world.
We can take Sartre’s account of Roquentin and his existential angst in Nausea and
draw similar parallels to Nietzsche’s Silenus and King Midas in The Birth of Tragedy.
Recall that Nietzsche is concerned about how one can avoid pessimism and remain
cheerful—as the Greeks did—in the face of what is often times a painful, sometimes
meaningless existence. Silenus is the very image of that pessimism. Recall that his
wisdom to Midas was to, “not...have been born, not to be, to be nothing. However, the
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second best thing for you is: to die soon.”103 Of course one who has been thrown into
existence and finds oneself here cannot opt to not be born or opt, existentially speaking,
to have stayed as nothing or as nothingness. The very asking of the question presupposes
one is already here, otherwise who is doing the asking? And Sartre acknowledges this
point when Roquentin thinks to himself, “to imagine nothingness you had to be there
already.”104 Much in the manner of Midas and Roquentin, we are thus confronted with
freely being here in all its angst with the overarching dilemma either of owning up to our
existence and living authentically through our own creative deeds or of succumbing to
pessimism, lethargy, or unfortunately, on some occasions, suicide. And the voice of this
angst is nothing less than the shrill laughter of the wood god, Silenus.
However there does appear to be a notable and important difference between
Sartre and Nietzsche concerning laughter and comedy. Nietzsche’s position is clear on
his appreciation of comedy, for example those of Aristophanes, the tendency even for
philosophers to appear comic at times, as well as his appreciation and use of laughter
within philosophy itself. However, Sartre appears to see little value in comedy and
laughter. Yet, if both Nietzsche and Sartre want us to live authentically and own up to our
freedom and existence, especially through creative deeds, where then lies the difference?
For Nietzsche, the appearances that make up existence, even the same ones that
Sartre details in his stories and plays, are often times humorous. For example Socrates,
who is to a large extent a serious philosophic rival to Nietzsche, also appears comedic.
Nietzsche uses these illustrations not merely to ridicule for the sake of ridicule. For
Nietzsche, the comic elements that Aristophanes exposes (discussed in detail below) are
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intertwined with the serious elements that help form the constellation and force of
history. And what Nietzsche sees as “the problem of Socrates” is, to put it succinctly, the
problem of dialectic run amok.
Additionally, Nietzsche on many occasions has Zarathustra laugh at the
existential circumstances in which he often finds himself. Of course this laughter has
many dimensions (also discussed in the section below on Thus Spoke Zarathustra) but
the point is that, for Nietzsche, something such as Sartre’s “obscene nakedness” of
existence at times demands laughter and comedy as a legitimate and even necessary
response.
For Sartre, though, the knowledge of existence in all its absurdity harbors only the
possibility of continued nausea as a counterpoint to taking up one’s freedom. In one
instance when Roquentin is meditating on the park bench about all of the appearances
around him that form the “paste” of existence he says:
Trees, night-blue pillars, the happy bubbling of a fountain, vital smells, little heatmists floating in the cold air, a red-haired man digesting on a bench: all this
somnolence, all these meals digested together, had its comic side [un aspect
vaguement comique]....Comic...no: it didn’t go as far as that, nothing that exists
can be comic [rien de ce qui existe ne peut être comique].105
This is why existence is often referred to by Sartre as a “bending” or “yielding.”106 To
laugh and see humor in existence is to relinquish or “yield” one’s freedom by permeating
the appearances that constitute existence with a comic essence. A concise illustration of
this occurs near the novel’s conclusion when Roquentin is musing about what he is going
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to do with the remainder of his existence. These include the mundane affairs of his
finances and his daily agenda such as whether to see a movie or take a walk. Then he
states:
I’d better think about something else, because I’m playing a comedy now [je suis
en train de me jouer la comédie]. I know very well that I don’t want to do
anything: to do something is to create existence—and there’s quite enough
existence as it is [et il y a bien assez d’existence comme ça].107
For Sartre then, comedy does not appear able to break the surface of existence and expose
any deeper profound meaning whereas for Nietzsche, existence is riddled with
appearances that constitute comedic, laughter provoking moments that allow for deep
Dionysian truths to shine forth.
Even though both philosophers, in their own respective ways, ask the subject to
create meaning in his or her existence especially through art, for Sartre comedy and
laughter play a diminished role. They succeed only in furthering nausea and lethargy
when it comes to owning up to one’s freedom. When we look at Sartre’s body of work,
especially his artistic endeavors such as novels and plays, one is hard pressed to identify
any of them as strictly comedic. And although it is uncertain whether Sartre himself finds
any of his plays to harbor comedic elements, sometimes they do elicit laughter. For
example, No Exit is understood almost exclusively as a serious existential play.
Nonetheless, the circle of sexual tension between Joseph, Inès, and Estelle appears
laughter provoking as each character’s desire of the other is thwarted. Still, one can safely
conclude that for Sartre existence is no laughing matter!
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Nietzsche prefers to use Shakespeare to elucidate the notion of lethargy and the
Dionysian state of ecstasy. He asserts, “In this sense Dionysiac man is similar to Hamlet:
both have gazed into the true essence of things, they have acquired knowledge [sie haben
erkannt] and they find action repulsive, for their actions can do nothing to change the
eternal essence of things.”108 “Knowledge,” in this sense, is not positive knowledge. It is
not the kind of grounding knowledge one acquires and subsequently acts or builds on. It
works, at least at this point, in the opposite direction. It is the knowledge of what is
abysmal and without ground.
But something more emerges in what Nietzsche sees as the danger of being
submerged in the lethargic, purely Dionysian experience. After experiencing the abysmal
truth of the Dionysian and seeing the futility of all action, Nietzsche claims that the
Dionysian man, much like his example of Hamlet, does at this point will one crucial act:
he laughs: “[T]hey regard it as laughable [lächerlich] or shameful that they should be
expected to set to rights a world so out of joint. Knowledge kills action; action requires
one to be shrouded in a veil of illusion.”109 This laughter—one that is hardly comic—is
the response of the individual who returns to the everyday now having seen and acquired
the knowledge of Dionysian truth. In these terms laughter is symbolic of a deep futility,
one that stultifies the action of a finite individual in the vast expanse of time. Thus we see
that the Dionysian is not only dangerous, in itself, as something experienced. Indeed, to
experience the Dionysian would be to undergo one’s own destruction either literally or in
spirit.110 This kind of laughter, then, signals a certain danger in the sense that knowledge
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of this kind presents a direct threat to action, to the very affirmation of life Nietzsche
seeks.
Once again Nietzsche returns to the image of Silenus to illustrate the danger of the
Dionysiac man’s newly acquired knowledge and the resulting wisdom claiming that,
“...now he grasps the wisdom of the wood-god Silenus: he feels revulsion.”111 Like
Silenus, who erupts in shrill laughter when forced to respond to King Midas about what
was best for human beings (namely to be nothing or to have never been born), the
Dionysiac man through his primordial experience grasps this wisdom in an immediate
epiphany and he too laughs. It is at this moment, Nietzsche claims, that the will of the
human being is in most danger; danger in the sense of resigning oneself to inaction and
pessimism. However, this danger, this abysmal truth also harbors a saving power as well,
in which comedy is to play an important role. In what I argue is the ultimate
pronouncement in The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche states:
Here, at this moment of supreme danger [höchsten Gefahr] for the will, art
approaches as a saving sorceress with the power to heal. Art alone can re-direct
those repulsive thoughts about the terrible or absurd nature of existence [Absurde
des Daseins] into representations [Vorstellungen] with which man can live; these
representations are the sublime, whereby the terrible is tamed by artistic means,
and the comical [Komische], whereby disgust at absurdity [des Absurden] is
discharged by artistic means.112
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There are many striking things about this passage. Most notably is Nietzsche’s inclusion
of comedy along with tragedy as means by which human beings can affirm life and avert
the succumbing of the will to the “supreme danger” of pessimism. Until this point
comedy is mentioned mostly in passing. Indeed a certain genre of comedy, the
historically later development of New Attic Comedy, is even held responsible for the
disintegration of tragedy. And this had its roots in the plays of Euripides (and Socrates as
his mentor) characterized by its pedestrian take on the affairs of the Greeks.113
Nonetheless, one is also struck by this passage because of its inclusion of comedy
along with tragedy as an artistic means to such an end even though, as mentioned above,
comedy receives much less scrutiny. For Nietzsche, one must conclude that if comedy is
the other art that achieves the same end as tragedy, then it can not be seen as the
disadvantaged flip side of tragedy. This is not to say that Nietzsche does not prize tragedy
above comedy (and the other arts) due to its serious subject matter and its deep ties with
music. Tragedy’s origin lies in the pre-cultural realm (of nature) in which the impulses
had yet to be yoked. The deepest expression of this state lied in the music of the Satyr
chorus, which is for Nietzsche the key element in any tragedy. The Satyr chorus is the
unique expression of the Dionsyian. It is only when cultural structures have manifested
themselves and civilization is well established that comedy can subsequently ridicule the
excessiveness that quite often marks it. Thus tragedy is the antecedent groundlessness in
which human beings are situated, and because of its ontological priority, is privileged.
Whereas comedy, through its ridicule and laughter, is the later phenomenon that rebukes
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those who attempt to transcend this tragic status. What is clear though, for Nietzsche, is
that great comedy stakes out its own rights in the transformative possibility of art and vie
for that that space that pessimism would otherwise haunt.. The question becomes: How
does comedy achieve this?
If we delve into this most profound passage even further, Nietzsche explains that
whereas tragic art discloses the terrible through representations of the sublime, comic art
on the other hand discloses disgust at the absurd through its artistic means. The
Apollonian and Dionysian are both in operation for each art. The Apollonian, like a
buffer between us and the Dionysian, allows for these respective arts to shine. But what
are the artistic means that comedy utilizes and what exactly does Nietzsche mean by the
absurd? At this point he does not say and his writing turns back to tragedy.
Nonetheless, what is evident is the connection Nietzsche makes between comedy
and the absurd. The German and English words for absurd are almost equivalent
(German, adj. “absurd,” n. “Absurdes”). In its modern usage absurd means “dissonant,
out of tune, foolish.” In ancient Greek there are two words used for absurd. The retrieval
of the Greek significance is relevant because it is the great comic playwright
Aristophanes that Nietzsche has foremost in mind in terms of the genius of comedy, just
as he has the ancient Greek tragedians, most notably Aeschylus, foremost in mind in
terms of tragedy.
The first word for absurd is atopos that, in its Greek sense, discloses a far more
profound meaning than its derivative, modern counterpart which usually identifies silly
behavior or bad manners incongruous within a given setting. Here atopos, especially in
its adverbial form (atopōs, “absurdly”), means “out of place.” Not simply out of place in
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the sense that “the vase seems out of place on the table,” but more significantly that the
usual, expected flow of phenomena in nature has been disturbed, even usurped to the
point that things and appearances are convoluted and confused. It is as if the illusions one
is unconsciously immersed in, although thought of as permanent, begin to fracture and
strain under the weight of something alien. In other words when familiarity withdraws
one is left dwelling in the absurd.
To help illustrate this we can locate two examples, one in Plato’s Republic and the
second in Nietzsche’s Human, All Too Human. In Plato’s Republic, in the critical section
seven on the “cave-like dwelling”114 (katageiō oikēsei spēlaiōdei), that in essence is an
image that Socrates and his interlocutors have created in the likeness of their education,
this education takes on, at least initially, an absurd hue. After Socrates has brought forth
the image of the cave-like dwelling with all of its features, Glaucon says, “It’s a strange
(atopon) image, and strange (atopous) prisoners you’re telling of.” Then, in what
Freydberg asserts are the most profound words uttered in the philosophical tradition (and
I agree), Socrates says, “They’re like us”115 (Homoious hēmin). Atopon literally means
“no place” and most commentators translate atopon as “strange” in that Glaucon’s initial
reaction to the image of education that he is in the midst of undergoing is something he
does not or can not yet recognize. In this sense, for Glaucon (and Socrates to the extent
that he recognizes his own ignorance and does not claim to know) the image is absurd,
not only for the reason just mentioned but also because education brings us up out of the
cave and onto the level where we always assume we are. Glaucon and all the prisoners
already believe themselves to be on the outside of the cave because they do not recognize
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their own ignorance. Hence for Glaucon, Socrates’ image appears, at least initially, as
absurd because everything familiar has withdrawn. Education and absurdity then are not
mutually exclusive but appear as close kin.
In Human, All Too Human Nietzsche writes that the origin of the comic lies in the
disruption of the expected flow of phenomena, that is, in what is normally expected:
If one considers that man was for many hundreds of thousands of years an animal
in the highest degree (im höchsten Grade) accessible to fear and that everything
sudden and unexpected bade him prepare to fight and perhaps die; that even later
on, indeed, in social relationships all security depended on the expected and
traditional in opinion and action (Erwarteten auf dem Herkommen in Meinung
und Thätigkeit beruhte); then one cannot be surprised if whenever something
sudden and unexpected in word and deed happens without occasioning danger or
injury man becomes wanton, passes over into the opposite of fear: the anxious
crouching creature springs up, greatly expands—man laughs (der Mensch lacht).
This transition from momentary anxiety to short-lived exuberance is called the
comic (Komische).116
Here, Nietzsche not only connects the comic to the “unexpected in word and deed” but
also to our social development over time. The comic has its roots in this disruption of the
expected flow of phenomena coupled with the temporary loss of fear, which is why he is
careful to point out that comic exuberance is “short-lived.”
The second Greek word for absurd is paralogos. Here we can derive even more
insight. Literally paralogos means that which is set apart from the logos; the logos being
the account of something that discloses what that something is. Thus paralogos means
116
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“beyond calculation, an unexpected event contrary to calculation.” Paralogos is what
outstrips reason or what occurs beyond the perceived occurrence of natural events.
Exceeding them both, what is absurd is not amenable to calculation, quantification, or a
purely rational understanding of something. As mentioned it is something akin to
madness. And since madness is related to darkness just as reason is said to relate to light,
inspired comedies arise out of this darkness clearing their own space as semblances of the
absurd and excess that we subsequently take joy in.
Depending on one’s perspective, “clearing their own space” might mean viewing
inspired comedies in Deleuzian terms as an “assemblage” that deterritorializes itself
within a culture, on a stage with the actors (literally their bodies) and production
providing the content and the dialogue and gestures providing the expression. Or, if one
were to remain strictly within the Nietzschean purview of The Birth of Tragedy, then one
might say that it is the “Titanic struggle” of the Apollonian and Dionysian impulses that
clears its own space; the Apollonian on the one hand yoking the Dionysian yet allowing it
to discharge itself in absurd, comic semblances. Regardless of one’s perspective, what is
important is that these comic representations that people take pleasure in show them a
world—their world—in absurd inverted splendor.
Nietzsche hints at this very understanding when he says of comedy in an early
lecture (1874-75) titled, “History of Greek Literature” that, “It is grandiose caricature, an
inverted world [eine verkehrte Welt], that the poet shows, sense and nonsense, reality and
impossibility in absurd confusion.”117 Thus the ancient sense of absurd is a hodgepodge,
a whirlwind of opposites in crazy confusion, a world in which the standard order of
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things has been turned upside down, that is, inverted so that nature and life appear as if
turned inside out.
Still, what begins to emerge at this point is something that exceeds a comedy
simpliciter. A deep connection between the inverted world of ancient comedy and the
inverted world as understood in “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable”
examined above in the first section of the present chapter, becomes clearly evident. An
inspired comedy’s power to affect us does not lie solely within its own parameters, that
is, within the production and execution of the play itself. Its images of excess, always
faithful to its Dionysian origins, overflow, interfacing with the world and people they are
attempting to ridicule. A comedy’s nonsense would make no sense if it did not reference
in its absurd way the wider world in which it is situated. One might agree on the level of
this as trivially true: we and our world are reflected in the amplified, ridiculous images of
comedy. However, philosophically speaking for Nietzsche, the world in which human
beings are situated (at least we moderns) is the world in which traditionally understood
truths have become (or is becoming) “a fable.” This is not trivial. It is, however,
laughingly awesome.
How? What is the connection between the laughter of inspired comedy and the
ongoing event in which the true world becomes a fable? What is it like? How ought one
characterize it, if that is even possible? It certainly is a serious matter, perhaps the most
serious of matters in that all the old points of reference that formerly grounded
understanding and the very meaning of things no longer hold sway. What is left in the
wake of such an event except an astonishing mixture of nihilism and freedom? And yet I
assert as I believe Nietzsche does, that this serious matter has at its heart, or ought to
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have at its heart, a comic playfulness. Just like Schmidt’s convincing account, in On
Germans and Other Greeks, that ancient tragedy ought to play a role in our ethical life
today, inspired comedy too ought to have its place in the pantheon of human ethical
endeavors as well because, although it celebrates our absurdity it nonetheless in a ironic
way, allows us to live nobly. Similar to the Socratic ignorance at the heart of every
human breast, comedy never leaves us unfettered from our folly.
So, if Nietzsche is correct that the essence of comedy lies in the artistic
representations by which one lives with disgust at the absurd, then what could be more
absurd than to be in the historical midst of an inversion of meaning (or what is sometimes
referred to in the grandiose sense as the end of metaphysics)? What would be more
absurd than not only to be witness to such an event, but to be here as part of the event?
Indeed this inverted world, which is perhaps the most serious philosophical matter of our
time, is the world of “sense and nonsense, reality and impossibility in absurd
confusion.”118 One need look no farther than the 20th century and its events as a perfect
example.
The Italian film La vita è bella (Life is Beautiful),119 directed by Roberto Benigni
provides us with just such an example. The film is largely autobiographical based on
Benigni’s own experiences and, in addition to directing, he plays the lead protagonist
Guido. The film, which possesses both tragic and comic elements, explores the way in
which the lead character undergoes the ordeal of fascism and National Socialism in Italy
during the Second World War. Guido, a Jew, his spouse Dora, a non-Jew, and their small
child Giosué are rounded up and sent to a concentration camp (Dora demands to go in
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order to remain with her family). After being separated by gender, Guido makes it his
daily task to protect his son as best he can from the obvious physical dangers but also
from the knowledge of the terror being perpetrated. In essence, Guido is the guardian of
his son’s own consciousness. He does so by giving the appearance that the horrific
circumstance they are in the midst of is a game. In a sense, this makes him an Apollonian
figure appearing to his son in comedic ways in order to shield him from the terror and
absurdity that surround them. Giosué, a personification of innocence, is not merely
protected by his father from physical harm but from mental or spiritual harm as well.
What becomes evident is that this protection often manifests itself through the play of the
Apollonian and Dionysian impulses, as well as a powerful mixture of tragedy and
comedy.
The film opens with the following monologue delivered by Guido’s friend, a poet.
It is an echo of Nietzsche’s philosophy discussed thus far:
This is a simple story...
but not an easy one to tell.
Like a fable, there is sorrow...
and, like a fable, it is full of wonder and happiness.
I sing what I see. Nothing gets by me.
“Here I am,” said I to chaos.
“I am your slave!” And he: “Good.”
“For what?” said I.
Free in the end, I am! What good is a caress when bliss...
this man came to possess?
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Here I am, ready.
The trains are gone, the brakes are gone.
And I can resist no more. Go, sweet Bacchus, take me.
Striking is that Benigni refers to the story he is about to relate concerning the Holocaust
as a fable. The qualities and images this fable shares with Nietzsche’s philosophical
aphorism, “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable,” resonate deeply. In the
manner of the inversion of meaning in Nietzsche’s piece examined above, Benigni’s film
showcases this inversion in terms of the Holocaust. Guido has a simple but fulfilling life
in pre-war Italy. And like the Apollonian principium individuationis, Guido daydreams
about love, family, and friendship. The horizon of his world in a small town in Italy
appears settled, stable, even eternal. But the arrival of Fascism and National Socialism
succeed in dissolving this world’s tranquility much the same way a film fades to black.
As a result, Guido and his family’s whole horizon of meaning is not just replaced or
succeeded with a different form—their world is inverted. The horizon of Apollonian
semblances that constituted Guido and his family’s peaceful world has been effaced, and
what emerges is a world in which certain human beings were considered to no longer
possess the intrinsic dignities that were ascribed to them. Instead, certain peoples were
seen as objects to be dehumanized, reified and unfortunately, murdered. This inversion
that Guido and his family find themselves immersed in, an inversion envisaged by certain
20th century political, social and philosophical forces, can be described only as nihilistic.
Thus Guido and his family are swept along in a movement from meaning to nothingness.
There is no form. “The trains are gone, the brakes are gone.” Not even their suffering has
meaning. There is only madness.
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The poet continues; “I sing what I see.” Giving himself over to chaos and
Bacchus, the poet does not present a logical account or narrative. He sings what he sees,
that is, like the flowing notes of music, the succession of beautiful appearances that
dissolve into the abysmal truth of the Dionysian are most profoundly experienced as
music. Specifically, it is musical dissonance. Widely used by Richard Wagner,
dissonance in music is music that appears to dissolve time (literally to, “differ in sound,”
from dis- “apart” + sonare “to sound”). What the poet sings is the dissolution of the
beautiful, successive appearances in time, of his time before the chaos of war, into the
timeless truth of the Dionysian primal unity (das Ur-eine). In other words, the poet’s
images sound apart from the type of subjective, conscious time in which daily life is
constituted.
The importance of music for both tragedy and comedy cannot be overstated. Both
utilized the chorus, that phenomenon that Nietzsche says was indicative of that
primordial state of nature. However, Nietzsche is clear that the “origin” of tragedy is not
in time, in the sense that it is neither a historical period for example, “the tragedies of
Sophocles in 468 BCE” nor a production itself for example, “a performance of
Shakespeare’s Hamlet by the Pittsburgh Public Theater.” Although Nietzsche does not
overtly utilize the genealogical method in The Birth of Tragedy, which will become so
prominent in later writings, premonitions of this method begin to appear such as attested
to above concerning the beginnings of tragedy that lie in desire, delight, and madness.
Tragedy along with its correlate comedy were, Nietzsche argues, at least to a large part,
what allowed the Greeks to live in the face of their cruel existence. This is why Nietzsche
refers to both music and birth in his title. The origin—and this use of origin is only done
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in a very qualified sense in that inspired tragedy and comedy does not refer to anything
like a Platonic original—is a birth out of musical dissonance that allowed the individual
to experience the very Dionysian force that would otherwise annihilate him or her. This is
precisely why Schmidt characterizes musical dissonance as “music of passage”:
True music for Nietzsche—music which, like the tragic work of art to which it
gives birth, opens up the experience of suffering—is the music of passage. And
true music, which does not give comfort to such suffering, does not plaster over
the irreconcilability at work in time, is the music of dissonance.120
And much like the poet who sings, Nietzsche declares in section three of the
preface to the second edition of The Birth of Tragedy published years later that, “It ought
to have sung, this ‘new soul,’ and not talked! What a pity it is that I did not dare to say
what I had to say at that time as a poet.”121 In other words, Nietzsche is asserting that he
should have let the Dionysian, which is essentially musical, present itself more in line
with its essential nature:122 a dissonant nature possessing the Stimmung of incompleteness
or the Unheimlich feeling of not being at home. To be sure, Nietzsche treats the
phenomenon of the Dionysian in terms of musical dissonance as well stating:
[T]his difficult, primal phenomenon of Dionysiac art can be grasped in a uniquely
intelligible and direct way in the wonderful significance of musical dissonance
[musikalischen Dissonanz]; as indeed music generally is the only thing which,
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when set alongside the world, can illustrate [geben kann] what is meant by the
justification of the world as an aesthetic phenomenon.123
Here we see a close kinship with the more modern understanding of the absurd as
“dissonant” and “out of tune,” just as the Holocaust itself was dissonant and out of tune,
especially taking into account the inherited European continent’s philosophical,
scientific, and cultural legacy.124 But how are we to understand the Holocaust in terms of
“an aesthetic phenomenon” let alone posing the question of whether or not it is
“justifiable”?
If one were to take “aesthetic phenomenon” in a very narrow sense, a sense much
more restricted than Nietzsche’s understanding, then “aesthetic” would be limited to
something that appears to sense, that is, that the subject is able to experience. In this case
“aesthetic” would be understood to meet the conditions set forth in the Critique of Pure
Reason of Immanuel Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic (space as the form of outer
intuition and time as the form of inner intuition). The Holocaust certainly was a
phenomenon that appeared to the sense experience of those who endured it. As an
historical event, it had its own time and space from which it unfolded. Those who had the
direct experience of it, if they survived, have first and foremost their memory that keeps
the event near. In posterity, we too are able to experience it even if our experience is
removed and more distant. Many of us have seen the films and photos of the atrocities,
visited museums or even concentration camps where the images are what hold us out into
this event, which is to say, into this nihilistic nightmare so that we are surrounded by its
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impact and possess its memory in this way. But is this the kind of aesthetic phenomenon
and justification Nietzsche is referring to?
Nietzsche’s understanding of “aesthetic phenomenon” is qualitatively different.
By stating that the world is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon, Nietzsche is
asking, “How are we as human, all too human, to justify a world with a tremendous
amount of suffering”? Nietzsche was not alive when the Holocaust unfolded. Nonetheless
it would surely qualify as a supreme example of the kind of suffering human beings have
endured. Nietzsche’s question is how do we come to terms with this kind of suffering?
How do we own up to it authentically? Does this happen through rationality and science?
Does one understand the full impact of the holocaust by quantifying it? For example, X
amount of Jews perished. Is the full gravity of this event felt by undertaking a
comprehensive list of the “science” that accounted for the many ways of suffering and
death? A listing of all the kinds of technē used to commit these atrocities? Undoubtedly,
seeing the Holocaust through a rational, scientific lens does play a role but it is a role that
has a limited measure and thus only extends so far as that measure allows. A full coming
to grips, if that is even possible, must be through an experience of art because it is
precisely the Dionysian that can not be measured. It is the measure—an abysmal
measure. Hence the Apollonian, Dionysian and our dissonant nature leads Schmidt to
assert their connection to Nietzsche’s pronouncement on an aesthetically justified
existence:
The dissonant nature that each of us is is too shattering to bear unadorned. But,
we find this same dissonance to be the source of our capacity to make art, to
create that which widens the realm of the bearable by means of a splendid

77

illusion. The plasticity of such a dissonant nature, its capacity to see itself in a
transfiguring mirror, is owing to the same lively dissonance which makes art
necessary if life is to be justified: ‘It is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that
existence and the world appears as justified.’ But this abysmal truth—this truth
without stable foundation, without a secure ground—would destroy us if it were
not for the Apollonian power of transfiguration which enables this elemental
Dionysian ground of the world to enter consciousness in measures that can,
almost, be grasped.125
Returning to the event of the Holocaust we see that it presents us with grotesque,
macabre images. Nietzsche’s understanding of aesthetic phenomenon justifying the
world, however, is done through the transfiguration of these terrible events through art,
especially music, tragedy and comedy. Thus it is not the Holocaust itself in concreto that
one would say is an aesthetic phenomenon in Nietzsche’s sense. It is the transfiguration
of this event through an artistic representation of it that, in turn, transforms the spectator.
This is why Nietzsche refers to an experience of tragedy as a primal contradiction—it
transfigures our suffering into joy, our individualized ego into the primal unity of all
things, and in terms of comedy, the absurd into provocative laughter.
Returning to Benigni’s film, what is perhaps the most astonishing aspect of
Benigni’s film is the comic aspect of it that is situated at the heart of this horrific event.
Guido, of course, becomes well aware of what is taking place. To help maintain his son’s
innocence, Guido presents him with purely Apollonian images meant to veil the terrors at
hand. Through mimetic representation of the guards, Guido mocks their movements and
language. When the guards charge into the prisoner’s barracks and demand a translator,
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Guido volunteers and proceeds to comically (mis)represent their words to his son and the
other captives much to their quiet amusement. At one point Guido hides his son. Looking
out at the camp courtyard from a sweatbox, Giosué watches his father mock the guards
specifically and National Socialism generally; as he is being marched away he winks at
his son and then engages in an exaggerated goosestep much to the subdued laughter of
his child. Perhaps the most astonishing example of the comic workings of the Apollonian
and Dionysian impulses occurs when Guido is carrying his son in his arms around the
camp on a foggy night. Invoking Apollonian images, some even comic, Guido soothes
his tired son:
Where are we here?
I might have taken the wrong way.
Good boy, sleep. Dream sweet dreams.
Maybe it’s only a dream!
We’re dreaming, Giosué.
Tomorrow morning Mommy will come wake us up...
and bring us two nice cups of milk and cookies.
First, we’ll eat.
Then I’ll make love to her two or three times...
if I can.
These words provide the soothing veil of Apollonian images protecting his son from what
is most terrible. Even Guido appears to calm himself as he speaks these words,
“daydreaming” about better days to come as if he were enacting his own principium
individuationis. It is at this point in the film, with his sleeping child in his arms, Guido
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rounds a corner in the midst of the fog and sees an enormous pile of emaciated dead
bodies, the gravity of what is taking place imaged grotesquely before him. The
Apollonian semblances that Guido invokes dissolve, just as life has dissolved from the
shrunken dark faces of these once unique voices, so that he comes face to face with the
Dionysian. Only the innocence and survival of his child allows Guido to take comfort in
the knowledge that joyful existence will always be reborn and come back from
destruction. Shortly thereafter Guido is killed but Giosué and Dora survive having been
shielded temporarily from the evil around him.
What will allow the young Giosué to bear what he will surely come to know as he
matures? How could one bear this? Maybe silence is what is called for,...or that calls. But
perhaps as Giosué looks back he will be able to live with the terror and knowledge of the
absurd by recollecting his father’s comic appreciation of the event. In other words, there
is hope that his spirit will not be destroyed, or to put it in the language of Dionysian
danger discussed above, he will not remain lethargic. He will be able to act because of the
comic representations of his father who showed that we are all an audience for one
another. Just as Roberto Benigni’s real father had done years earlier, this is what Giosué’s
father has hopefully accomplished for his son in the film. Indeed the closing lines of the
film more than hint at this comic appreciation:
This is my story.
This is the sacrifice my father made.
This was his gift tome.
—We won! —Yes, We won!
A thousand points to laugh like crazy about!
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We came in first! We’re taking the tank home!
We won!
For us, this art in the form of a tragic-comic film can purvey its provocative
representations in order that we live in joy and be capable at times of laughing in the face
of what is monstrous. The Holocaust is certainly not humorous, but through the eyes of
comedy there reverberates moments of laughter that defy this human catastrophe. Far
from being the permanently opposite sides of the same pole, tragedy and comedy can
maintain close proximity to one another. Indeed the pole seems to bend and their
boundaries can on occasion blur, just as the two masks of Dionysus play in their
respective ways at the concealment/unconcealment of what is abysmal.
Returning to the notion of absurdity in its Greek sense, we can begin to see in the
midst of this inversion the very movement and setting apart that which exceeds logos.
Logos in its ancient sense was that which allowed something to be made manifest through
speech. This meaning of logos126 that has now been layered and sedimented by
succeeding philosophical epochs—an account in speech, something divine, ratio, ground,
reason—has now begun to lose its hold and no longer possesses the authority at this late
stage to make manifest what it would otherwise attempt to elucidate. What is left in this
wake, what would this wake be at least initially if not atopos or paralogos? It is an event
beyond calculation and reason, and even contrary to both. To be in the midst of this
inverted world is to be in a whirlwind without ground; it is being in a world that can not
be made manifest by appeal to the old hierarchy via more metaphysico. As such, things
surely would appear strange, dissonant, and “out of place.” It would be a world of
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absurdity and even madness but also, I strongly suggest, fertile ground for humor and
comedy as well as an ethical sensibility that nurtures these elements.
Recalling what Nietzsche says is the role of art, that it “can re-direct those
repulsive thoughts about the...absurd nature of existence into representations with which
man can live,”127 comedies are what allow for just this type of discharge. Great comic
representations, like their tragic counterparts, allow human beings to comically behold
themselves amidst the absurdity they are often immersed in. The representations in great
and inspired comedies allow for a movement that distances us, perhaps only temporarily,
from the very situations that give rise to the art forms and their representations in the first
place even though we always find ourselves here, being with others as if shadows in a
cave, and always entangled in some degree in our own absurdities.
If we return once again to the passage above from the critical section seven of The
Birth of Tragedy, we see that Nietzsche is making one of his most profound points,
namely that art is that phenomenon that allows human beings not merely to endure life, to
“get through it,” but to affirm even the harshest suffering by saying “yes to life.” Art in
its deepest sense, especially in the form of music, tragedy, and comedy, allows us to
forego ressentiment: a ressentiment that aims not only at an individual or a collection of
individuals but, as Nietzsche details in the first book of On the Genealogy of Morality, at
life itself. “I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse the accusers. Let looking
away be my only negation!”128 he says in The Gay Science. The sublime and absurd
mimetic representations of art rescue the subject from resignation. Instead of a defeated
will, a resigned will, art showcases the will transfigured. It is the will “saved” and thus
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able to behold itself transformed. As Nietzsche states, the human being “is no longer an
artist, he has become a work of art [Kunstwerk geworden].”129
But this raises an interesting question, then, about the seeming contradictory
nature of tragedy and comedy and their relationship to Dionysian truth. If both, through
their respective approaches, allow for a glimpse into the terrible Dionysian abyss, then in
what way can the Dionysian be both comical and terrible at the same time? In other
words, if we are to accept prima facie that tragedy is terrible and its experience allows a
glimpse of the Dionysian, in what way is this same terribleness often laughter provoking?
Does not the logical principle of non-contradiction invalidate this claim?130 What does
Nietzsche see as comedic about what is also obviously terrible such as the Holocaust
example above? Keeping in mind the fact that Dionysus is the patron of both tragedy and
comedy, does this mean that the Dionysian suffers a rupture or, more to the point, suffers
a schism? Does the original Duplizität of the Apollonian and Dionysian undergo a further
split within the Dionysian itself? A tragi-comic split where the representations of tragedy
and the representations of comedy seem to hover between the deep primordial truth of the
Dionysian and their respective appearances as Schein?
In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche does not elaborate on this possible bifurcation.
However in an unpublished work titled “The Dionysiac World View,”131 he does
recognize and attempts to adjudicate this issue when he states:
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The sublime and the comical [das Lächerliche] are a step beyond the world of
beautiful semblance, for a contradiction is felt [Widerspruch empfunden] in both
concepts. On the other hand, they are in no sense identical with truth; they cast a
veil [Umschleierung] over truth, which, although it is more transparent than
beauty, nevertheless remains a veil.132
What actual tragic and comic presentations accomplish then is a play that occurs in what
Nietzsche refers to as a “middle world” (Mittelwelt) between the beautiful Apollonian
semblances and the monstrous truth of the Dionysian.133 It is the effect of intoxication by
which one hovers between these realms. Nietzsche stresses that as a spectator to inspired
tragic and comic art, we are witness, in the deepest sense of that word, to “Dionysiac man
as he is played. He seeks to emulate his model in the emotional upheaval of the sublime
or of laughter.”134 This play with intoxication and semblance that constitute the art form,
“saved the Greeks from clear-sighted, prophetic ecstasy and revulsion at existence—
through the work of art which embodied tragic-comical thought.”135
In philosophy especially one is quite often tempted to focus solely on the logical
validity of an argument, position or explanation, such as the one Nietzsche provides that
considers the nature of the Dionysian as it relates to the two seemingly contradictory
semblances of tragedy and comedy. Yet, in Nietzsche’s view, for something such as the
Dionysian to be thought of as both sublime and comic, that is, as both tragic and laughter
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provoking is not a failing of logic, that is, of failing in this case to apply the principle of
non-contradiction. Nor is it a failure of rationality or a short-sightedness on Nietzsche’s
part. It is the vagaries of life outstripping rational and logical approaches that would
otherwise attempt to understand and correct it.136 As Nietzsche will come to say in the
roundelay section of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “The world is deep, / And deeper than the
grasp of day. / Deep is its pain –, / Joy – deeper still than misery.”137 The “grasp of day,”
that is, daylight, the sun, the light of reason that would potentially disclose what
something is no longer provides the measure. Indeed these things are measured by that
which is both deeply painful and joyful yet beyond measure. In a word—Dionysian.
So we see that this supposed bifurcation at the heart of the Dionysian is really the
expression of the human being’s essential condition. The condition is one’s desire to
come to grips with suffering and a harsh existence by being called back to the primal
unity of the Dionysian through the sublime or comic arts that justify life. Yet in the very
undergoing of this event, one’s very individuation, like the god himself, is torn asunder.
So, it is as if this pole of the Dionysian is not constituted by opposites, that is, two
extremes occupying separate ends of the same pole, but instead the pole itself is not
fixed. It is flexible in the sense that tragedy and comedy in their autonomous ways allow
this Dionysian pole to bend so that its ends touch or at least come into close proximity
with each other within the nature of the Dionysian itself. The Apollonian impulse in the
form of tragedy and comedy allow for a play within the middle world between the
136
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terrible truth of the Dionsyian and the veil that allows us to affirm this truth and thus live
in the face of it.
In The Birth of Tragedy the transformed will, through the saving power of art, is
saved from pessimism. As we saw above Nietzsche’s overall view is characterized as a
tragic view, that is, a view in which we have only a narrow perspective on the world and
all absolutes or meta positions are called into radical questioning. And one of Nietzsche’s
goals is to affirm life through the sublimity of tragedy or the comic discharge of the
absurd in the face of this tragic view which facilitated Nietzsche’s break from the
pessimism of Schopenhauer. But Nietzsche also saw the danger to this affirmation in
another, opposite extreme. This is characterized by the overly optimistic outlook of the
Apollonian impulse that leaves the realm of art and locates itself in the satisfied, blinding
optimism of science and that which can be made intelligible. In The Birth of Tragedy this
impulse is exemplified by a singular figure named Socrates.

III. The Threat to Dionysian Affirmation: A New Daimon

Philosophers seek the truth. How “truth” is defined is surely a contentious issue
among these seekers. Nonetheless it is widely held that Socrates was one of truth’s
greatest devotees. Socrates always sought the best logos that accounted for what
something was. For example the question, “What is piety?” is examined in the
Euthyphro. Socrates implores Euthyphro to tell him, not an instance or act of piety, but
what piety is in itself. Likewise the question at the heart of the Symposium, in which the
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interlocutors partake in excessive wine drinking (although Socrates is the only one that
maintains his sobriety), is “What is love (eros)?” The question turns within the room as it
is addressed by each interlocutor and then turns “upward” with Socrates’ account of
disembodied love as it was told to him by Diotima. The great comic playwright
Aristophanes is also an interlocutor in this dialogue. His participation is humorous for a
number of reasons, including his first attempt at an account in logos, which he postpones
due to having the hiccups! It is only near the end of this dialogue when “beautiful bodied
Alcibiades” raucously enters that a descent from disembodied love to images and the
earth is restored.
For Nietzsche, Socrates is emblematic of something fateful in the history of the
West. This fate essentially revolves around the notion of instinct and its discharge.
Nietzsche argues that, prior to Socrates, most notably in the works of the great tragedians
such as Aeschylus, the instincts were given an outlet. These instincts included both those
of the individual and culture as a whole. Because the word “instinct” has been
appropriated by many academic disciplines, perhaps it is best if we always keep in mind
Nietzsche’s characterization and use the term “Dionysian.” For Nietzsche, Socrates
represents the turn away from the primordial experience of the Dionysian, especially as
experienced through tragic-comic art, towards only that which can be made intelligible.
To be sure, Nietzsche is clear about the peril the Dionysian faced in terms of this new
agōn stating, “This is the new opposition: the Dionysiac versus the Socratic, and the work
of art that once was Greek tragedy was destroyed by it.”138 To once again appropriate
Nietzsche’s characterization, we ought to say that the Dionysian impulse was all but
vanquished from the tragic-comic stage and Greek life in overwhelming favor of the
138
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Apollonian impulse, an impulse that, in its disproportion, furthered a certain naiveté
about life in general and science in particular. Hence forth Dionysian monstrousness was
no longer merely veiled by Apollonian illusion but dominated by it. There are multiple
consequences of this turn by Socrates to the intelligible and the reverberations are still
felt today. But for Nietzsche, as much as tragedy’s apparent downfall is itself tragic, it
also presents us with those laughter provoking elements that, for instance, Aristophanes
magnified with his unsurpassed comedic genius.
But caution is in order here. Nietzsche is often characterized as a Dionysian
philosopher, that is, as a philosopher who “demolishes” older worn systems in favor of
the “rebirth” or the will to new knowledge. This characterization certainly rings true and
is even carried on by certain postmodernist philosophers such as Gilles Deleuze and Félix
Guattari. Both emphasize the destruction and rebirth through the process of their absolute
deterritorialization model, and Michel Foucault’s notion of discursive practices which are
the genesis of new knowledge and power relationships. However, to say that Nietzsche is
“anti” Apollonian is false. Nietzsche’s appreciation of the Apollonian is rooted in its very
necessity. Such is Nietzsche’s pronouncement, “And behold! Apollo could not live
without Dionysos. The ‘Titanic’ and ‘barbaric’ was ultimately just as much of a necessity
as the Apolline!”139
We must always keep in mind two important things concerning Nietzsche’s view
of the Apollonian. First, as it was explained above, the Apollonian is what allows us to
live in the face of Dionysian terror. The Apollonian veil that shrouds the Dionysian is a
necessary shroud lest we resign ourselves to inaction and lethargy. In essence, we can
characterize the Apollonian as the very illusions that give rise to motion and hence
139
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action. Second, Nietzsche himself is very clear about the necessity of the Apollonian and
its yoking to the Dionysian. The Apollonian illusion, in the form of tragedy and comedy,
is the veil that human beings cast over the Dionysian in the form of beautiful semblance
(all inspired art in general), allowing for the very discharge of the terrible truths of that
deity. To use Nietzsche’s words, “the power of the epic-Apolline is so extraordinary that,
thanks to the delight in semblance and release through semblance which it imparts, it
casts a spell over even the most terrifying things before our very eyes.”140 All in all, it is
too simplistic to say that Nietzsche is exclusively Dionysian and Socrates is exclusively
Apollonian.
But what then of Nietzsche’s criticism of Socrates? This criticism that levels the
charge that the Socratic pursuit of truth is Apollonian in nature and thus dangerous to the
instincts. In what way is the Apollonian in its Socratic form a danger for Nietzsche,
always keeping in mind though, Nietzsche’s assertion that the Apollonian is a necessity
for life as well?
Socrates, too, revels in his own Apollonian illusions. These illusions revolve
around the idea that beauty and the purely intelligible share a kindred relationship.
Nietzsche’s reading of Socrates and Plato, a reading that surely can be challenged, is one
in which images, the mimetic or those things that appear on the lower part of the divided
line, as it appears at the end of Book Six of the Republic, are held in a sort of contempt.
For Nietzsche, Socrates represents a new aesthetics that replaces the kind of aesthetics
that the world (more specifically the Greek world) up until this time justified it. Instead of
an aesthetics in which the Apollonian and Dionysian were engaged in a fruitful and
perpetual agōn, each needing the other, the overbearing dialectical frenzy of Socrates
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banished the Dionysian from the Greek stage and wider culture. For Nietzsche, the result
was a new monstrousness, one that replaced the abysmal monstrousness of the Dionysian.
Nietzsche refers to this new phenomenon as “aesthetic Socratism” that he characterizes in
the following way:
We can therefore now get closer to the nature of aesthetic Socratism
[aesthetischen Sokratismus], whose supreme law runs roughly like this: ‘In order
to be beautiful [schön], everything must be reasonable [verständig]’—a
sentence formed in parallel to Socrates’ dictum that ‘Only he who knows
[Wissende] is virtuous.’141
For Nietzsche, aesthetic Socratism signifies a paradigm shift away from the beauty and
freedom of shining images as they appear, to Socratic beauty that is only beautiful when
it comes under the teleological pull of dialectic and reason. In essence, for something to
be beautiful it must first be given form and structure by its participation in the intelligible
eidē. Individual instances of beauty as that which appears to us, that which shines, plays
second fiddle to the form (eidos) they participate in. A conventional reading of Plato and
Socrates even asserts that tragedies and comedies are a copy of a copy (the mimēsis of
others and nature) and thus even more removed from not only the forms, but from images
as they are themselves.
What does this mean in terms of Nietzsche’s focus on instinct and, moreover, as
something fateful for all of Western thinking? What could it have to do with anything
comic? Until Socrates, great tragedies allowed the Dionysian impulse an outlet. The
barbaric was indeed allowed to expel itself. What was monstrous shined forth in and
through the Apollonian. With the advent of Socrates and his “tools,” such as dialectic and
141
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elenchus, the Dionysian all but disappeared into its own abyss. What dialectic, for
example, does in and through its very practice is distance oneself from the original
manifestation of shining images. When one thinks dialectically one traverses the divided
line away from an image that is manifest in space and time to the non-temporal form.
Thus both the Apollonian and Dionysian achieve their own respective respite from time
but in two wholly different ways. Whereas the Dionysian is allowed a voice in and
through music, dissonance, and tragic-comic art that dissolves individualism and
reconciles the spectator back to primal unity (das Ur-eine), the Apollonian moves in a
wholly different direction. How? To reiterate, dialectic and elenchus are deliberative and
as such they function as a movement of thought. As a consequence, thought, through its
movement, tends to withdraw us from our existential condition. This requirement of
something so strongly reflective undermines instinct that, by definition, seeks no reason
to act but simply acts on a quick, intuitive insight. In essence, this perversion of instinct
allows for one, a devaluing of sensory perception and two, an exiling and forgetting of
the Dionysian oblivion that lies at the heart of all human beings. In Daybreak Nietzsche
speaks to this devaluing when he says in aphorism 43, “The many forces that now have to
come together in the thinker”:
To abstract oneself from sensory perception (Sich dem sinnlichen Anschauen zu
entfremden), to exalt oneself to contemplation of abstraction—that was at one
time actually felt as exaltation (Erhebung gefühlt worden): we can no longer quite
enter into this feeling. To revel in pallid images of words and things, to sport with
such invisible, inaudible, impalpable beings, was, out of contempt for the
sensorily tangible (Verachtung der sinnlich tastbaren), seductive and evil world,
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felt as a life in another higher world. ‘These abstracta are certainly not seductive,
but they can offer us guidance!’—with that one lifted oneself upwards. It is not
the content of these sportings of spirituality, it is they themselves which
constituted ‘the higher life’ in the prehistoric ages of science. Hence Plato’s
admiration for dialectics (Bewunderung der Dialektik) and his enthusiastic belief
that dialectics necessarily pertained to the good, unsensory man (guten
entsinnlichten Menschen).142
Moreover, the movement to purely Apollonian images constitutes for Nietzsche a
surely pleasurable experience but one that dwells in untruth (what Nietzsche refers to in
The Birth of Tragedy as the “naive in art”143). This impulse devoid of its Dionysian
counterpart, distances us and removes us from what is otherwise terrible. For Nietzsche
this harbors its own danger to the extent that we today, with our overwhelming allegiance
to science and technology, have forgotten that the Apollonian is pure illusion. In other
words, we believe the illusions to be real. And when we forget that illusion is illusion we
dwell in naive optimism.
Nietzsche is clear about this movement to purely Apollonian form, begun with
Socrates, when he states early in The Birth of Tragedy that, “the image of Apollo must
also contain that delicate line [zarte Linie] which the dream-image may not overstep if its
effect is not to become pathological, so that, in the worst case, the semblance [der Schein]
would deceive us as if it were crude reality.”144 For Nietzsche this effect has become
pathological to the point that the play of imagination and the freedom of the image in the
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form of art to shine has been coerced into another kind of monstrosity so that “art
becomes overgrown [überwächst] with philosophical thought which forces it to cling
tightly to the trunk of dialectics. The Apolline tendency has disguised itself as logical
schematism [logischen Schematismus].”145 Dialectic is akin to a powerful opiate that not
only removes us from the pain of existence but crowns us with the good feeling that we
have arrived at all that truly counts—disembodied intelligible knowledge absent of any
sensible shining.
Nietzsche’s mention of dialectics surely means that he has Plato and Socrates in
mind and even Hegel. And although he does not explicitly refer to Kant in this passage,
nonetheless the reference to “logical schematism” indicates this crucial function as found
in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The emphasis on the logical schematism is what
allows meaning or sense to be given to the pure concepts of the understanding. Indeed,
the schematism is the nexus that bridges both sense and understanding. However, the
logical schematism is a function of the imagination that is antecedent to any meaning in
that it is the very fertile operation that is generative of any significance whatsoever and is
itself without ground.146 Kant says of the imagination that it, “is a blind but indispensable
function of the soul without which we would have no cognition whatsoever, but of which
we are conscious only very rarely.”147 Likewise, the schematism which itself is driven by
the imagination is accorded the same profound depth. Kant says of it that, “This
schematism of our understanding, i.e., its schematism regarding appearances and their
mere form, is a secret art residing in the depths of the human soul, an art whose true
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stratagems we shall hardly ever divine from nature and lay bare before ourselves.”148
Kant, who is at pains to put metaphysics on a secure footing, to lay bare the mechanisms
and functions by which the human being can say with certainty that true knowledge has
been attained betrays the fact that there lies within the “depths of the human soul”
something that is unaccountable, something abysmal and without ground from which all
being arises. This, what I would call a dark poetic source, is what led Heidegger to
declare that Kant “recoiled [zurück] in the face of this unknown root.”149 Far from a
secure foundation, the linchpin of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (indeed his other two
Critiques as well!) is something we are conscious of “only rarely” and that we “hardly
ever divine from nature.”
Nietzsche’s assertion above, recast in terms of the Apollonian and Dionysian
impulses, highlights the fact that, since the excision of the Dionysian, the overwhelming
tendency has been the emphasis on the purely uninstinctual Apollonian which has cast a
veil of naive illusion over life. The illusion that science, dialectic, reason or the
intelligible are symptoms of a certain type of life denies pessimism and the truth as
Nietzsche says in the preface to the second edition of The Birth of Tragedy. These things
however, in the end, answer to something much more fundamental. Hence Nietzsche is
clear that, “all those things which we now call culture, education, civilization must some
day appear before the judge Dionysos whom no man can deceive.”150
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For Nietzsche the consequence of such an Apollonian drive exemplified by
Socrates has not only inverted “the wisdom of instinct” and turned it against itself but he
does so under the assumption that existence can and needs to be corrected:
‘Only by instinct’: the phrase goes to the heart and centre of the Socratic
tendency. With these words Socratism condemns existing [bestehende] art and
existing ethics in equal measure; wherever it directs its probing gaze, it sees a lack
of insight and the power of delusion [Macht des Wahns], and it concludes from
this lack that what exists is inwardly wrong and objectionable. Socrates believed
that he was obliged to correct [corrigieren] existence...”151
At the heart of this “correction” was the belief that existence is ultimately understandable
and comprehensible. Unlike the Dionysian counterpart, which is truly without ground and
thus abysmal, Nietzsche’s claim is that Socrates and Plato work in the opposite direction
and revel in the Apollonian serenity that results from tracing “the thread of
causality...into the deepest abysses of being.”152 This tracing to first cause or that which is
in-itself (the eidē) represented the highest participation in truth for Socrates and Plato.
Indeed, dialectical thinking that strives for understanding the form of something was not
merely a whimsical mental exercise for Socrates. Nietzsche is quite clear that it was
meant to correct and even justify existence; an existence that for Nietzsche, needed no
correcting and the very assumption that one sees a problem with life is “in-itself” a sign
of delusion and decay. This leads Nietzsche to state in a public lecture given in 1870 at
Basel University about Socratism, “For the infinitely more profound Germanic
consciousness, Socratism appears [erscheint] as an altogether inverted world [verkehrte
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Welt].”153 Much like the inverted world of comedy that exploits the absurdity on display
within it, Socratism too is an accurate manifestation of the inverted world exhibited in
“How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable” but with the ominous consequence of
arriving at its own limit.
Consider how many times in the Platonic dialogues that dialectic led to the
successful correction of existence. Half the time? A quarter of the time? Quite the
contrary, in almost every case the eidē themselves were unattainable. Was a new and just
republic founded by Glaucon and Adeimantus after the dialogue of the same name was
written by Plato? Better still, did Plato help found a new republic when he went to
Syracuse? Was the form of piety found by Socrates and Euthyphro so that Euthyphro may
have acted wisely proffering a correction to existence? Or might we say that dialectic,
although useful, has limits and its usefulness could be in the recognition of limits. Might
not the “music-making” Socrates, which is to say the redeemed Socrates that Nietzsche
appreciates, have been “redeeming” himself all along in the Phaedo (perhaps in all of the
dialogues?) when he says what is in my view the crucial passage after all of the
arguments for the immortality of the soul are explored and after telling the myth of the
earth:
No sensible man would insist (diischurisasthai) that these things are as I have
described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is
a noble one (kalos gar ho kindunos)—that this, or something like this, is true
about our souls and their dwelling places, since the soul is evidently immortal,
and a man should repeat this to himself as if it were an incantation, which is why I
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have been prolonging my tale (mēkunō ton muthon). That is the reason why a man
should be of good cheer (tharrein chrē) about his own soul,...154
Keeping in mind Nietzsche’s penchant for risk taking it would appear here that Socrates’
very nobility lies not with his actual arguments about whether the soul is immortal or not,
which is to say their logical construct, but instead with the logos and the myth itself. The
telling of stories at the limit of logic “as if they were an incantation” is the noble act and
one whose result is cheerfulness.
The same goes for the Socratic-Apolline legacy of science. Nietzsche argues that
although science (Wissenschaft) appears to move us closer to truth, in essence science
ends up delimiting its own function. The accounts of science are no doubt impressive and
scientific advances have alleviated many human ills (and one must also keep in mind that
Nietzsche is not “anti-science”), but this impressiveness stems in part from the more and
more refined explanations of things, and hair-splitting distinctions. In the end, science
reaches its limit and the secrets to existence remain concealed from our type of being—a
human, all too human being. In Nietzsche’s words:
At present, however, science, spurred on by its powerful delusion [kräftigen
Wahne], is hurrying unstoppably to its limits, where the optimism hidden in the
essence of logic will founder and break up….logic curls up around itself at these
limits and finally bites its own tail, then a new form of knowledge breaks through,
tragic knowledge [die tragische Erkenntniss], which, simply to be endured, needs
art for shelter and as a cure [als Schutz und Heilmittel die Kunst braucht].155
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As the optimism of science flounders, as our belief in science begins to flounder, we
come to realize in the deepest sense that we need images of a different kind, we need
images of art as well as thinkers who think not merely analytically but poetically. In “The
Culture of Science as Art” Babich writes accordingly:
What Nietzsche, speaking of ‘Kant’s tragic problem,’ names ‘the tragic conflict’
is the insight that human society and culture cannot exist without art, i.e., without
the untruth or illusion of art,....It is as an artist that Nietzsche proposes a creative
recollection of the ‘poetic’ foundational task of the philosopher as ‘physician of
culture.’156
The physician of culture’s “poetic foundational task” is to think science and art together
so that science’s unrestrained optimism can be kept in check and so that both science and
art serve life. At its best science merely stares at the abyss, unable to account for it
according to its own measure. Unable to account for its own ground it is not able to grasp
the illusions, that is, the errors that arise from it even though it assumes it does. Nietzsche
recognizes this prejudice of science when he states:
We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we are able to live—by positing
(der Annahme) bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and
content; without these articles of faith (diese Glaubensartikel) no one could
endure living! But that does not prove them. Life is not an argument (Das Leben
ist kein Argument); the conditions of life might include error.157
Indeed the images that science gives us are images of “measure,” that is, some kind of
metric that quantifies and explains the world in increasing detail, whereas art revels in
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beauty and being-here within the transitory nature of time.158 Thus science at the limit
needs a relief or medicine in the form of art to be able to endure tragic knowledge. Art
allows the abyss, the Dionysian, to show itself in its unfathomable depths. This may be
why many human beings, rather than remain idle, gather themselves in theatres and
music halls to experience the actual shining and play of images that tragedy and comedy
present. For unlike science and logic, whose domain is ultimately of the intelligible, the
enjoyment of comedy lies in the demand of sense, that is, the aesthetic ability to see and
hear the spectacle “in a manifest accord”159 as Sallis says in the last chapter of his book
Stone.
The Dionysian affirmation of life through the shining of beautiful Apollonian
images impels us as Beings in the world to move, to gather and to live and laugh with the
knowledge of the tragic. Indeed the demand of sense and the need of images overflows
the poetic text, even a great poetic text. Thus lies the difference between what is said to
us in the form of a text and what shines for us—for our sense—in the space of a theater
or even in the life of intersubjectivity. This distinction is drawn by Sallis in the context of
the Shakespearean comedy A Winter’s Tale160 and he concludes by interrupting his own
reading so as to gather at the place of shining: “But now time has come to interrupt the
poetry, to release the shining from the play, turning it out and putting the text aside, going
off to the theatre.”161 This notion of going off to the theatre where images both tragic and
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comic shine is not lost on Freydberg who, in The Thought of John Sallis, notes something
very similar to Nietzsche’s conclusion in The Birth of Tragedy where Nietzsche implores
us to act on the sounding call of both gods at the limit of science and logic: “But now
follow me to the tragedy and sacrifice along with me in the temple of both deities!”162
At this point one may conclude that Nietzsche’s thought itself must fall into its
own sort of pessimism as it sees itself left behind in the wake of this Socratic-Apolline
impulse as it gains momentum in the West. However, as we shall see, Nietzsche not only
refuses pessimism and its attendant ressentiment because of the role art such as tragedy
and comedy come to play, he also comes to appreciate a comic image of Socrates as well.
This comic image that revolves around the contradiction of instinct turned against itself,
that is, instinct in a struggle with itself, surely is ripe for laughter. Nietzsche is clear about
his appreciation of Aristophanes who brings this laughter to fruition in the form of comic
images.
Moreover Nietzsche sees a Socrates who, at the end of his life, redeems himself in
the image of the “music-making Socrates.” Nietzsche’s claim is that science at its limit
needs art, especially in the form of music, “for shelter [Schutz] and as cure
[Heilmittel].”163 This epiphany occurs to the condemned Socrates as he awaits the return
of the ship from Delos. This shining image is of a Socrates redeemed; a Socrates who
welcomes back the Dionysian through his composition of Aesopian fables into a hymn to
Apollo. Here, Nietzsche facilitates his own inversion. He inverts the classic image of the
theoretical Socrates on his death-bed that the new Greek youth esteemed—an image of
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Socrates “liberated from fear of death by reasons and knowledge”164—into an image of a
cheerful Socrates who makes music, refuses ressentiment, and demands that others be
cheerful as well. Although one of the abiding characteristics about Socrates has always
been his cheerfulness, the cheerfulness here is no longer simply conditioned by
Apollonian dialectic. It is a cheerfulness that harmonizes both impulses. Freydberg
reminds us of this Socratic cheerfulness and its ties to Nietzsche’s thought when he
states:
[O]ne must quickly call to mind the most pronounced of Socratic traits: his
cheerfulness. Being given over to darkness and ignorance is the furthest thing
from being the cause of gloom and helplessness. Rather, it produces a playfulness,
even comedy in the dialogues....Nietzsche will say some two millennia later: ‘The
certain prospect of death should fill every life with a precious and fragrant drop of
cheerfulness.’165
We might say that in the very waning hours of his life a cheerful Socrates made his
acquaintance with that chaotic, dark force that he originally sought to vanquish...and to
which the hemlock returned him.

IV. Socrates, Aristophanes, and Plato’s Pillow

For Nietzsche, there was one person who was able to recognize the internal
contradiction of Socrates in its full significance indeed its abundant comedic significance.
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This person was the comic playwright Aristophanes. Remarkable is the fact that
Nietzsche does not identify him among the myriad of philosophers and philosophical
schools that evolved after Socrates that countered Socratic/Platonic thought. To be sure,
Nietzsche is (generally speaking) cautious of philosophical thought post-Socrates.
Instead, Nietzsche argues in Section Thirteen of The Birth of Tragedy that it was only
Aristophanes who was acutely aware of the negative influence Socrates, along with
Euripides, was exerting on Athenian society. This Socratic influence is described as a
“dubious enlightenment [zweifelhaften Aufklärung]” where “physical and spiritual
energies were atrophying progressively.”166 Whereas Socrates inverted instinct and
turned it against itself, Aristophanes acts on instinct and inverts the image of Socrates
into a comic laughter-provoking opposite. Socrates is no longer the truth seeker. Instead
he becomes the very essence of those he opposed. He becomes a Sophist:
It is in this tone, half outraged, half scornful, that Aristophanic comedy [die
aristophanische Komödie] usually spoke of these men [Euripides and Socrates],
to the consternation of those moderns who would gladly have abandoned
Euripides, but who could not get over their surprise that Socrates should figure in
Aristophanes’ plays as the first and leading Sophist, as the mirror and
quintessence [der Spiegel und Inbegriff] of everything the Sophists were trying
to do; the only comfort they could find was in pillorying Aristophanes himself as
a dissolute, mendacious Alcibiades of poetry.167
For Nietzsche, Aristophanes is a sort of last hero in that he is able to diagnose a declining
Athens, parodying it by way of comic representations. This of course extends to Socrates
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who, in Clouds, is comically portrayed as he was not. In other words, keeping faithful to
the notion of inversion, the image of the historical Socrates is inverted and portrayed as
its opposite. Of course the result is a comic romp that ridicules Socrates in particular and
philosophy in general. This ridicule however is far from scorn and disparagement. As
Freydberg states, “In Aristophanes, the most severe ridicule and laughter is united with
the greatest respect and honor.”168 There are many examples from this text that illustrate
this, but the following two present the most compelling instances.
First, the conventional reading of Plato (and for the most part, Nietzsche’s reading
of Plato is conventional) is that he, through the figure of Socrates, always sought the truth
and what constituted the truth was the strongest logos. Socrates demanded from his
interlocutors, as well as himself, that the strongest logos was one that accounted for the
form (eidos) of whatever phenomena was being examined—piety in the Euthyphro, love
in the Symposium, justice in the Republic and so forth. The focus was on a movement
away from the temporal, changing world of becoming to the unchanging realm of being
and the forms. Socrates’ dialectical lens was usually focused almost exclusively on the
intelligible section of the divided line as well as the visible section only as it related and
is informed by the intelligible. Far from his interest was knowledge of the natural world
(although he had nothing against such knowledge or those who pursued it).169 However,
the entrance of Socrates in Clouds has him treading the air in a basket high up in the
clouds examining just those types of natural phenomena that the historical Socrates took
no interest in, namely “meteorological things (meteōra pragmata).”170
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But Aristophanes’ comic portrayal of Socrates moves even deeper than the
inversion of the subject matter of Socrates’ interest. To effect proper knowledge of
meteorological things, Socrates says to Strepsiades, “I had to suspend my mind, to
commingle my rarefied thought with its kindred air. If I had been on the ground and from
down there contemplated what’s up here, I would have made no discoveries at all.”171 In
terms of the divided line recall that Plato and Socrates strove to understand the highest
participation in truth of something. This occurred in the top division of the line, the
intelligible, at the level of thinking and mathematics (dianoia and ta mathēmatica) and
ultimately intellection and the forms (noeisis and eidē). This, of course, was farthest
removed from the actual phenomena of sense and opinion. When one moved in thought
from empirically real things to intelligible things, one focused all the powers of thought
on the forms. In a sense, the historical Socrates suspended interest in actual things so as
to “commingle” with the intelligible forms. In other words, the historical Socrates sought
to dwell near the form of a thing, which entailed a deferral of interest in the visible
world.172
The comic genius of Aristophanes inverts this dynamic. Instead we have a
Socrates in Clouds who has physically suspended himself in the air to be nearer the
natural phenomena he wants to study. Moreover Aristophanes’ comic finesse of the word
“suspend” nudges the inversion and the comedy farther. To suspend, in Greek, is
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kremannumi, which means “to be hung up” as in “to hang up one’s shield.” Hence it
refers to the hanging up of a physical object. Aristophanes, however, plays on the absurd
yet comic notion of Socrates suspending his mind as if it is even possible to suspend a
non-physical entity such as a mind. To be sure, this is more than just a problematic
analogy. Aristophanes is at play with language that is to say giving his own comic
account in logos to showcase an inverted Socrates, a figure engaging in the kinds of
things that the historical Socrates did not.
The second example concerns the very nature of Socrates’ work at the Thinkery
(phrontistērion) versus the “work” of the historical Socrates. This comic polemic
revolves around the seeking of truth. Again, Socrates sought the best logos. The best
logos constituted the strongest logos that accounted for the essence or form of something.
However, in the Clouds we have again another comic inversion perpetrated by
Aristophanes.
When Strepsiades enters the Thinkery, Socrates asks him why he has come.
Strepsiades’ response is that he is “anxious to learn public speaking” so that he can evade
his creditors and their lawful collections. What Aristophanes has Socrates do in this
comic jaunt is precisely what the historical Socrates never did, that is, teaching
Strepsiades (or anybody else for that matter) how to make the weaker argument appear
stronger in this case so as to foil his creditors. Moreover as we know, Socrates never
accepted any monetary compensation for his philosophical endeavors. Instead he freely
engaged in philosophy in the agora. In the Thinkery, though, Socrates, like the Sophists
he distinguished himself from, received payment for instruction in how to speak well and
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be persuasive even if it meant disregard for truth.173 In essence, Aristophanes presents us
with an inverted image of Socrates that was counter-instinctual to the contemporaries of
Socrates in Athens as well as to us today as heirs of his teaching. Perhaps this is why, as
Nietzsche argues in the quote above, the moderns of that time found “comfort...in
pillorying Aristophanes.” As Athens began to embrace the dialectical reasoning of
Socrates and the supposed optimism it brought, Aristophanes was challenging them
through the shining images of his comic representations. The images were so perverse in
their portrayal as compared to the historical Socrates that one’s instinct was surely alerted
to the fact that something was unheimlich about Athens in the time of Socrates compared
to its recent past and the kind of tragedies performed at its Dionysia.
Indeed this perversion of instinct is extended directly to Plato the author of the
dialogues in which Socrates featured so prominently. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche
asserts the following:
[N]othing I know has given me a better vision [mehr hat träumen lassen] of
Plato’s secrecy and Sphinx nature than that happily preserved petit fait: under the
pillow of his deathbed they did not find a “Bible” or anything Egyptian,
Pythagorean, or Platonic—but instead, Aristophanes. How would even a Plato
have endured life [Leben ausgehalten]—a Greek life that he said No to—without
an Aristophanes!174
What Nietzsche discerns here is the necessity of Aristophanes and his comedies for Plato.
A necessity that takes the form of a fundamental need for the kind of Dionysian comic
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celebration that revels in our earthbound human condition. This deep tie between comedy
and philosophy is best rendered by Freydberg in Philosophy and Comedy:
[T]he comedies of Aristophanes serve to remind human beings of those matters
that are most fundamental to the quality of their humanity. However, unlike the
Platonic dialogues, which address these concerns through question and answer,
the comedies of Aristophanes—like the works of his colleagues in the tragic art—
bring these concerns to their audience through the vicarious experiences they
provide.175
Thus laughter provoking comedies provide for the kind of measure that reminds us that,
for as far reaching as philosophical logos may take us, Platonic logos no exception, we
are one and all bound to the earth and its shining images.
However, I argue that there is another interesting and revealing detail about this
particular passage from Beyond Good and Evil that constitutes much more than mere
semantics. Some translations, such as Judith Norman’s above, translate “mehr hat
träumen lassen” as “has given me a better vision.” Others, such as Walter Kaufmann and
the internet based, The Nietzsche Channel, translate the same as, “has caused me to
meditate.” But the word träumen denotes very strong ties to “dreaming,” or “day-dream.”
Thus although translations that utilize “vision” or “meditate” are in no way inappropriate,
Nietzsche’s use of träumen, given all the implications with the Apollonian impulse so
crucial to his thought, might best be rendered along the lines of “day-dream” such as
Marianne Cowan’s translation “has made me day-dream more...”176 With this in mind we
realize that Nietzsche is appropriating his very own Apollonian image: the soothing
Freydberg, Philosophy and Comedy, 18.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Marianne Cowan (Washington D.C.: Regnery
Gateway, 1955), 35.
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illusion of a Plato in need of earthly comedy. Perhaps this illusion temporarily veils
Nietzsche from what he views as the destructive threat that Platonism and dialectical
thinking has perpetrated on philosophical thinking.
In the last analysis, Aristophanes trained his comic eye on Socrates to present us
with his comic images of a Socrates in excess. For it was only “Aristophanes’ sure
instinct,” claims Nietzsche, that “certainly grasped things correctly.”177 And so does
Nietzsche train his eye on Socrates who he sees taking the theoretical standpoint in the
form of dialectical reasoning to an unhealthy excess but then redeems himself in the
image of the music-making Socrates by letting the Dionysian impulse presence itself in
the form of poetry and music. When we take Nietzsche’s full characterization of
Socrates, it appears as an image of eros, abundance, and fullness of life. Indeed, just as
Nietzsche hoped for a rebirth of tragic art including its comic aspects for contemporary
and future life, he locates this very possibility in the image of Socrates who undergoes his
very own Dionysian rebirth.

V. Conclusion: From The Birth of Tragedy to The Gay Science

This first section in Nietzsche’s early work, The Birth of Tragedy, provided a
stage from which his view of comedy and laughter was projected. Foremost of these was
the way in which comedy related to tragedy as well as how both are expressions of
Dionysian groundlessness (Abgrund). This was a necessary first step because Nietzsche
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seemed to be concerned almost entirely with tragedy and its role whereas comedy and
laughter appear less significant.
But we have seen that Nietzsche’s view of tragedy encompasses much more than
a play. The tragic view of the world that claims we cannot transcend our human, all too
human, status that structures Nietzsche’s philosophy. It lays bare the choice that human
beings must make in the face of tragic knowledge: we can either succumb to pessimism
and resignation or we can choose to affirm life. If we choose the later, then comedy as
well as tragedy becomes part of that ethical disposition. Comedy, though, is not only a
response or a reaction to tragic knowledge, it is also a reflection—in what can only be a
reflection—of the Dionysian abyss into which we all stare at some point.
We have also seen that comedy’s indispensability to the affirmation of life is
constituted by the manner in which comic images scheinen. To put it another way, it is
the way comic images shine forth as contrasted with images of tragedy. Comic images, as
Nietzsche says, save the will from destruction. They allow a transformation of the will by
the way in which disgust at absurdity is discharged through their particular artistic means.
Effective comedy shines forth as a vicarious image of our own experiences. It mirrors life
and the absurdities and struggles within it, although the mirror is more of a “funhouse
mirror.”178 Often times in the face of absurdity, comedy, like tragedy, lets us live and
even flourish despite the Dionysian abyss that every human being at one time or another
must confront.
Moreover comedy, in both a literal and figurative sense, allows for movement.
Just like the tragic hero who has glimpsed the abyss and gained the kind of proprietary
knowledge inherent to it, one is tempted to remain lethargic and idle. This is why both
178
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Hamlet and Silenus laugh. They recognize the futility of action. Their laughter is not
laughter directed outward and aimed at something such as the kind of trivial laughter that
happens when one sees another slip on a banana peel. This laughter signifies the
knowledge of futility and the “supreme danger of the will” as one teeters on the precipice
of resignation and despair. It is a laughter that at one time bursts outward yet its source
lies inward in that it comes from a soul that has gained the kind of monstrous knowledge
belonging to the god Dionysus.
But we also saw what Nietzsche perceived as a threat to the Dionysian impulse
and its two creative domains of tragedy and comedy. The Apollonian impulse that has
become estranged from its Dionysian adversary presents its own danger to the will in the
form of excessive optimism. Here the Apollonian no longer works in tandem with the
Dionysian so as to allow the Dionysian impulse to be given an outlet through beautiful
Apollonian images. Instead, as an isolated impulse, the Apollonian proclaims that all can
be known through science and logic. Science and logic, especially in the form of
dialectical reasoning, leads one to the serenity of intelligible knowledge as if one could
remove oneself from the confines of space, time and history. For Nietzsche, this drive to
theoretical reasoning is manifest in the person of Socrates. Embracing the purely
Apollonian illusion, Socrates accepted the illusion as real. As a consequence, ancient
Athens and Western culture have inherited this framework best seen today as the
unchallenged ascendancy of science and technological thinking. It excludes instinct and
the kind of creativity that allows us to own up to tragic knowledge and live cheerfully in
the face of that knowledge.
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Nietzsche, however, refuses to react to Socrates by way of ressentiment just as
Socrates refused the model of ressentiment against those who condemned him to death.
Instead, within Socrates’ exclusively theoretical image, Nietzsche locates a saving power.
This is the music-making Socrates that emerges in the final days before his death.
Socrates needed to make music, which is another way of saying needed to let the
boundless Dionysian manifest itself. Socrates’ music making consisted in setting to verse
the Aesopian fables that he knew. But what is also clear is that Socrates’ impulse to make
music arose from his dreams and his wanting to understand the meaning of them.
Socrates states, “The dreams were something like this: the same dream (enupnion) often
came to me in the past, now in one shape now in another, but saying the same thing:
‘Socrates’ it said, ‘make music (mousikēn poiei) and cultivate (ergazou) it.’”179 Notable is
the relationship between the Apollonian dream images and their call to make music—a
Dionysian phenomena. The very boundaries between the two appear to blur.180 What is
clear though, is that Socrates does not analyze or explain music. Nor does he interpret or
categorize music. He does not seek its form through dialectic. He brings his music out of
nothing...he creates it and cultivates it. Nietzsche’s insight of Socrates’ redemption is
similar to the insight he provides concerning Plato. Plato needed comedy, Aristophanic
comedy in particular, to affirm his “Greek life” if not to merely make it bearable.
Moreover, we also saw how instinct and intuition were truly served by
Aristophanes, the great comic playwright. Nietzsche claims Aristophanes was most
Plato, Phaedo, 60d-61b.
In addition to this distinction, Nietzsche locates another distinction in The Gay Science between our
modern view of life and the ancients’ view: “We no longer fully understand how the ancients experienced
what was most familiar and frequent—for example the day and waking. Because the ancients believed in
dreams, waking life had a different light. The same goes for the whole of life, illuminated by a light
radiated back on it from death and its significance: our ‘death’ is a completely different death....‘Truth’ was
formerly experienced differently because the lunatic could be considered its mouthpiece—which makes us
shudder and laugh.” 131-32/Aphorism 152.
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attuned to this radical shift in the life of Athens at the time, away from instinct to the
domineering methods of science and logic, which was personified in the person of
Socrates. Aristophanes’ Clouds presented us with a comic image of Socrates that
presented him as a Sophist, which is to say, presented us with Socrates as he was not
challenging the audiences and our own instinct. The laughter provoking moments that
ensue are deeply connected to the most serious philosophical issues. And these issues, for
Nietzsche, are nothing short of what he sees as the very rebirth of the Dionysian spirit
through art, including comedy.
Let it be said, then, that Nietzsche avows comedy as much as tragedy and music
as a creative Dionysian means by which we can affirm life and forego pessimism and
ressentiment. At the conclusion of the preface to the second edition of The Birth of
Tragedy, the opposition between those pessimists who seek metaphysical comfort,
especially in Christian dogma, and those who would affirm life is startlingly clear.
Moreover, the distinction turns on the very notion of one’s ability to laugh:
But it is very probable that it will end like this, that you will end like this, namely,
‘comforted’[getröstet], as it is written, despite all your training of yourselves for
what is grave and terrifying, ‘metaphysically comforted’, ending, in short, as
Romantics end, namely as Christians...No, you should first learn the art of
comfort in this world, you should learn to laugh [lachen], my young friends, if
you are really determined to remain pessimists. Perhaps then, as men who laugh
[als Lachende], you will some day send all attempts at metaphysical solace to
Hell—with metaphysics the first to go!181
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Nietzsche follows this pronouncement and ends the preface to the second edition of The
Birth of Tragedy (1886) with an extended quote from his recently written Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, which has Zarathustra extolling the virtue of laughter. The insights that
Nietzsche provided in The Birth of Tragedy also allow us to broach his further use and
appreciation of comedy and laughter in later works especially The Gay Science and Thus
Spoke Zarathustra.
Thus we take our departure and move to The Gay Science where we will see that,
far from abhorring science, Nietzsche harbors a deep, albeit cautious, appreciation of it.
But it is a science that is far from the serene, detached eye of a rational observer: the kind
of hermit-like observer that is shut off from life: “What? Do we really want to demote
existence in this way to an exercise in arithmetic and an indoor diversion for
mathematicians? Above all, one shouldn’t want to strip it of its ambiguous character.”182
For Nietzsche, science (Wissenschaft) must be a praxis where all aspects of the human
being—social, political, ethical, natural science—are brought together in a grand arena of
knowledge that seeks to enhance life, both in meaning and value. As we shall see, these
endeavors can be laughter provoking and, if intellectual honesty (Redlichkeit) is lacking,
then even ripe for that other kind of laughter: a derisive laughter that seeks to humble and
challenge. Thus Nietzsche seeks a “fröhliche Wissenschaft”—a joyful science that never
forgets the chaos that it is always attempting to order and more importantly never forgets
that our attempts to constitute order out of this chaos are often wonder provoking...and
laughter provoking.
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Chapter Two: The Gay Science or The Humorous Knowledge of Free Spirits

“And let each day be a loss to us on which we did not dance once! And let each truth be
false to us which was not greeted by one laugh!”
~Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra~

I. Beginning, Inscription, Laughter

How does Nietzsche begin what was the second and final edition of The Gay
Science?183 There is a new preface that appears before the first edition’s introductory
poems, “Joke, Cunning, and Revenge—Prelude in German Rhymes.” In short order the
new preface will announce a specific kind of comedic device that animates much of The
Gay Science as well as Thus Spoke Zarathustra—parody. But even before this proper
beginning, we have a call to cheerfulness and laughter in the form of a short epigram:
The Gay Science
(‘La gaya scienza’)
This house [Haus] is my own and here I dwell [wohne],
I’ve never aped nothing from no one
and—laugh [lachte] at each master, mark me well,
who at himself has not poked fun [ausgelacht].
Over my front door [Hausthür].

The first edition of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft was published in 1882. A later, final edition was
published in 1887 that included a preface, fifth book (“We Fearless Ones”), and an appendix of poems
(“Songs of Prince Vogelfrei”).
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An epigram of course is a short introductory statement located at the beginning of a text.
The word epigram, from the Greek epigraphein, means to “write on, inscribe.” It is a
writing into in the sense of a bringing forth or a disclosing of what is to follow in the
main body of the text. What does Nietzsche’s epigram attempt to bring forth? Laughter
and cheerfulness. These two elements are the centerpiece of the kind of knowledge or
science that Nietzsche envisions for the future, but also for those free spirits in the present
who have the ears and the stomach—quite literally the physiology—for it.
In Ecce Homo Nietzsche writes that the “concept of a gaya scienza, [is] that unity
of singer, knight, and free spirit that is distinctive of the wonderful early culture of
Provence...”184 He also signals in section one of the preface to the second edition that,
“‘Gay Science’: this signifies the saturnalia of a mind that has patiently resisted a terrible,
long pressure—patiently, severely, coldly, without yielding, but also without hope—and
is now all of a sudden attacked by hope, by hope for health, by the intoxication of
recovery.”185 With this we see that gay science will in one sense embrace the
characteristics and values of troubadours. These characteristics include music and a
nobility arising from the fact that as troubadours they were semi-nomadic and thus
wandered, as Nietzsche did most of his life, from place to place. They created their own
free verse that often celebrated the unrestrained, uncloistered life of a free spirit that had
recourse ultimately to themselves. In short, they were their own masters. This is reflected
in the line that states, “I’ve never aped nothing from no one” or one could read, “I am not
an image of anyone. I am a free spirit.”
Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, 123/The Gay Science.
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 3/Aphorism 1 of the preface to the 2nd ed. A translator’s note in this
edition states that saturnalia refers to a “Roman winter festival at which usual bonds of social order were
thrown off, social roles were reversed, etc.” For Nietzsche, this reversal of custom that happened once a
year is now to become an inspiration and experiment in how to live for the future.
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This recourse to “homelessness” both literally and figuratively is also echoed
years later. Book five “We Fearless Ones,” which was added when the second edition of
The Gay Science was published in 1887, echoes the free wandering nomadism of the
preface. Here Nietzsche reiterates his admiration for the Unheimlich and the homeless
who experience it most fully:
[I]t is to them in particular that I commend my secret wisdom [geheime
Weisheit] and gaya scienza...We children of the future—how could we be at home
in this today! We are unfavorably disposed towards all ideals that might make one
feel at home in this fragile, broken time of transition [zerbrochnen
Uebergangszeit];...we homeless ones, are something that breaks up the ice and
other all too thin ‘realities’ [Realitäten].186
To be homeless then in its greatest significance is to dwell in that time of history where
all previous values are being called into question thus elevating existence itself to a
question. If we can imagine someone, such as Nietzsche, who had no permanent address,
no permanent home then it might be possible to experience the angst and foreboding that
might accompany such an impermanence. However, this existential angst at the loss of all
previous values, of not being at home in a familiar world, also harbors its own creativity
that arises out of freedom and the will to transgression, “[W]e are delighted by all who
love, as we do, danger, war, and adventure; who refuse to compromise, to be captured, to
reconcile, to be castrated; we consider ourselves conquerors; we contemplate the
necessity for new orders as well as for a new slavery.”187
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So the use of homelessness and gaya scienza by Nietzsche is reflected in much the
same way as the free-spirited troubadours. His philosophy will not mimic any others,
including Schopenhauer whose philosophy of pessimism Nietzsche departed from in The
Birth of Tragedy. It will not appeal to transcendent originals such as Platonic forms and,
in the realm of ethics and morality it will not appeal to rigid “Thou shalt...” type of
commandments or binding imperatives. Nietzsche, in aphorism 324 in The Gay Science
titled, “In media vita,” which translates as “In mid-life,” says that for him life was not
something that was lived in order to fulfill any antecedent criteria, moral or otherwise. He
characterizes it instead as an “experiment for the knowledge-seeker,” which is a way of
saying that lived experience, especially lived bodily experience is to be oriented towards
new, future goals. Furthermore, it is characterized by a peculiar mixture, almost an
alchemy even of gaiety, laughter, war and transgression; “‘Life as a means to
knowledge’—with this principle in one’s heart, one can not only live bravely but also live
gaily and laugh gaily! And who would know how to laugh and live well who did not first
have a good understanding of war and victory?”188 This notion of war and victory has
less to do with the kind of war between states but is more a metaphor of the kind of war
that one wages with oneself, better yet, within oneself. “Gay science” will seek to reverse
old prejudices that came to dominate serious thinking until Nietzsche’s time. Well aware
of his own agenda of transgression Nietzsche states of those who hold this prejudice that:
The lovely human beast seems to lose its good mood [die gute Laune] when it
thinks well; it becomes ‘serious’! And ‘where laughter and gaiety [Lachen und
Fröhlichkeit] are found, thinking is good for nothing’—that is the prejudice of
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this serious beast against all ‘gay science’. Well then, let us prove it a
prejudice!189
Indeed, Nietzsche’s philosophy will not only refuse to imitate others, it will essentially
deconstruct—destruct—all previous values and as we shall see, laughter, comedy and
humor will play a significant role in this effort to turn homogeneity inside out so that
heterogeneity can flourish.
In terms of “saturnalia of mind,” we see once again a kind of inversion whose
locus is reflected both in actual history as well as physiology. Nietzsche seems to want to
equate gay science with a newly reborn physiology and health and a rebirth of values that
reject the “terrible, long pressure” of previous millennia and their dominant systems of
morality. Thus what becomes readily apparent in the preface to the second edition (and
even in the “Prelude in Rhymes” of the first edition) is largely constituted by Nietzsche’s
views of the body, health and sickness, indeed his own health and sickness, and its
relationship to cheerfulness, joy, lightheartedness, laughter, and humor. He even goes so
far as to extend this need for cheerfulness and good physical health and those able to
diagnose such health to all of humanity to a, “philosophical physician in the exceptional
sense of the term—someone who has set himself the task of pursuing the problem of the
total health of a people, time, race or of humanity.”190
Because Nietzsche rejects the Cartesian distinction between the soul and the body
(for Nietzsche the body and soul are not separate and the body is always privileged191)
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the philosopher can not help but to translate his physical state, especially that of illhealth, into either a healthy life affirming philosophy in which pain is transfigured into
strength, or the opposite in which the philosopher’s weakness is translated into what he
understands as dismal thought. Nietzsche carries the distinction farther by examining
what motivates philosophers of ill health:
The former [philosopher’s of weakness] need their philosophy [hat seine
Philosophie nöthig], be it as prop, a sedative, medicine, redemption, elevation, or
self-alienation; for the latter [philosopher’s of strength], it is only a beautiful
luxury [ein schöner Luxus], in the best case the voluptuousness of a
triumphant gratitude that eventually has to inscribe itself [schreiben] in cosmic
capital letters on the heaven of concepts.192
The conclusion drawn by Nietzsche is that philosophers of ill-health (and for Nietzsche
this has been the majority in history) seek to find reasons for their illness or physical
incapacity. Consequently they end up inscribing this weakness into their philosophies, or
in Nietzsche’s words, it is their “distress that philosophizes.” The reason ultimately stems
from some type of guilt that leads them to think, “I am of ill-health therefore I must be
guilty of some sort of transcendent infraction in the form of sin.” Hence they need their
philosophy to consequently find a reason for what they perceive as a painful existence.
Whereas, for Nietzsche, existence needs no justification. One of the results of the
connection between ill health and philosophy is a stifling seriousness that squashes
humor.
On the other hand the philosopher of strength, indeed the philosopher who draws
strength from their most severe pain, is the one who philosophizes, Nietzsche claims,
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with a gratitude and pride. “Only great pain is the liberator of the spirit,”193 says
Nietzsche. Thus the lived body, in a sense, becomes a beautiful experiment in which
inchoate physical states as well as pain are not given a raison d’être in “religious
cravings” or any other transcendent referent. The body and its attendant states become the
very substance of a creative, life affirming philosophy. Nietzsche even goes so far as to
assert, “this art of transfiguration just is philosophy.”194 Indeed the hermeneutical lens
that Nietzsche’s philosophy demands could show “great pain” to mean the type of
spiritual pain one undergoes because of the effacement of all the older values that gave
meaning and purpose to European culture for centuries.
Nonetheless, Nietzsche’s understanding of physiological states and the role they
play in our philosophizing allow him to maintain that:
The unconscious disguise [unbewusste Verkleidung] of physiological needs under
the cloaks of the objective, ideal, purely spiritual goes frighteningly far—and I
have asked myself often enough whether, on a grand scale, philosophy has been
no more than an interpretation of the body [Auslegung des Leibes] and a
misunderstanding of the body [Missverständniss des Leibes].195
One at this point might ask, “In what way then does laughter, humor, comedy or their
lack play a role in terms of Nietzsche’s take on our physiological states, most notably
pain and ill-health?” I believe there are two perspectives from which Nietzsche broaches
this issue.
First, in a negative sense, those who suffer from sickness both in terms of life and
physical health most often are less, if at all, humorous, at least in Nietzsche’s view. They
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do not see humor in an existence that is painful especially when the reason for that pain
often lies in what they see as their own sin and guilt. Simply put, life is no laughing
matter to them. As a consequence, the philosophies of these types of thinkers tend to see
life as a problem or as something that conceals the truth behind it and therefore
something they must strive to understand. But echoing Heraclitus, Nietzsche states that,
“One should have more respect for the bashfulness with which nature has hidden behind
riddles and iridescent uncertainties.”196 For Nietzsche, the resulting “wisdom” of these
philosophies that seek truth behind appearance is sullen and hardly joyful. Alas, these
philosophers come on the scene much too late in history when the instincts have already
atrophied and thus life itself becomes an object of reflection and analysis instead of a life
in which instinct provides its own vital kinesis. The supposed wisdom of these
philosophers—and Nietzsche sees this lineage stretching at least from Socrates to
Hegel—is a philosophy of life descending values.
Second, in a positive sense, when we are in an agōn with our own physiology and
we triumph over pain can we then find the source for a rebirth; one that ought to be
characterized by cheerfulness! The resulting philosophies of such a stance—and for
Nietzsche these are rare types—engender life ascending values. Philosophy is not used as
a crutch or a vehicle of explanation that seeks to justify life or find reasons as to why one
exists, that is, as to the meaning of existence. Philosophy becomes something contingent,
airy, always playing second fiddle to creative life itself that Nietzsche says, “means
constantly transforming all that we are into light and flame, and also all that wounds us;
we simply can do no other.”197 This idea of the transfiguration of pain into philosophy
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and the transforming of ourselves into light and flame is the creation of ourselves into
works of art. And what lies at the heart of this art as an essential property? Humor and
laughter:
[I]f we convalescents still need art, it is another kind of art [eine andere kunst]—a
mocking, light, fleeting, divinely untroubled, divinely artificial art that, like a
bright flame, blazes into an unclouded sky! Above all: an art for artists, only for
artists! In addition we will know better what is first and foremost needed for that:
cheerfulness [die Heiterkeit]—any cheerfulness [jede Heiterkeit], my friends!198
We may say that this art that Nietzsche has in mind is a cheerful play with appearance
from which he gives many examples, a few of which are examined below. This notion of
transfiguring “ourselves into light and flame,” that is, into “works of art” involves a play
of memory and forgetting of being, “good at not knowing!,” as well as a call to let the
ascendancy of appearance scheinen forth without the need to seek truth behind the
appearance. Unlike the world of being, beautiful appearances disclose themselves to us in
time. As such, they are impermanent. Yet this impermanence of becoming is exactly what
Nietzsche would have us affirm, we finite beings of “light and flame” saying “yes” to
indestructible life.
Nietzsche extends his deep appreciation of appearance as it relates to truth farther
by stating that, “Perhaps truth is a woman who has grounds for not showing her grounds?
Perhaps her name is—to speak Greek—Baubo?”199 The most notable thing about the
witch Baubo was her ability to make the goddess Demeter laugh by raising her skirt and
exposing herself. This laughter was not a response to some mundane occurrence but was
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set amidst Demeter’s own tragedy; the tragedy of the abduction of her daughter
Persephone into the underworld by Hades. Nietzsche’s appropriation of this myth once
again highlights that it is radiant appearance as truth especially in its playful sense that
can in part help constitute a joyful, humorous life. With echoes from The Birth of
Tragedy, he proceeds to specify that what is needed to live well, to overcome pessimism
as the Greeks did. One must remember, “to stop bravely at the surface, the fold, the skin;
to worship appearance, to believe in shapes, tones, words—in the whole Olympus of
appearance!”200
Hence we see that what is inscribed at the outset of this text is the need for
laughter if we are going to be artists and masters. But we must always remember that by
“master,” Nietzsche has in mind more than its denotative meaning. It is a term that has
many layers and folds. At times master can refer to a singular person, and Nietzsche’s
criticisms often take the form of humor that find their target in specific individuals. It can
also signify the totality of a historical figure’s thought, what Nietzsche refers to as
“master moralities.” But I believe Nietzsche is ultimately asking us to be able to laugh at
ourselves. Master moralities are nothing without the multitude of believers who make
them up. Therefore, Nietzsche is asking that, at times, we find humor in our investment in
these historical movements, even when we may believe them to be universal for all time
(this in itself is ripe for laughter!). In a sense Nietzsche is calling on us to master
ourselves, often through humorous examination, by interpreting our own prejudices. For
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who is not the ultimate master of oneself if not our self? Who is ultimately responsible
for one’s own mastery if not one’s self?
So laughter is Nietzsche’s first salvo that signals a danger to the old philosophical
order. However, he is quite aware that the danger works in another direction and in
another way. This is the danger that results from the collapse of previously held values.
One might say that it is the danger of nihilism or the “straying as though through an
infinite nothing?”201 What Nietzsche is attempting to inscribe in this epigram that will
come to shape the tone and texture of The Gay Science, then, is the necessity of
cheerfulness that is not only outwardly directed but at times inwardly directed. From
Nietzsche’s perspective, if one finds oneself in the midst of a tragic age, as we have come
to understand it, one need not only initiate a reevaluation of all values to compensate for
such a loss. One also needs cheerfulness in the form of laughter and the ability to frame
existential situations in a comic light that are otherwise of the utmost seriousness: a
comic light that helps detoxify this toxic, transitional time of history. Thus the inscription
of laughter and humor that is characteristic of The Gay Science is more than literal, that
is, more than words written on a page; the very inscription of cheerfulness in the text
works at the same time in and through its very lightheartedness to move the text outward
into the world of lived experience. Like a hot-air balloon that inflates, rises, and lifts,
Nietzsche’s humor all but abandons the text and gives us a new purview on our own
existential circumstances.
Such laughter, however, perches Nietzsche on a very precarious tightrope. This
tightrope stretched over the abyss of nihilism and the loss of all previously held values
appears to be hardly an occasion for laughter. Nonetheless, laughter, humor and
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cheerfulness are what Nietzsche prescribes if we are to overcome the abyss and move
from “man to overman.” In what is very metaphorical language, Nietzsche states in the
preface to the second edition that in The Gay Science, “one is constantly reminded of
winter’s nearness as well as of the triumph over winter that is coming, must come,
perhaps has already come...”202 Here I take winter to be a symbol of tragic, Dionysian
wisdom dawning on humankind. This is why the laughter that Nietzsche recommends is
provocative because it calls out to us.
Returning once again to the epigram that inaugurates cheerfulness and laughter
into, as well as outside, the text, we see that there is a final play at work in this
inscription. This revolves around the notion of home. The epigram reads, “This house is
my own and here I dwell” and concludes with, “Over my front door.” How does
Nietzsche understand “house” here? Is it Nietzsche’s literal house and literal front door?
This is unlikely since Nietzsche was nomadic in the sense that he wandered according to
the changing climate and its affect on his health. For me, home has the possibility of two
things. First, home can refer to existence itself. It is one who is thrown into the world, in
a word, into one’s home and so finds oneself here. The dwelling is a dwelling here on
earth where one is tasked with becoming what one is by taking up one’s own authentic
possibilities in the midst of, and in full recognition of, tragic knowledge.
The second possibility is that home refers to the body. The body is the
phenomenon through, and in which all our perceptions occur and Nietzsche is
preeminently aware of the need for a healthy body and therefore a healthy spirit. To be
sure, these two are hardly distinct, antithetical terms and Nietzsche is constantly striving
to show that pain and health can not help but work together in a strange alchemy of
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significance. The body and the suffering that often times accompany it, as it did in
Nietzsche’s case for most of his life, require a translation into philosophy, indeed, a
cheerful philosophy of affirmation. Both of these possibilities are not mutually exclusive.
To be sure, finding oneself here in the world means also to realize oneself as an
embodied being.
There is one last important element that appears at the beginning as well as the
end of both editions of The Gay Science. These anchoring points will come to further
characterize this book as a work that is well aware of the danger it presents, but is also as
a harbinger of comedic and laughter provoking moments that erupt from this danger that
keeps one in good health. At the end of the first section of the preface Nietzsche states,
“Incipit tragoedia,” or “the tragedy begins.” The same is true of the conclusion of the
first edition where Nietzsche writes “Incipit tragoedia” and then proceeds to announce
the first appearance of Zarathustra in his corpus and the need for “going under”
(Untergang). This notion of incipit tragoedia is echoed once again in aphorism 382 (the
last section before the epilogue) in the second edition where it is stated, “it is perhaps
only with it [a spirit that plays naively] that the great seriousness really emerges; that the
real question mark is posed for the first time; that the destiny of the soul changes; the
hand of the clock moves forward; the tragedy begins.”203 Nietzsche is clear that attempts
to grasp and even shape what he sees as the most transformative philosophical issues of
his time—the problem of nihilism—is necessarily linked to a playfulness and innocence.
Indeed, it is only with a playful spirit that one can begin to grasp the tragic view of life.
Kathleen Higgins interprets Nietzsche’s use of incipit tragoedia in a number of
ways. The first is to reflect on the historical dimensions of Nietzsche’s thought as it
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relates to actual Greek tragedy. She skillfully relates Nietzsche’s insights about tragedy
and its beginnings in the chorus to the subsequent development of the actual tragic hero
who arrives on the Greek stage later, and who propagates only the already achieved
mystical, transformed state of the spectator. For Higgins, the notion of incipit tragoedia,
coupled with Nietzsche’s introduction of Zarathustra, functions very similar to the tragic
hero of ancient Greek theater who arrives on the stage as a later historical development
well after the tragic chorus. Thus, whereas the tragic hero continues the transformational
process of tragedy that allowed the Greeks to live cheerfully in the midst of their tragic
age, Zarathustra arrives on the scene of later history (Nietzsche’s own time) to continue
the same type of insights. As Higgins states:
When the hero Zarathustra appears at the end of The Gay Science, I think that
Nietzsche expects that the rest of the book has served the function of the chorus.
....By the book’s end, Nietzsche hopes, we are capable of entering Zarathustra’s
perspective and seeing his achievement in a transfigured light.204
The Gay Science and its attempts at lightheartedness in the midst of what Nietzsche
believes is the imminent, if not already collapsed, order of all older values functions as a
tragic chorus that prepares the way for his tragic hero, Zarathustra.
Higgins also considers another historical perspective in terms of religious
development. Zoroastrianism not only predates Christianity, but many of the most
fundamental concepts found in Zoroastrianism, such as monotheism and the moral ideals
of good and evil from this ancient Persian religion, were later appropriated by the JudeoChristian tradition. Nietzsche by turn cleverly appropriates the historical Zarathustra to
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his own Zarathustra, a later literary creation, to be the free spirit who brings into radical
questioning religious historical development. In Higgins’s words:
Zoroastrianism’s influence on Judaism and Christianity allow Nietzsche to
address his own tradition by means of his retelling of the Zarathustra story. “The
tragedy” that “begins” with the historical Zarathustra includes the Judeo-Christian
developments that follow him....What Zarathustra accomplished with his primal
distinction, Nietzsche’s comments suggest, is the initial move toward
perspectivism.205
It is a humorous yet serious account of the historical Zarathustra with Nietzsche’s later,
literary creation. The cleft between them is nothing less than the move to perspectivism
that he desires. Higgins’s insights continue as she skillfully lays bare much of the comic
twists and turns of the German language found in The Gay Science. Moreover, she
continues her analysis on what she identifies as the main issue at hand—perspectivism
and “the enterprise of reconsideration, of identifying errors.”206 What Higgins concludes
is that The Gay Science, as well as the entrance of Zarathustra onto the “stage” of
Nietzsche’s thought, initiates a new type of thinking—light, free-spirited, unencumbered
by the past—that careful readers will see as a comic relief to the previous tradition, while
also maintaining the requisite seriousness.
While I agree with Higgins and consider her study a major contribution (as well
as a joy to read), my perspective diverges on one critical point. Whereas Higgins sees The
Gay Science as playing the role of the tragic chorus and Nietzsche’s introduction of
Zarathustra at its conclusion as a metaphor for the tragic hero who appears later and thus
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all is contained in the text, my interpretation takes a more comprehensive turn and
expands outward. Nietzsche’s The Gay Science and his Zarathustra initiate an often times
playful, humorous perspective that operate as an eruption, one that bursts forth in an age
of moralities that are winding down. Similar to the play of inscription seen above, the
writing in The Gay Science and the figure of Zarathustra overflow the text; they are
eruptions out of the text into philosophical history. In other words, these texts are not just
to be read and subsequently left behind but enacted. Nietzsche’s fröhliche Wissenschaft
not only brings to the stage Zarathustra, perspectivism, and constant revision, but the
work itself is a playful account of the kind of humorous, lightheartedness, and freespiritedness—the comedy performed at the end of the tragedies207— needed to overcome
tragic knowledge. The kind of cheerful science Nietzsche advocates pulls away the veil
of comfort provided by metaphysical illusions so that life reasserts its own free,
instinctive, kinetic force in the wake of tragic knowledge.
To conclude, consider Nietzsche’s last line of the first aphorism of the preface to
the second edition after his announcement of “Incipit tragoedia.” It reads, “Beware!
Something utterly wicked and mischievous is being announced here: incipit parodia, no
doubt.”208 “Incipit parodia” means “the parody begins.” To parody something means to
mock and imitate it in order to trivialize, hence its use as a comedic device. Parody from
the Greek paroidia, from para- “beside or parallel to as in mocking” and oide- “song,
ode,” stays faithful in much the same way to the meaning of both tragedy and comedy
that also harbor “oide-” as part of their etymology. Hence we see Nietzsche’s
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appreciation of framing these important issues of philosophy in terms of art, music, and
song as evidenced by the root meanings of all three terms. This recalls his reflection in
“An Attempt at Self-Criticism” that The Birth of Tragedy “ought to have sung” and not
spoken.209 Thus it is reasonable to conclude that with The Gay Science and Thus Spoke
Zarathustra we will see these later works “singing” in the way that he had wished The
Birth of Tragedy to have sung. And by use of imitation, Nietzsche will bring to an image
or an appearance in a mocking manner those philosophical targets he wants to “sound
out” in terms of their hollowness. There will be no recourse to some original form or
logical formulation. There will be only an aesthetic will-towards-truth as appearances
play out into the freely open. This strategy of parody will help begin to relieve the
pressure of millennia so that subsequent thinking can return, “with merrier senses, joyful
with a more dangerous second innocence, more childlike, and at the same time a hundred
times subtler than one had ever been before.”210

II. Becoming Interesting to Ourselves—Laughter and Perspective

Nietzsche’s release from the pressure of ill health in 1882, however temporary,
reinvigorated his spirit and consequently his thinking. The “gaya scienza” also relieves
the kind of heaviness that he believes has kept its pressure on philosophical thinking for
millennia, keeping it from being the type of thinking that ought to be joyful and
lighthearted; a thinking worthy of philosophy in that it sings and dances on the precipice
Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 6/Section 3 of the preface to the second edition, “An Attempt at SelfCriticism.”
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of multiple perspectives. In the first aphorism titled, “The teachers of the purpose of
existence” laughter comes to prominence in its relationship to truth and perspective, and
reason and unreason, or one might say in its relationship to appearance.
The preservation of the human race, Nietzsche says in this laughter filled
aphorism, “constitutes the essence of our species and herd.”211 This instinct to preserve
the human race creates, in a sense, a vacuum. The vacuum is the need for a reason or
purpose as to why we exist, otherwise existence would operate on an essentially base
level of mere survival. Hence Nietzsche refers to man and this need to know why he
exists as someone who “became interesting to ourselves,” and who has over time become
“a fantastic animal.”212 This vacuum opens the door to various individuals who have
come along and filled this void with reasons as to why we exist, that is, to the purpose of
our being here. Nietzsche observes that in the long run, even those who appear most
harmful, may be just as beneficial or useful to “the amazing economy of the preservation
of the species” as those who appear as good. It is all a matter of perspective and the way
in which one views history and life. Or one might say that it is the perspective one has,
knowingly or not, within the time of which one lives providing the horizon of meaning
for that period.
This gives rise to a tension between the individual and the species. Is it possible
for an individual to genuinely harm the species anymore? Nietzsche claims that at this
time in history, what we might call modernity, an individual may pursue what they think
is their own good or bad desires. They may be rewarded or blamed according to the
prevailing normative moral codes but nonetheless they are still a “promoter and
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benefactor of humanity.” One of Nietzsche’s insights in this aphorism is that the
individual, regardless of its “good or bad” desires, is always subsumed beneath the
species whether the individual is conscious of it or not. One individual relegated to its
own perspective, its own “fly—and frog-like wretchedness,” cannot possibly have a
birds-eye view of history and existence let alone discern its purpose. Even the most
brilliant individuals have failed at recognizing this supposed perspective Nietzsche
himself claims to have recognized. And this is just what he believes is worthy of a great
deal of laughter:
To laugh [lachen] at oneself as one would have to laugh in order to laugh from the
whole truth [aus der ganzen Wahrheit heraus zu lachen]—for that, not even the
best have had enough sense of truth, and the most gifted have had far too little
genius! Perhaps even laughter [das Lachen] still has a future—when the
proposition ‘The species is everything, an individual is always nothing’ has
become part of humanity and this ultimate liberation and irresponsibility is
accessible to everyone at all times. Perhaps laughter [das Lachen] will then have
formed an alliance with wisdom [Weisheit verbündet]; perhaps only ‘gay science’
will remain. At present, things are still quite different; at present, the comedy of
existence [Komödie des Daseins] has not yet ‘become conscious’ of itself; at
present we still live in an age of tragedy, in the age of moralities and religions.213
So, one of the things Nietzsche finds so laughter provoking is that we do not often see
ourselves as laughter provoking. We are not yet capable of laughing at ourselves because
he does not believe we possess the perspective needed—from that of “the whole truth”—
to see ourselves as worthy of laughter (even this apparent contradiction of a “perspective”
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on the “whole truth” is humorous, but then again Nietzsche revels in laughter,
contradiction and the play of appearances). We are always acting within the confines of
our given historical reality and its attendant moral and ethical systems. We believe the
appearance of these systems due to their various advocates to be universal and applicable
to all times. It seems as if there will always be, Nietzsche believes, the kind of teachers
who promote a meaning that lies behind appearance and who “from time to time decree:
‘There is something one is absolutely forbidden henceforth to laugh at.’”214
Yet Nietzsche is saying that, as necessary as these systems including their errors
may be, if one were to take up the perspective he supposedly has we would find that all
of these systems and the meta-positions they engender are really only appearances on the
stage of history and so within time. Rarely has anyone achieved the perspective (once
again Nietzsche believes himself to be an exception) that the individual is always in
service to the species and acting under the guise of good and bad or good and evil as he
will have it in On the Genealogy of Morality. This lack of conscious awareness on the
part of the subject—let alone whole peoples—is what Nietzsche finds so laughter
provoking. It may appear to individual subjects, especially in Nietzsche’s and our
contemporary era of self-assertion, that we are promoting our own destiny independent of
any forces and that we are ends in ourselves, yet the reality is we and all of our systems
both good and bad are one and all in service to the species. It is exactly these moral and
ethical systems that are promoted by the teachers of the purpose of existence and beheld
by their followers so that it appears as though existence has behind it some eternal truth
to which people and whole cultures can take comfort in that Nietzsche finds additionally
amusing: “All ethical systems hitherto have been so foolish and contrary to nature that
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humanity would have perished from every one had it gained power over humanity—all
the same!”215
Recall that measure and self-forgetting are defining characteristics of comedy and
provocative laughter. The notion of self-forgetting exhibited by the teachers of the
purpose of existence above was called “lack of conscious awareness.” What accounts for
the most serious transgression of measure and hence becomes open season for
Nietzsche’s laughter is the failure—whether intentional or not—to recognize limit and to
take into account the measureless. Just as great comic characters, to some degree or
another, engage in self-forgetting so to do the people of various professions who surround
us. A brief detour to On the Genealogy of Morality has Nietzsche offering us a similar
account to that of the teachers of the purpose of existence in The Gay Science.
Just as he finds the teachers of the purpose of existence laughter provoking so too
does he find comedic value in ascetic ideals and those who seek them. In the third essay
in On the Genealogy of Morality, “What do ascetic ideals mean?” an example of this selfforgetting is given in terms of different people in different spheres of life. These include
artists, historians, philosophers, and most of all priests. All of these require that some
kind of meaning be given to life, that is, that they always display an impulse to find an
ultimate truth that comforts them (and in the case of the priest comforts their believers).
This always entails in some way the withdrawing from real life, the rejection of the world
of becoming, and the failure to affirm our suffering. But for Nietzsche life needs no
explaining, it needs no grand meaning, and the impulse to do so, to ask, “Why are we
here?” especially under the pretext of suffering is nihilism. The important correlate to this
though is Nietzsche’s beseeching us to love our fate or in his words, “amor fati.” What is
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valorized here is the affirmation of the very chaos that sends others searching for
meaning elsewhere. This is precisely why Nietzsche says in Ecce Homo, “My formula for
greatness is amor fati: that you do not want anything to be different.”216 Perhaps Babich
has it most succinctly when she says, “amor fati is the benediction of the Dionysian.”217
In other words, what is to be loved, what is necessary, is the chaos that eternally returns.
Nietzsche provides only one way to counter the ascetic ideal and the impulse
behind it—comedy, “[T]he ascetic ideal has, for the present, even in the most spiritual
sphere, only one type of real enemy and injurer: these are the comedians of this ideal—
because they arouse mistrust.”218 Nietzsche is not exactly clear whether by comedians he
means someone such as himself or a playwright (perhaps in the vein of Aristophanes)
who ridicule the ascetic ideal through their respective works or that the actual comedians
of the ascetic ideal are the very perpetrators of the ideal themselves because their very
appearance arouses laughter thus providing the spectacle of a comedy. Either way, to
“combat” the ascetic ideal is to hold it up for mockery and ridicule due to its selfforgetting and transgression of limit. Indeed, part of the ascetic ideal’s self-forgetting is
that it is a closed system because the assertion that there is only one overarching meaning
to all life makes life referential only to that positing.219 In the desire to provide itself with
some ultimate meaning, usually transcendent, the purveyors of the ascetic ideal have only
looked inward and forgotten the joy one can take in eternal becoming which for
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Nietzsche is the agonistic interplay of all the value-creating forces in nature, none of
which ever become fixed into permanence.
Returning to The Gay Science we are confronted with the question: “If not reason,
what then is really at work in promoting the species at the expense of the individual?” In
asking this question we must always keep in mind Nietzsche’s own endorsement of the
individual, the Übermensch type, over the herd. He offers the following explanation:
This drive [Jener Trieb], which rules the highest as well as the basest of human
beings—the drive for the preservation of the species—erupts from time to time as
reason and passion of mind [Vernunft und Leidenschaft des Geistes]; it is then
surrounded by a resplendent retinue of reasons and tries with all its might to make
us forget [vergessen] that fundamentally it is drive, instinct, stupidity, lack of
reasons.220
What is comedic, then, is that behind the appearance of purpose and reason in history
with all the subsequent “resplendent retinue of reasons” really lies its opposite: unreason,
instinct, chaos, recklessness, Dionysian madness. Only when this dynamic of the species
over the individual has become “part of humanity,” which is to say only when one comes
to recognize that they are a single voice within a multitude of voices that constitutes an
agon, will this secretive laughter for the few and the rare become accessible to all. It is
only then, as he states above, will “laughter have a future” and form “an alliance with
wisdom.” When the game is up, so to speak, gaya scienza is what will remain.
Although Nietzsche does not mention Hegel here or anywhere in this first
aphorism (he offers only poets as an example of teachers of existence), nonetheless
Nietzsche’s phrasing, “reason and passion of mind” and “resplendent retinue of reasons”
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offers the chance to present a contrast as well as a few similarities to Nietzsche’s views.
Hegel’s lecture “Reason in History,” published after his death as part of Lectures on the
Philosophy of History, argues that rationality is behind all motivations and appearances in
history driving it forward in a progression to absolute consciousness. “Reason” he states,
“...is both substance and infinite power.”221 Reason in the individual, a people, and a state
are subsumed under the teleological pull of Spirit as it progresses towards itself as selfknowing. At one point Hegel asserts, “This restless succession of individuals and
peoples, who exist for a time and then disappear, presents to us a universal thought, a
category: that of change.”222 This notion of the “restless succession of individuals and
peoples” as well as the idea of change seems to be prima facie in accord with Nietzsche’s
appreciation of change and becoming. However, a closer look reveals the similarities to
be more apparent than real and a cause for laughter.
The difference between Hegel and Nietzsche is that, although Hegel recognizes
the phenomena of change within the unfolding of Spirit, Spirit nonetheless achieves in
the end wholeness and completion. Any production of difference is always subsumed
under an over-arching homogeneity as a totality of self-knowing, self-same Spirit. Simply
put, according to Hegel unreason and chaos are always vanquished by reason and order.
Therefore, he would never accept Nietzsche’s premise that unreason, error, and folly play
the crucial role in history’s development. Where Hegel sees the march forward of reason,
Nietzsche is always quick to point out that far from originating out of the lofty heights of
a transcendental plane, the genealogy of our moral and ethical valuations lie in a sort of
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primordial grayness and fog as, for example, Michel Foucault has shown.223 In addition
there is not a single mention of laughter (Lachen), humor (Humor), comedy (Komödie) or
cheerfulness (die Frölichkeit) in this particular lecture by Hegel. It purports to find only
dispassionate reason in history.
To be fair, one ought not conclude that Hegel does not appreciate comedy and the
laughter that accompanies it. As we saw in the introduction, Hegel, like Nietzsche, lauds
comedy, particularly the genius of Aristophanes. Both philosophers grant that much of
Aristophanes’ gift lies in the fact that he was aware that he was part of the actual “tumult
of history” of his time. This is to say, he was part of becoming yet was able through much
of the (non)sense of his comedy to stand outside that tumult as a spectator, enabling him
to write the kind of comedies that never betray the most profound philosophical issues.
So we see Hegel’s deep appreciation of Aristophanes and his craft just as we saw
Nietzsche’s appreciation of the same.
This however raises a point of contention concerning Hegel, Aristophanes, and
even comedy in general. How can Hegel, the philosopher of reason and Spirit, appreciate
Aristophanes even to the point of elevating comedy above the epic and tragedy? In other
words, how can Hegelian rationality and Spirit appreciate comedy whose essence is
absurdity and, if Nietzsche is correct, an inversion of reason? The answer I argue
revolves around the perspective Hegel takes, which can be broached two ways.
First, Hegel is taking the perspective of the subject and ordinary consciousness.
By adhering to a dialectical critique of consciousness, he is able to reflect on and critique
consciousness. This is because in Hegel’s account contradiction cannot stand, that is,
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contradictions must be resolved. By observing consciousness as a phenomenon, and what
appears to it he is able to follow it as it moves from a lack of knowing to self-certainty.
Because Hegel sees the world as inherently rational, all objects of inquiry must, in the
end, conform to the subject. In other words, a subject’s reason and the way they comport
themselves in the world and see the world are preeminently important. To some degree
this diminishes the importance of the object, comedy being no exception. With the stress
put on the subject and consciousness, comedy as a phenomenon is important only in that
it is represented in consciousness and, moreover, that it is understood, however absurd it
may appear. One must, in a sense, “get one’s mind right” if one is to achieve any selfcertainty about the external world, which means the use of dialectical reason that relieves
the tension of dualistic thinking.
Second, because the subject is both distinguished from the lived world and yet
finds itself part of it, Hegel will maintain that all of our particular theories (in all of the
sciences) can not be dislocated from the conceptual-historical framework that gives rise
to them. In other words, even our theories are given through a perspective; one that
locates them at a particular place and time in history. The same is true for religion and
art, including comedy. They too are historical developments (as stated above Hegel treats
them in the section on art and in the privileged position of just preceding the pinnacle of
Spirit’s absolute knowing). Hegel argues essentially that, historically speaking, comedy
exceeds both epic and tragedy because behind the comedic mask lies an actor. In other
words, the spectator understands what the mask really conceals. But what of the gods?
Hegel claims:
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With the vanishing of the contingent character and superficial individuality which
imagination lent to the divine Beings, all that is left to them as regards their
natural aspect is the bareness of their immediate existence; they are clouds, an
evanescent mist, those imaginative representations. The essence of these having
been given the form of thought, they have become the simple thoughts of the
Beautiful and the Good, which tolerate being filled with any kind of content.224
The divine beings that once were present have now been vanquished by the comedies of
Aristophanes and are now thoughts and concepts deprived of real existence.
Both of these reasons, indeed because of them, allow Hegel to laud comedy in all
of its absurdity and still maintain the critical stance. Even a phenomenon such as comedy
which may appear to exceed the limits of reason is, nonetheless, brought into reason’s
purview as well as his phenomenological investigation just like all other phenomena so
that consciousness might correct itself as it relates to the world in which it is situated. In
Hegel’s words:
The scepticism that is directed against the whole range of phenomenal
consciousness,...renders the Spirit for the first time competent to examine what
truth is. For it brings about a state of despair about all the so-called natural ideas,
thoughts, and opinions, regardless of whether they are called one’s own or
someone else’s, ideas with which the consciousness that sets about the
examination [of truth] straight away is still filled and hampered, so that it is, in
fact, incapable of carrying out what it wants to undertake.225
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Then there is the notion of transgression. Unlike Hegel, Nietzsche’s view of
comedy and laughter always comports itself to the transgression of limit. This is why
Nietzsche refers to humankind’s reconciliation back to nature as a “primal contradiction,”
because at its core the Dionysian never gets resolved. It is never “worked out,” unlike
Hegel’s system of dialectical consciousness, onto a higher plane. As abysmal, the primal
pain and joy are always held together in their opposition. Logic simply fails to account
for this phenomenon. Hence comedy and laughter enact the very moment when limits are
either torn asunder, or at least when limit is recognized as limit to then be subsequently
targeted for demolition. Nietzsche’s assertion that “the comedy of existence is not yet
conscious of itself” expresses just this assertion. Nietzsche is saying that the successive
appearances of moralities and tragedies that bring a certain order out of the chaos of
nature and history and help perpetuate the species, that is, have demarcated their own
limits out of themselves, have yet to be seen as appearances, that is, as successive
appearances in history. To transgress this limit is to garner the perspective Nietzsche
supposedly has and thus to be consciously aware of these appearances as appearances and
so as a comedy of history unawares. The “fearless ones,” or free-spirited individuals as
subjects, are able to recognize the appearances for what they are. This is precisely why
Nietzsche always promotes the robust individual—the Übermensch type—as one who
treads lightly on the periphery of history, as one who is able to use history only as a
springboard forward, as one who recognizes the burden of memory and so attempts to
forget. “Healthy is who can’t recall” Nietzsche says in “‘Joke, Cunning and Revenge’:
Prelude in German Rhymes,” which played the part of a preface for the first edition of
The Gay Science and is itself a playful hint of the transgression that occurs in the rest of
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the text, most notably the transgression that laughter and cheerfulness perpetrate. Hence,
similar to Aristophanes, those fearless ones recognize that they too exist within a
particular historical epoch yet through the conscious knowledge of successive
appearances and illusion are also on the outside. Nietzsche also promotes this kind of
notion. It is as if, on the one hand, we are swept along on the inside of the great stream of
becoming but, on the other hand, when we take a different perspective we are also on the
outside looking in at ourselves.
For Hegel, change is surely part of his thinking. Indeed Nietzsche in section 357
of The Gay Science (Book Five “We Fearless Ones”) asserts that, “We Germans are
Hegelians even had there been no Hegel, insofar as we (as opposed to all Latins)
instinctively attribute a deeper meaning and greater value to becoming and development
than to what ‘is’; we hardly believe in the justification of the concept ‘being.’”226 In one
sense, then, Hegel also attributes change in and through the negating subject. Through
sublation [Aufheben] the subject is able to negate what is initially given to consciousness
into a new, higher level. As Tom Rockmore states, “Through this new concept
[sublation], Hegel stresses that the developmental process of knowledge preserves what is
true (wahr) in the prior moment.”227 Yet Hegel’s conception of subject and change, as
dynamic as it is, is always already an emergence towards Spirit (Geist). There is no
standing out of the subject. Indeed the individual subject and its will appear to be
sublated evermore as Spirit unfolds. Thus, although Hegel recognizes change as part of
his phenomenology, and Nietzsche too recognizes this kind of change in Hegel, Hegel’s
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sense of change is still an ordered, structured change that never transgresses the limit of
Spirit. It is as if the change manifested by the negating subject is never able to transgress
the closed circuit of Spirit which provides the ultimate meaning to the world. For Hegel
there really does not exist a Dionysian element (call it Abgrund or unreason) that
appearances scheinen forth from. This is exactly what is so crucial to Nietzsche who
retains this element as well as the more robust, will-to-power expressing, noble value
creating subject.
Coming full circle, Nietzsche refers to this lack of consciousness on the part of
humanity (who normally believe themselves to be aware of it) as “the comedy of
existence.”228 This lack of awareness, often manifested as the will to conscious illusion,
that is, the need for the illusions provided by in this case the teachers of existence,
provides fertile ground for comedy. The notion of being unaware, of self-forgetting has
always been a cornerstone of much comedy, including that perpetrated by great thinkers.
As Freydberg points out (albeit in reference to Sallis’s thought on comedy), “comedy
involves the playful collapsing of differences, the playful transgression of limits proper to
a human being.”229 Often great comedic characters suffer from exactly this notion of selfforgetting, of not being able to distance themselves from their own existential quandaries
so as to obtain a more enlightening and comedic perspective on their own situation. And
for Nietzsche, there is hardly a difference in this case between “enlightening” and
“comedy.”
In book one of The Gay Science, Nietzsche locates an example of the eternal
comedy of existence in the historical figure of the Roman emperor Augustus. In aphorism
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36, titled “Last words,” Nietzsche discloses the play of concealment and unconcealment
in terms of the masks that this ruler had worn during his reign. However, his inability to
remain silent on his death-bed betrayed his “act”:
[H]e let his mask fall for the first time when he made it clear that he had worn a
mask and acted a comedy [Komödie gespielt]—he had played the father of the
fatherland and the wisdom of the throne well enough to create the proper illusion!
Plaudite amici, comoedia finita est!230
Augustus’s failure in Nietzsche’s eyes to remain disciplined and silent let slip the notion
to those around him the necessary illusions needed in order to rule. In other words, the
illusions were unmasked. Notwithstanding the many achievements under the purvey of
the Roman Empire as a whole, when we consider the level of brutality that also took
place it was only under the guise, the disguise, of a mask that such terror could be
perpetrated by a legitimate leader. Most notable though to Nietzsche was that behind this
mask of Augustus was not concealed a tragedy, or drama, but comedy. This is not to say
that Augustus did not take his rule seriously or that he saw his rule as something
frivolous. The comedy lies in the fact that Augustus, unlike the vast majority who
believed the illusions themselves to be real, was conscious of the play of appearances
needed to rule. The great emperor Augustus saw himself perpetrating a comedy even
amidst the bloodshed and terror of the time.
This criticism is also leveled at Nero in the same aphorism when Nietzsche states
that, “The thought of the dying Nero—qualis artifex pereo!—was also the thought of the
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dying Augustus: actor’s vanity! Actor’s prolixity!”231 Both Augustus and Nero’s
purported last words were the kind of admission that saw life as shining appearance; they
saw their capacity as rulers not just in political terms or in the skill needed to manipulate
the mechanisms of government apparatus, but as lead actors on the stage of life. And, at
least for Augustus, this stage was a stage of comedy where the follies of humankind
played out.
In Daybreak Nietzsche speaks of this phenomenon although he uses men of Greek
antiquity instead of Roman leaders. Because virtue (aretē) was highly prized by the
Greeks, Nietzsche’s claim is that many play-acted, that is, showcased themselves before
others in a kind of competition of virtue:
Among the men of antiquity famed for their virtue there were, it appears, a
countless number who play-acted before themselves (vor sich selber
schauspielerten): the Greeks especially, as actors incarnate, will have done this
quite involuntarily and have approved it. Everyone, moreover, was with his virtue
in competition (Tugend im Wettstreit) with the virtue of another or of all others:
how should one not have employed every kind of art (alle Künste aufgewendet
haben) to bring one’s virtue to public attention, above all before oneself, even if
only for the sake of practice! Of what use was a virtue one could not exhibit or
which did not know how to exhibit itself?232
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Nietzsche’s insight, if he is correct, suggests that in Greek ethical life, virtue and acting
were not mutually exclusive but were so closely mixed that the “play-acting” was
involuntary, which is to say that it was unconscious. Acting, which in essence is a way to
appear, was intimately tied to one’s ethical standing.
There is however a danger that Nietzsche discerns here. When an “actor” of this
kind—especially for example a Roman emperor—reveals the illusions necessary for the
ruled to be ruled, then there is the danger for chaos and terror to return. Similar to the
noble lies told for the benefit of the ruled in Plato’s Republic,233 Nietzsche is stressing the
need for disciplined rulers who maintain the requisite silence. Hence his example of
Tiberius, whom he claims, “was genuine and no actor!” and who was the “most
tormented of all self-tormentors”234 in that he underwent the pain of knowing the secrets
and contradictions involved in political rule. Unlike Tiberius, both Augustus and Nero
failed to remain silent and to take the truth of necessary illusions with them to their grave.
They betrayed this truth unconcealing it as “the comedy of existence.”
However, Nietzsche’s comedic take here is not necessarily aimed at any certain
individual, as apropos as the example of these Roman emperors may be. Nor is it aimed
at any particular teacher of the purpose of existence or any specific believer of these
teachers. Instead it is the largest scale of humanity and history itself that Nietzsche
locates the comedy. From Nietzsche’s perspective, existence (Dasein) and the
unconscious parade of humanity who unknowingly promote the species over themselves,
but think otherwise, is worthy of the greatest laughter. It is a perspective on the whole: a
perspective in which life itself is the sum total of the great phenomena that appears.
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Moreover his claim that, “We still live in the age of tragedy, in the age of
moralities and religions” because “the comedy of existence has not yet ‘become
conscious’ of itself” attests to his view that on whole we are only on the cusp, indeed
hardly prepared, for the inevitable dawning of the tragic view of life. One that says that
life is often painful and destructive and that there are no eternal rewards waiting for us
behind life and at the end of life. Until this realization, the need for life to have a purpose
and meaning will continue to be filled by countless heroes on “the stage” of history,
whether theologians, moral and ethical philosophers, or even Nietzsche’s example of
poets. Perhaps, if he sees himself as part of the eternal comedy of existence and the
evidence surely points to this, Nietzsche too is a hero on this stage, albeit the kind of hero
who hopes to proffer a move towards life ascending values as a counterbalance to the
nihilism that he believes looms on the horizon of existence. To illustrate this, as well as
the necessity of comedy as a response to this existential dilemma, he appropriates a key
passage from Horace’s Ars poetica:
‘I myself, who most single-handedly made this tragedy of tragedies, insofar as it
is finished [sie fertig ist]; I, having first tied the knot of morality into existence
and drawn it so tight that only a god can loosen it—which is what Horace
demands!—I myself have now in the fourth act slain all gods, out of morality!
What is now to become of the fifth act? From where shall I take the tragic
solution? Should I start considering a comic solution [komische Lösung]?’235
One might be tempted to suggest after reading this aphorism that Nietzsche
suffers from hubris, that he sees himself as a new god that can “loosen” the knot of
morality that has gripped existence. But this would be a misreading. For Nietzsche, all
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gods must be overcome, but surely not to be replaced with another, including himself. If
read in its entirety, this aphorism exhibits Nietzsche’s irony and playfulness, especially
when he states that he has slain the gods out of morality, the very phenomenon that gives
rise to them in the first place. Moreover, the slaying of the old gods ultimately gives way
to the need for comedy as a means to confront the “tragic solution” in a “fifth act.” If
Nietzsche sees himself as a hero in any sense, then it must surely be a kind of comichero, or even an anti-hero, that is attempting a furtherance of life ascending values and
not a restoration to any previous historical norms. And even he as a “hero” would have to
see himself and this bombastic task as a target for its own earth-grounding laughter.
And this is just what Nietzsche stresses. The heroes on the stage of life have their
own shocking counterpart in the form of laughter. To be sure, Nietzsche’s idea is not to
laugh at any particular hero (however laughter provoking they might be at times); they
are a necessity “by promoting a faith in life.” Instead, he calls from the perspective of
“the long run” of “the whole” because he notes:
[E]ach of these great teachers of a purpose was vanquished by laughter [das
Lachen], reason and nature: the brief tragedy always changed and returned into
the eternal comedy of existence [Komödie des Daseins], and the ‘waves of
uncountable laughter’ [Wellen unzähligen Gelächters]—to cite Aeschylus—must
in the end also come crashing down on the greatest of these tragedians.236
Just like the comedy performed at the end of the tragedies at the Dionysia by the ancient
Greeks, the heroes that have ascended the stage of history are in the end vanquished by
laughter. However, notwithstanding all of this “corrective laughter,” Nietzsche claims
that human beings are the beings that still crave its teachers, beings who require teachers
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of the purpose of existence. The appearance of teachers then is necessary, even though the
substance of their teachings, under the guise of reason or dutiful purpose, always betrays
unreason, instinct, and a motivation to protect a certain kind of life they are promoting. It
is these masks that betray comedy.
For Nietzsche nothing is more worthy of laughter for those free spirits, the
“fearless ones” who are able to recognize the truth of our instinctual drives and impulses
and who are consciously aware of the succeeding generations of the play of appearances
that conceal these drives. In a sense, laughter plays just as important a role as the need for
illusions; both are necessary for life. The ability to grasp this grand perspective, of
standing out of any particular situation that may appear as the most solemn and important
to them, that understands that there are only perspectives is a worthy goal and one that
Zarathustra will soon come to embrace.
But what are we to make of Nietzsche’s views on truth and perspective?
“Perspectivism” Nietzsche claims, “is the fundamental condition of all life.”237 How can
Nietzsche claim that the only thing human beings can have is a perspective while
believing his perspective is of the whole? Is not a perspective of this kind exactly what he
claims we ought not to try and take, indeed that is impossible to take “that of the whole”
as if we were a divinity of some sort? Recall that he says, “To laugh at oneself as one
would have to laugh in order to laugh from the whole truth—for that, not even the best
have had enough sense of truth, and the most gifted have had far too little genius!”238 I
argue that this can be addressed two ways.
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First, Nietzsche might well be engaging in his own play on perspective. By this I
mean that Nietzsche’s perspective is less a “godlike” perspective and more of the kind of
perspective suitable to someone human, all too human. It is only a grand perspective, that
is, a perspective of perspectives in that his understanding of “the whole” does not entail
some transcendent meta-position from which we have the luxury of standing completely
outside the prescribed limits of our earthbound humanity. In other words, as a metaperspective it is a perspective that is keenly aware of itself as a perspective and thus
never succumbs to the temptation to step outside space, time and the world of becoming.
Human beings must be content, indeed cheerful with the knowledge, that there is no
“meta” position outside of nature from which one could judge existence as good or evil.
Second, if one were to analyze Nietzsche on purely strict, logical terms, his
comments on perspective and the whole would surely be found lacking. Yet, this is
exactly the kind of “restrictive” thinking he is trying to escape. Recall that, for Nietzsche,
philosophy must be in service to life. And the lighthearted, cheerful, free-spirited life he
is espousing in The Gay Science is the kind that utilizes humor to advance this particular
kind of life at the expense of always being “logical.” This point is expounded in aphorism
82 of book two where he compares the supposed disposition of the Greeks to the French.
Here Nietzsche’s claim is that logic is equated not only with lack of spirit but lack of
humor as well:
The Greeks are indescribably logical and simple in all their thought; at least in
their long good age they never wearied of this; as so often do the French, who all
too gladly take a little leap into the opposite and actually only endure the spirit of
logic when, through a series of such small leaps into the opposite, it betrays its
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sociable civility, its sociable self-denial....The Greeks’ sense of sociability was far
less developed than that of the French is and was; that is why there is so little
esprit in even their most spirited men; that is why there is so little humour
[geistreichsten] in even their humorists [Witzbolden].239
For Nietzsche it is not that logic is not necessary or does not play a role at all, and as we
shall see, he even claims that it is even necessary to promote a certain kind of life among
its practitioners. His point in this aphorism is that the purely logical stance and those who
may see everything only through its lens, suffer from a lack of energetic imagination and
sociability (one can surely argue against Nietzsche on this point). Logic, claims
Nietzsche, ought to be used in doses much like the “bread and water” of prisoners, that is,
sparingly so that it may provide a minimum of sustenance. However, it should never be
allowed to dominate and therefore ruin the spirit of “sociable civility.”
Moreover, the notion that we can locate certain tendencies in whole groups, in
the way that Nietzsche appears to be doing, is itself ripe for laughter in that these types of
sweeping judgments although they appear logical (“this group is all X” and “this group is
all Y”) are in essence hardly valid. But even though it appears that Nietzsche believes
these statements to be absolutely binding, this is deceiving and the deception is
eventually unveiled. Consider book two, aphorism 95 where he says of the French
politician and writer Nicolas Chamfort that he:
[W]as rich in depths and backgrounds of the soul—gloomy, suffering, ardent—a
thinker who found laughter [Lachen] necessary as a remedy against life and who
nearly considered himself lost on those days when he had not laughed [gelacht]—
seems much more like an Italian, related to Dante and Leopardi, than a
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Frenchman! We know Chamfort’s last words: ‘Ah! Mon ami’, he said to Sieyès,
‘je m’en vais enfin de ce monde, où il faut que le cœur se brise ou se bronze—’.
Those are surely not the words of a dying Frenchman.240
Nietzsche held Chamfort, along with a few other French writers and thinkers, in high
esteem because of their wit and passion. But here the laughter that Chamfort employed in
his life as a way to forego disillusionment, the kind of laughter that was previously
attributed to the French as opposed to the solemn logic of the Greeks, now belongs to the
Italians. There certainly appears to be a contradiction but one that Nietzsche surely
recognizes. He uses this contradiction as a weapon against those wielders of reason who
would demand a rigid consistency that Nietzsche simply does not believe can be
maintained in lived experience. We are our contradictions because lived existence often
times outstrips formal logic. So in the end, we come to recognize that Nietzsche himself
sees a certain fluidity and heterogeneity of traits—in a sense a coming and going of traits
as opposed to a stable essence—that allows for a more dynamic subject that can navigate
these multiple textures of life, both good and bad.
He does, however, state in aphorism 348 “On the origin of scholars” in book five
that one may find certain idiosyncrasies behind the scholarly work of individuals. These
idiosyncrasies betray what is motivating the kind of thinking they are undertaking. One of
the examples he gives is that of Jews. In defense of them he says of logic:
A Jew, on the other hand, in keeping with the characteristic occupations and the
past of his people, is not at all used to being believed [glaubt]. Consider Jewish
scholars in this light: they all have a high regard for logic, that is for compelling
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agreement by force of reasons [das Erzwingen der Zustimmung durch Gründe];
they know that with logic, they are bound to win [siegen müssen] even when
faced with class and race prejudices, where people do not willingly believe
them.241
Here logic serves the particular life of Jewish culture, that in Nietzsche’s time especially,
was under pervasive racism and discrimination (and was to become even more so as the
next few decades dawned in Germany and elsewhere on the continent). Indeed, Nietzsche
ends this aphorism to say that Europe, especially Germans, owe a great deal of reverence
to Jews and Jewish thinkers for “making its people more logical, for cleaner intellectual
habits.”242
We can also locate the ebb and flow of logic and humor in a poignant example
from more recent history. In his book, From the Kingdom of Memory, Elie Wiesel
presents his own thoughts on the inversion, indeed the perversion of logic and reason
during the period of National Socialism in the mid 20th century. Wiesel brings this notion
of inversion to prominence through the image of The Tower of Babel. The Holocaust is
described this way by Wiesel:
Mankind, jewel of His creation, had succeeded in building an inverted Tower of
Babel, reaching not toward heaven but toward an anti-heaven, and there to create
a parallel society, a new “creation” with its own princes and gods, laws and
principles, jailers and prisoners. A world where the past no longer counted—no
longer meant anything.243
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Just as Guido’s world was inverted in the film Life is Beautiful, so too was Wiesel’s
world, and the world of the Jews, and other European minorities in the mid-20th century.
Or one might say the world underwent an inversion and a withdrawal of all that was
familiar. Wiesel says that by this inversion that Jews were prisoners “in a social and
cultural void,” “another universe,” a universe “so distorted, so unnatural.”
Yet, in the midst of this nihilistic void, Wiesel also relates the story of the FrenchJewish humorist Tristan Bernard who was arrested by the Germans; “[A]fter months in
hiding, his fellow prisoners were surprised by his smiling face. ‘How can you smile?’
they asked. ‘Until now, I have lived in fear,’ he said. ‘From now on, I shall live in
hope.’”244 What is evident then in Tristan Bernard’s account is a non-logical giving over
into opposites. Bernard feels most free after his capture. His humor and ability to smile
happens in the midst of the most tragic and severe event of his life. What good would
logic do for Bernard Tristan at this point? The reign of National Socialism marks the very
closing of logic and the ability to persuade by rational argument. As the most irrational of
events, it marks out the very limit of logic and reason whose ability to persuade was no
longer felt. Yet in this desert of reason, laughter found a home amidst madness.
If we were to appraise this in terms of Nietzsche’s views, it becomes evident that
the logic that he sees permeating Jewish thinking in his time, which helped further the life
of this culture, met its fate in the madness of National Socialism. I would argue that for
Tristan Bernard the ability to appear cheerful and smile even in the midst of this tragic
finale of the 20th century, is an act of extreme courage. This courage comes from the
conscious awareness that human absurdity may appear as comic, even if set in the most
horrific of circumstances, allowing one to surmount it in order to conquer despair. Those
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who come to realize the play of appearance made manifest by many perspectives and the
play of reason and unreason should begin to see the “eternal comedy of existence.” The
necessity of a “gaya scienza,” that frees thinking into a new playful, but still serious
space, where we can stave off disillusionment enabling us to become the noble beings
that we are.

III. The Fool’s Cap and the Play of Appearance

Nietzsche’s thoughtful appraisal of comedy and appearance continues throughout
the rest of The Gay Science. Because Nietzsche rejects any essence that somehow lies
behind an appearance, he refuses to accept then that appearances are only a dim
counterpart to essences. He states in aphorism 54 of book one, “What is ‘appearance’
[Schein] to me now! Certainly not the opposite of some essence [Wesens].”245 Life itself
is appearance, or better yet “beautiful shining.” Nietzsche is at pains to disavow any
belief in a binary appearance/essence distinction. He further characterizes life and
appearance as if one were dreaming, but conscious that one is dreaming. Indeed, what are
dreams if not appearances and if life consists of things that appear—objects, other
subjects—what then is life if not the conscious awareness of these appearances? He
states, “appearance [Schein] is the active and living itself, which goes so far in its selfmockery [Selbstverspottung] that it makes me feel that here there is appearance [Schein]
and a will-o’-the-wisp and a dance of spirits and nothing else.”246
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In terms of comedy this idea of existence or life as appearance works in two ways.
First, as we saw in the first section that focused almost exclusively on The Birth of
Tragedy, comedy was tragedy’s counterpart and equal that disclosed the Dionysian
impulse in its own way. Comedy, along with tragedy, allows the spectator to behold those
aspects of existence that are painful or absurd. They allowed for the discharge of
Dionysian madness through beautiful Apollonian appearances so that we may say “yes”
to life and not succumb to disillusionment.
The second way appearance works is that by looking at life itself as an appearance
without the need for essences behind it generates its own comedic moments. These
comedic, laughter provoking moments are born out by the “actors” who themselves
appear consciously unaware of the kind of insight Nietzsche believes he has. The
supposed serious business of bustling humanity, of people consumed with their own selfimportance, is really fleeting appearances that help constitute the “eternal comedy of
existence.” So, unlike the first way, where appearance works in a sort of pre-established
arena where we consciously gather, in this second aspect it is not necessary that one
gather into a theater as a spectator to witness a tragedy or comedy. This distinction
between the proper theater of comedy found in the early work The Birth of Tragedy and
the kind of comedy one can locate in lived reality (one’s own lived reality and the
appearance of others) is made clear by Nietzsche later in The Gay Science when he states:
Whoever has enough tragedy and comedy in himself probably does best to stay
away from the theatre; or, should there be an exception, the entire event—
including theatre and audience and poet—becomes the actual tragic and comic
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spectacle to him, so that the piece that is performed means little to him by
comparison.247
In what is the remarkable workings of irony, existence itself many times harbors its own
comedic elements as we appear before each other deceptively unaware in the play of
humanity. We become the cause of provocative laughter.
Nietzsche proffers many good examples of this second understanding of
appearance in The Gay Science. Aphorism 30 of book one provides a model example.
This aphorism titled “The comedy of the famous [Komödienspiel der Berühmten]”
discloses the motivations that “famous men” undertake in order to maintain the
appearance of their fame, which Nietzsche claims “they need.” His example of famous
men (Männer) are politicians (apparently women are not considered here, an omission
that provokes its very own cautious laughter). Nietzsche offers a keen insight into the
play of appearances that these men of fame undertake; a play of concealment and
unconcealment that to the conscious eye of the aware observer discloses some of the most
sublime comedic moments.
These famous men, says Nietzsche, typically act with “ulterior motives” so that
they may appear to others in an advantageous light. Accordingly he states, “from one
they want a piece of the splendour and reflected splendour of his virtue; from another the
fear-inspiring aspects of certain dubious qualities that everyone knows him to have”248
and so forth. Depending on those who appear as his company, he gravitates to the
required mask of his own appearance. As Nietzsche points out in this quote, this play of
appearance is often a doubling, that is, a “splendour and reflected splendour” or one
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might say “a shining of what das Scheinen.” For many, especially politicians, this
doubling or layering of appearance provides a cushion from which to absorb the
accolades, fears or sympathy they seek from others, as well as give those who bestow
these praises an object for their attention. For Nietzsche there is no distance between the
wearing of masks and the comic—the masks are us. But how exactly?
If we consider Plato’s cave-like image at the beginning of book seven in the
Republic, then to a large degree politics is based on images, that is, the phenomenon of
appearance. In turn, when we take into account Nietzsche’s view that no essence lies
behind appearance, then politics as an endeavor is least tethered to some original form or
essence, such as justice, even though we believe it to be or believe that it ought to be. If
justice and the nature of the political is anything in Nietzsche’s scheme, then it is
certainly the understanding, appreciation, and ability to manipulate appearance to one’s
advantage. The typical politician seeks his own advantage and that most likely means an
advantage that asserts his power. However, this power is the image that the politician
projects to his followers. In other words, it is one’s appearance that is in service for
politicians and other men of fame. Justice, then, ends up as a phenomenon that is
intimately tied to appearance and not something distinct, distant and transcendent. “And
so the surroundings and exteriors of famous men die off continually”249 says Nietzsche.
Appearance then is at one time something very powerful and yet is something that can be
shed like the skin of a snake. The potency of appearance and its chameleon-like character
is its power...but for Nietzsche also its comedic value.250

249

Ibid.
This obviously raises the question of the intersection of political power and justice. What if a politician
believes justice to be a charade, that is, to a large degree the play of appearance? Moreover, if justice is a
charade that the politician is aware of and thus can manipulate, then would not the consummate politician
250

158

Nietzsche describes this phenomenon of famous men and the play of appearance
in terms of comedic stagecraft. The constant shuffle of props as well as the coming and
going of friends and allies that reinforce a particular appearance all but fulfill the
spectacle of a comedy. Accordingly he states:
Their friends and allies belong, as I said, to these stage properties [BühnenEigenschaften]. What they want, however, must stand all the much more firmly
and unshakeably and be splendidly seen [weithin glänzend stehen bleiben] from
afar; and this, too, sometimes requires its comedy [Komödie] and its theatrics
[Bühnenspiel].251
For Nietzsche, notwithstanding the seriousness of the political and its objectives, the
individual characters that make up the political as well as their sycophants are nothing
short of comical. Moreover, Nietzsche stresses the need for a more detached, birds-eye
perspective if one is to see the laughter-provoking scenes generated by these so called
“famous men.” One is, of course, always situated within a state with its political
apparatus and one may also be involved to a healthy extent in the important issues of the
time. Yet the perspective Nietzsche is advocating is both a figurative and literal stepping
back, allowing one to be on the outside looking in. The result? Nothing less than
existence as a comic stage where famous men betrayed by their motivations appear for us
as “glänzend... Komödie.” The word “glänzend” is translated as “splendidly.” However,
keeping faithful to Nietzsche’s high regard for the image as that which appears, glänzend
be an Übermensch and one who is able to move the state beyond the conventional morality of good and
evil? I would argue that Nietzsche would make the distinction between those leaders that understand ruling
to involve the play of appearances (and who may only look out for private, narrow gain) and those rulers
who not only understand that ruling involves the play of appearance but utilize it to advance noble,
aristocratic, life ascending values, even if those ruled believe their justice refers to some original,
transcendent referent.
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can also be translated as “shining.” Once again, to appropriate Shakespeare, “All the
world’s a stage, And all the men and women merely players” on this stage of life,
radiantly shining for each of us in what often times are comic moments amidst the most
serious of pursuits.
Some might object that Nietzsche is disparaging politics, the political process and
those who participate in them. That politics has all of its serious issues—going to war,
civil equality, economic justice, to name a few—is hardly an occasion to disassociate
oneself from it, let alone see it as comic. However, although it may be least apparent, the
opposite is true. To appreciate this one has to, as always with Nietzsche, navigate the
many masks that he wears. In a strange irony, Nietzsche could quite convincingly be
arguing that if one were to engage the political in a serious manner, that is, if one were
predisposed to effect some sort of social change by direct and frequent participation in
the political process, then to take the political seriously there is required not a full
immersion into the political currents but a healthy distance. Often times when one is
immersed in something directly, one’s perspective of the whole is diminished. How often
have we provided our time (and financial assistance!) to a political figure or cause that
we thought we understood and believed in and then became disillusioned as either little
changed or the opposite took effect? From a distance, one has the advantage to see what
is motivating many or most of its practitioners, allowing one not only to understand better
the phenomenon at hand but perhaps generating some well needed laughter at the
spectacle of “famous men” and their “stage properties.” With the healthy perspective of
distance we are better judges of those who hold political power than those who are close,
but unknowingly relegated, to stage props.
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This observation of humanity by Nietzsche, in this case the intersubjectivity of so
called “famous men,” takes place from a distance. It occurs from an anonymous place
within the space of the shining of appearance, which allows him to feel the power that
results from these appearances in their very play. In part, this power consists of the joy
one gets from the conscious knowledge of these illusions as illusions. It is, in a sense, the
reward of the transgression Nietzsche feels he is making through this conscious
awareness of this play of appearance. One that has not “yet become conscious of itself” to
others but to him, is nothing less than the finest comedy. As a result, existence is likened
by Nietzsche to a state of dreaming where Apollonian images scheinen:
[A]mong all these dreamers, even I, the ‘knower’, am dancing my dance; that the
one who comes to know is a means of prolonging the earthly dance and thus is
one of the masters of ceremony of existence [den Festordnern des Daseins], and
that the sublime consistency and interrelatedness of all knowledge [die erhabene
Consequenz und Verbundenheit aller Erkenntnisse] may be and will be the
highest means to sustain the universality of dreaming, the mutual comprehension
of all dreamers, and thereby also the duration of the dream.252
This perspective allows Nietzsche and any conscious observer of human folly not only to
bear the tragedies and moralities that still grip life but to begin to twist free of them into a
new, cheerful thinking. It is a space in thought where these tragedies and moralities start
to lose their force and dissolve into “the eternal comedy of existence.” Accordingly, we
see then that comedy and serious matters are hardly antithetical just as we saw with
tragedy and comedy that often times mingle in close proximity so that each bends and
folds into the other, sometimes giving over into one the other yet able to remain distinct.
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Nietzsche continues his analysis and appreciation of appearance as it relates to
comedy and laughter in the critical aphorism that concludes book two. However
aphorism 107, “Our ultimate gratitude to art,” treats appearance in a much different way
than we have seen in The Gay Science thus far. In this aphorism, he looks at existence as
the phenomenon of appearance and art as the most sublime kind of appearance. By doing
this we hear the continued reverberations of his most important insights from The Birth of
Tragedy. This aphorism not only reiterates Nietzsche’s profound belief in the necessity of
art, it also showcases laughter and folly in the most significant way, whereas The Birth of
Tragedy concentrated mainly on tragedy.
In this aphorism Nietzsche uses art as a “counterforce” to science. Recall that in
the preface to the second edition of The Birth of Tragedy “An Attempt at Self-Criticism,”
which was published in 1886 only a year before The Gay Science, Nietzsche asks, “what
indeed is the meaning of all science, viewed as a symptom of life? What is the purpose,
and, worse still, what is the origin of all science? What? Is scientific method perhaps no
more than fear of and flight from pessimism? A subtle defence against—truth?”253
Nietzsche is concerned with science in terms of how it affects life. More specifically, he
sees it not as many of his contemporaries see it, which is the overwhelming tendency to
treat it as if it is the supreme method of disclosing the deepest truths. In other words,
many believe that science describes and understands the world as it actually is. But for
Nietzsche the theoretical tendency is a fleeing in the face of Dionysian truth, which is to
say tragic knowledge, because it veils this truth with its own Apollonian illusion in the
form of a runaway theoretical optimism. The very premise of science rests not only on
the quest to discover truth by its own method but it also rests on the notion that life itself
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is a problem that needs to be “fixed,” a premise that Nietzsche rejects. Nietzsche reverses
this, viewing science as a problem and something hostile to life and unable to come to
grips with tragic knowledge: “a problem with horns” he says in The Birth of Tragedy.
In aphorism 107 Nietzsche posits art as a counterpoint to science. It is the
phenomenon that is best suited to deliver us from disillusionment that results from the
failure of science to “correct” existence. Thus he states:
Had we not approved of the arts and invented this type of cult of the untrue
[Unwahren], the insight into general untruth and mendacity that is now given to
us by science [die Wissenschaft]—the insight into delusion and error as a
condition of cognitive and sensate existence—would be utterly unbearable.
Honesty [Redlichkeit] would lead to nausea and suicide. But now our honesty has
a counterforce [eine Gegenmacht] that helps us avoid such consequences: art, as
the good will to appearance [guten Willen zum Scheine].254
First, what is newly apparent in this aphorism of The Gay Science is that Nietzsche is less
hostile to science. The tone is less an outright rejection of science and more accepting of
science, but only under the guise of its intrinsic limits. In other words, it recognizes the
value of science by pointing out the very limits that science can never overcome. This
was certainly less evident in The Birth of Tragedy, where science was harshly critiqued
and even personified in the figure of Socrates who championed dialectical reasoning.
There is little doubt that at the conclusion of The Birth of Tragedy, art was seen as the
unquestioned champion of man’s “highest task” and the “greatest metaphysical activity.”
But what is striking here is Nietzsche’s claim that art too, like science, is its own type of
“untruth” indeed, a “cult of the untrue.” Hence we see a more balanced tone between art
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and science than we did in The Birth of Tragedy. One is compelled to ask then, does art
still retain the same status over science as it did in The Birth of Tragedy? And if so, What
is the difference? The answer to the first question is yes. However, the second question
requires scrutiny.
What Nietzsche is preeminently concerned with here is honesty. Honesty
(Redlichkeit) has a more nuanced meaning in German. It denotes more than the general
prohibition against telling untruths in that it is mainly focused on the scholarly work of
academia, which in Nietzsche’s time was the work done by thinkers that made up the
totality of sciences the Germans called Wissenschaft. Thus it is aimed at intellectual
honesty as the cohesiveness that binds all the sciences together, including the humanities.
Nietzsche’s critique is that science is never free of error “as a condition of
cognitive and sensate experience.” Science requires its own necessary illusions in order
to function at all.255 However, we expect science and its practitioners—those concerned
with the truth—to be least likely to utilize illusions because we equate truth with
something transcendent and fixed. Most people are either unaware of this dynamic or do
not believe it. Posited science, for them, is describing the world the way it really is
because it assumes that the fixed, rigid realm of Being lies behind the world as its
guarantor. Hence Nietzsche’s assertion is that if one were to exercise intellectual honesty,
or Redlichkeit, then the truth of science and its method could only lead to disillusionment
(literally the taking away of the illusion). To reiterate, this is not to say that Nietzsche is
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opposed to science and its practice, but only that at its heart lies the type of “untruth” that
few people are aware of or fail to acknowledge. Hence it is once again a failure of
Redlichkeit, of honesty, that Nietzsche finds as the problem. Somewhat similar to the
kind of nausea we saw with Sartre, a truly honest appraisal of science, Nietzsche
believes, “would lead to nausea and suicide.”
But of course Nietzsche, the philosopher of life, does not want us to take our own
life. Instead he would have us recognize these illogical “foundations” and irrational
beginnings of science and the subsequent need for art. It is when philosophers of all
people fail in this recognition that comedy ensues. Indeed this kind of self-forgetting is at
the heart of almost all great comedy, and for Nietzsche counts as one of the severest
transgressions in his catalogue of crimes.
There is, however, an important distinction that must be made between that of
memory related to history and the self-forgetting intrinsic to comedy. This comic selfforgetting that is tied to the philosopher’s epistemological enterprise must not be
confused with the type of healthy unhistorical thinking Nietzsche advocates in the essay,
“On the uses and disadvantages of history for life” in the Untimely Meditations. In this
essay the idea that one can “live almost without memory”256 is tied to happiness, history,
and action. Nietzsche uses the image of grazing cattle that live contently because they
live unhistorically in that they do not burden themselves with the past and are unaware of
the great stream of becoming they are part of. For the human being though, memory can
be a burden if it becomes oppressive. If the human being is unable to forget, to dememorialize at least to a large extent the past and is, “thus condemned to see everywhere
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a state of becoming: such a man would no longer believe in his own being.”257 This kind
of burdensome memory would lead to inaction much in the same vein as we saw above
with lethargy in The Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche goes on to stress that both, “the
unhistorical and the historical are necessary”258 although he characterizes the
unhistorical “as being more vital and more fundamental”259 to the action of a healthy
individual.
And this is where we see the difference between science, art, and their respective
illusions. Nietzsche’s appreciation of art, including the appearances that constitute both
tragedy and comedy, are indeed appearances but of a much different kind. Unlike
science, art “as the good will to appearance” (Nietzsche’s emphasis) allows us to derive
sublime pleasure from our own creations. “Good will” here denotes the kind of will that
recognizes appearance as appearance and does not attempt to seek meaning behind the
appearance. In other words, it is a reveling in appearance without prejudice. Nietzsche
states that with art, “We do not always keep our eyes from rounding off, from finishing
off the poem,”260 which is to say that art hovers before us as if it were a mirror. Whereas
with science its “function” is almost always in service to the kind of life that seeks to
correct existence and devalue the world of becoming. This is why it has always been
necessary for science to posit the unchanging world of being behind appearance: the
same kind of positing we saw in “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable” above.
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By appearing to ourselves in the form of art, we are able to bear and even affirm
the changing world of becoming where we find ourselves at the mercy of time, change,
cause and effect, but most importantly tragedies and follies:
As an aesthetic phenomenon [ästhetisches Phänomen] existence is still bearable
to us, and art furnishes us with the eye and hand and above all the good
conscience [gute Gewissen] to be able to make such a phenomenon of ourselves.
At times we need to have a rest from ourselves by looking at and down at
ourselves and, from an artistic distance, laughing [lachen] at ourselves or crying
at ourselves; we have to discover the hero no less than the fool [den Narren] in
our passion for knowledge; we must now and again be pleased about our folly
[froh] in order to be able to stay pleased about our wisdom! And precisely
because we are at bottom grave and serious human beings and more weights than
human beings, nothing does us as much good as the fool’s cap [die
Schelmenkappe].261
Unlike the world of being, which is posited outside of space and time in a realm that can
never truly be bridged, art allows us to distance ourselves from ourselves within the
world of becoming because it allows us within our space and time to hold up pieces and
moments of ourselves for reflection. On the one hand, we are part of the stream of
becoming, on the other hand, art allows us a reprieve to behold ourselves within this
stream. For Nietzsche it is the only significant way we can bear and affirm the contingent
world of becoming that we are part of.
What is even more evident in this aphorism is Nietzsche’s appreciation of folly
and laughter as it relates to the kind of Redlichkeit he is speaking about. Nietzsche
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stresses that if we are to remain faithful to the kind of beings that we are—human, all too
human beings—then honesty really means recognizing the kind of dishonesty inherent in
our desire for knowledge. In other words, there is a lawful and fluid play between
honesty and dishonesty that Nietzsche recognized as far back as 1873, when he wrote in
“On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense” that, “The feeling that one is obliged to
describe something as red, another as cold, and a third as dumb, prompts a moral impulse
which pertains to truth; from its opposite, the liar whom no one trusts and all exclude.”262
Perhaps Nietzsche is suggesting that the liar—the artist and/or the philosopher of
Zarathustra’s strain—really is the truth teller because the liar, especially through the
analysis of language, challenges the “lawful” and supposed universal designation of
things. In this context then art, as a “cult of the untrue,” really is a truth teller. This was
not lost on Pablo Picasso who professed, “Art is the lie that enables us to realize the
truth.”263
When we locate this aphorism in the context of The Gay Science and its call to
release thinking from the kind of heaviness that has dominated it until Nietzsche’s time (a
heaviness characterized by imperatives and “goal oriented” metaphysics such as Hegel’s
phenomenology of spirit), we find again a playfulness between folly and seriousness and
between science and art. If our science and knowledge are to be taken seriously, and
more importantly if they are to be honest, then laughter, folly and comedy are necessary
counter-elements. They help to bring balance to the lawfulness of all knowledge seeking
endeavors. Why exactly do we need folly to help achieve this?:
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[W]e need it against ourselves—we need all exuberant, floating, dancing,
mocking, childish, and blissful art lest we lose that freedom over things [Freiheit
über den Dingen] that our ideal demands of us. It would be a relapse [Rückfall]
for us, with our irritable honesty [reizbaren Redlichkeit], to get completely caught
up in morality and, for the sake of the overly severe demands that we make on
ourselves, to become virtuous monsters and scarecrows. We have also to be able
to stand above morality—and not just to stand with the anxious stiffness of
someone who is afraid of slipping and falling at any moment, but also to float and
play above it! How then could we possibly do without art and with the fool
[Narren]?—And as long as you are in any way ashamed of yourselves, you do not
yet belong among us!264
It is clear that Nietzsche equates art, especially comedy and the fool, with freedom.
Unable to see folly in our endeavors, it is as if we are condemning ourselves and the way
in which we practice science and the quest for knowledge, to the kind of oppressive
weightiness that Nietzsche’s thinking hopes to free us. This thinking is characterized by
transgression that says “no” to imperatives, that “floats and plays” outside of any
syllogistic structure, that is out of step with the march enough so that it dances. If
necessity that has traditionally been allied with Being has any role at all, it is that art and
folly are what is necessary as they temper our lives within the contingent world of
becoming. They allow us to remain free or, as Nietzsche puts it in quasi medical terms,
art as medicine, keeps us from relapsing so that we do not lose the very freedom over the
things we seek to understand. Especially as they are manifest in art, folly and laughter
allow us the distance necessary, not only from the serious work that we do as human
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beings, indeed “more weights than human beings,” but it allows for us to distance
ourselves from ourselves. All of this occurs within the world of becoming so that we can
showcase our folly and in turn reground our scientific and philosophical excess back to
the earth. And because “ground” has a long history within the Western philosophical
tradition this notion of a regrounding that returns to the earth is very different from this
history. It is to see these practices under the auspices of their intrinsic limits and the
illusions they employ. It is to see the endeavors of science and philosophy as part of the
world of nature, that is, of becoming where we are subject to its flux and chaos and yes,
to affirm all this as necessary in the manner of amor fati. Hence this “ground” is far from
the ground that guarantees certainty, it is in essence an abgrund.
To be sure we can find just such an image of this crazy mixture of seriousness and
folly much farther back in philosophical history than Nietzsche states here. As was
related in the Introduction, Thales was engaging in his own pursuit of knowledge and
discovery in the form of astronomy. While looking up and making his astronomical
observations, Thales forgot himself and stumbled into a well, much to the mirth of a
servant girl. If this image teaches us anything, then it surely is that folly and wisdom are
aligned and not antithetical. Nietzsche recognizes this about “the first philosopher of the
West” as well. In Philosophy During the Tragic Age of the Greeks, Nietzsche is trying to
show the type of creative genesis that lies behind the scientific edifice that will come to
dominate thinking for millennia in a short time. His characterization of the kind of
thinking undertaken by Thales, who believed water to be the one underlying substance of
the world, shows it to be more free and poetic or unmoored from the purely scientific and
logical:
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What then is it that brings philosophical thinking so quickly to its goal? Is it
different from the thinking that calculates and measures [dem rechnenden und
abmessenden], only by virtue of the greater rapidity with which it transcends all
space? No, its feet are propelled by an alien, illogical power [unlogische
Macht]—the power of creative imagination [die Phantasie]....Even if all the
footholds have crumbled by the time logic and empiric rigidity want to cross over
to such a proposition as “all is water,” even after the total demolition
[Zertrümmerung] of any scientific edifice, something remains. And in this
remainder lies an impelling force [treibende Kraft] which is the hope of future
fruitfulness [die Hoffnung zukünftiger Fruchtbarkeit].265
Creative imagination that precedes both sensibility and understanding and is the root of
all our artistic endeavors, indeed any of our endeavors, emancipates thinking out into the
freely open. One might prefer another perspective and say that imagination allows for the
boundless to enter back into our thinking once again. Hence the greatest weight and
importance of the Thales image lies not in any of its scientific discoveries and analyses,
although these have their own measure of importance. The important image is one of
seriousness sewn with laughter and folly which forms a shining rhapsody of humankind.
Far from being a distant, irrelevant image of the past, the image of Thales appears before
us as our image...as an image of us.
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IV. Conclusion: From The Gay Science to Thus Spoke Zarathustra

The laughter and comedy that is central to The Gay Science showcased
Nietzsche’s appeal for a new approach to thinking and its attendant wisdom. We saw that
Wissenschaft was henceforth released from the kind of heaviness that had constituted it at
least since the time of Socrates. This was accomplished in a number of ways.
First, gaya scienza itself was a new orientation towards existence that stressed an
unmooring from the kind of thinking anchored to “thou shalt” binding imperatives. This
new thinking achieved this not through any ressentiment of the old order, that is, it was
not simply a reactionary stance that was an antithesis to this order. It released itself in and
through its own cheerfulness and “yes saying” to life. One of the ways Nietzsche believes
we can achieve this is by having recourse to our own bodies—letting otherwise inchoate
states translate themselves into a vital, cheerful philosophy. Thus, there is a strong
emphasis in Nietzsche, especially in The Gay Science, on the transfiguration of the body
from something that formally was the seat of sin to a phenomenon that celebrates
cheerful life in its return and replenishment. The body’s pain was something to be
transfigured and affirmed and used to forge an outlook on life that celebrated strength and
life ascending values. Nietzsche appears to say that the key to this overcoming of pain in
large part lies in a hermeneutics of our physiological state: “The fact that someone feels
‘guilty’, ‘sinful’, by no means proves that he is right in feeling this way; any more than
someone is healthy just because he feels healthy.”266 Instead of interpreting physiological
pain as the factual state of sin, it ought to be transfigured, or as he says in this same
aphorism “digested” in the same way one “digests his meals.”
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What becomes evident then is the close connection between hermeneutics and the
body.267 To be sure, the feeling, affected body before any valuating, before any
psychological or transcendent cause is posited, is already undergoing interpretation as
Nietzsche makes clear:
[W]hat does valuating mean itself? Does it refer back or down to a different,
metaphysical world? As Kant (living before the great historical movement) still
believed. In short, where did it ‘originate’? Or did it not ‘originate’? Answer:
[M]oral valuating is an interpretation, a way of interpreting. The interpretation
itself is a symptom of particular physiological conditions, as well as of a particular
intellectual level among the ruling judgments. Who interprets?—Our affects.268
To be a body that is affected is always already an interpretation. I believe Nietzsche is
saying that he wants his readers to ruminate and think about the body just as carefully as
we do psychological states, and even to entertain the possibility that the pain we may feel
in our soul may be an effect of our physiology. When our physiology is affected some
way—once again suffering seems to be Nietzsche’s prime example—our interpretation
ought not rush to a conclusion, especially one that posits a cause of our pain due to some
transcendental transgression (our very Being as a state of sin). Instead, Nietzsche would
have us hover in the “in between,” our initial inchoate physiological states and thinking
consciousness that gives rise to hermeneutical explanation. It is as if, contra Kant,
Nietzsche is saying that authentic duty lies in mastery of one’s own affected body and its
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subsequent interpretation (hopefully into cheerfulness and laughter) before our affects are
assimilated by others into the socio-cultural formations of the herd.
Second, to come to grips with the kind of tragic knowledge examined in the first
section, knowledge essentially of nihilism and the collapse of all values hitherto, as
Nietzsche says many times, a necessary first step is to recognize oneself as homeless, as
nomadic much in the tradition of the troubadours. This is to say that because of the loss
of any transcendent meaning—the death of God is announced in this work—existence
becomes a place of unfamiliarity unlike one’s home. Nonetheless, because we find
ourselves here, existence no matter how familiar or unfamiliar is always our home. But to
be able to grapple with this homelessness, Nietzsche attempts a kind of reversal that is as
troubling as it is liberating. It turns us out into the freely open in which thinking can
become creative once again. To be sure, Nietzsche recognizes that his thinking is for the
few and the rare, that his thinking is in a sense untimely because he sees himself keenly
aware of the tragic view of existence where others do not. He is also quite aware of the
repercussions that take the form of pessimism. If he is to have us transform this
pessimism into life affirming laughter, a necessary first step is to take the perspective on
one’s new home, the existence into which we are thrown, so that we can become who we
are without illusions.
Third, there is a paradigm shift at work that attempts to rethink humankind only in
relation to the earth as opposed to “other worldly hopes.” Existence is to be understood in
purely human terms, which means that sensate experience is given more weight than the
intelligible realm. In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche stressed that “only as an aesthetic
phenomenon is existence eternally justified,” which is to say that only that which appears
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to sense is to hold sway. For Nietzsche the most important aesthetic phenomena are those
of art, especially tragedy and comedy, which disclose in the deepest way the symbols that
constitute our humanity. They are the only appearances able to disclose the Dionysian
abgrund to which we are all subject.
Fourth, there is a constant stress in Nietzsche that the most human beings can
have on things is a perspective. This provides a tension, a very comic tension at times,
because most people, including philosophical thinkers, believe first that metaphysics is a
hierarchy. For example, this paradigm has god at the top and we are a pale reflection of
its supposed perfection, and two, that if there are perspectives, then the belief is that they
harbor an all-encompassing bird’s eye view of things. In other words, they fail to see
their particular perspective as a perspective, as extremely limited and narrow in its
relation to millennia and history. One of Nietzsche’s examples is the idea that we are all
in service to the species, even though it may appear to us that we are promoting our own
self-interest. For Nietzsche, this is laughter provoking in that we not only fail to
recognize this but we also fail to comprehend that errors have played the major role in the
development of our species.
Fifth, the mocking tone of The Gay Science promotes the idea of transgression as
opposed to obedience. Nietzsche’s preface to the first edition, “‘Joke, Cunning, and
Revenge’ Prelude in German Rhymes” set the stage for the mischievousness that was to
take place in this work. One of the ways Nietzsche says we can begin to transgress the
kind of limits he believes characterizes thinking since at least Socrates. To be sure,
transgression exists within laughter itself, which in its very discharge says that one is no
longer swayed by previous thinking. Moreover, laughter itself is also a way to
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disassociate oneself from the very dialectical process that keeps one bound to such
thinking (this will come to even more prominence in Thus Spoke Zarathustra). To use
Nietzsche’s own metaphor on dancing, there is a freedom in laughter that releases
thinking from a march to a dance.
Last and perhaps most poignantly Nietzsche stresses the need to see life itself in
all of its beauty and hideousness as an appearance that provides us with its own laughter
provoking moments. Amidst the kind of tragic view of life Nietzsche is arguing that
existence itself, when we step back and let it appear to us, can shine. This can happen
even when or where it is least likely, in even the most depraved and serious of times
laughter is always possible, if not necessary. We can now start to see how The Gay
Science is in a certain sense an opening act for Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The first mention
of Zarathustra does not occur in Thus Spoke Zarathustra but in The Gay Science.
Nietzsche ends the first edition of this work in 1882 with aphorism 342, “Incipit
tragoedia,” introducing us to his Zarathustra and it is clearly evident that Nietzsche is
invoking the kind of poetic imagery that showcases the kind of inversion that he
envisions for philosophical thinking.
For example, in this aphorism Nietzsche invokes the image of the sun. Of course
the sun is a central image especially as it occurs in Plato’s Republic as an offspring of the
good.269 For Nietzsche the sun has a much different significance as it relates to the
inversion of the sensible/intelligible distinction. Nietzsche’s emphasis lies not on the sun
itself, nor as an “offspring of the good” but on those for whom the sun shines—earthbound human beings. Thus he says of the sun, “What would your happiness be if you did
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not have those for whom you shine!”270 Second, Nietzsche states that the sun rises to
Zarathustra’s place in the mountain not that Zarathustra or anyone else has to ascend to it
(whether through thinking or otherwise). Thus Nietzsche says that Zarathustra became
“sick” of his wisdom and there was now a need for “going under” in order to
“undermine” previous philosophical grounds. A major aspect of this going under for
Zarathustra is to bring back laughter and folly to human beings who have forgotten how
to laugh. Thus Zarathustra says, “Behold, I am sick of my wisdom [Weisheit], like a bee
that has collected too much honey; I need outstretched hands; I would like to give away
and distribute until the wise among humans once again enjoy their folly [Thorheit].”271
Once again it is clear that for Nietzsche wisdom and folly are never divorced. As
we will see, one of Zarathustra’s first tasks in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is to invoke the
“higher men,” that is, men of learning, so that they learn to laugh again, which means to
recognize the appearance of folly in human affairs as well as in the kind of thinking done
by men and women of learning. But the set-up to the laughter and the higher men actually
occurs in book three of The Gay Science. Aphorism 177, “On ‘the educational
establishment,’” states, “In Germany, higher men lack one great means of education: the
laughter [Gelächter] of higher men; for in Germany, these do not laugh [lachen].”272
Here we do find a significant difference, in that the lack of laughter amongst higher men
is limited to those in Germany whereas in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, we will see that this is
extended to all human beings, regardless of nationality. The “higher men” are of the
earth. Hence we can say that Nietzsche will end up broadening his perspective to include
any higher men of learning.
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 3/“Zarathustra’s Prologue.”
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Perhaps the greatest primer that The Gay Science offers its readers as a
preparation for Thus Spoke Zarathustra is its inclusion of laughter, a bestiary and other
animal imagery that helps us to see ourselves in our human, all too human capacities.
Aphorism 224, “Animal’s criticism” in book three states, “I fear that the animals see man
as a being like them who in a most dangerous manner has lost his animal common
sense—as the insane animal, the laughing animal [das lachende Thier], the weeping
animal, the miserable animal.”273 Nietzsche leaves much room for interpretation here.
Nonetheless two things can be said. First, Nietzsche seems to want to stress a continuity
if not a likeness with animals so that we do not simply privilege ourselves over them to
the point that our illusions strip us of our earthbound situatedness. Similar to animals, we
too are biological beings and creatures of the earth. Second, if this first interpretation is
correct then it calls into question the very question of our humanity. If we are not
privileged and the death of God and the advent of nihilism shows that we are, at a
minimum biologically speaking, just another animal, what will then fill this nihilistic
void? By taking the perspective of an animal as Nietzsche does in this aphorism, he is
asking how it is possible in the midst of tragic knowledge to consolidate all of these
individual, disparate characteristics that an animal might see—the insane, laughing,
weeping, and miserable animal—into a “common sense” so as to counter nihilism.
Aphorism 314, “New domestic animals” states, “I want my lion and eagle around
so that I can always have hints and forebodings to know how great or small my strength
is. Must I look down on them today and fear them? And will the hour return when they
look up at me – in fear?”274 Once again, these kind of pronouncements by Nietzsche
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surely grant the fact that there is much hermeneutical license involved, indeed required in
Nietzsche’s writings. Nonetheless the polemic in both of these aphorisms revolves around
the notion of perspective and whether we are capable of having the kind of perspective on
ourselves where we see each other as human creatures of the earth that have “become
interesting.”
Nietzsche is stressing the need to have a perspective on oneself that in light of all
that we have called ourselves—rational animal, a thinking thing, something worthy as an
end in itself—we have forgotten that we are also all the things (and more) that he claims
we are in this aphorism. Once again we see Nietzsche in the mode of a psychologist,
stressing the kind of phenomena that constitute us as a human animal but that we too
often sublimate to the values of the herd. Laughter is just one such example he uses in
conjunction with the animal perspective. It will reoccur in full splendor in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra.
In the second aphorism there is again a play of animals and perspective. In
Nietzsche’s view, when things have reached their zenith and have fulfilled their role,
whether it is Christ and Christianity or Socrates and the Greeks, then all must perish
under the weight of its own greatness. In other words, there is typically an almost
palpable tension found in Nietzsche’s writings: an agōn either between people, thinkers,
cultures or values. Both the lion and eagle are metaphors of strength and vitality. The
lion’s perspective is of the earth as it roams and seeks its prey and the eagle’s perspective
is of the sky from which it descends to its prey. For Nietzsche, we might say that both the
lion and eagle are reminders of one’s own vitality, in both body and spirit, and whether
he has reached his heights as a thinker or is falling short of his own noble goals.
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Before we transition to Thus Spoke Zarathustra and the prolific laughter that one
finds amidst that work, it seems as though a necessary first step is to address Nietzsche’s
appropriation of Zarathustra. Why does Nietzsche choose such an archaic figure from
whom many things are said and from which laughter resounds on many occasions? What
is the significance of Zarathustra the historical figure and Nietzsche’s literaryphilosophical Zarathustra?
The Gay Science saw Nietzsche trying to reassert the need for laughter and folly.
If we are to successfully confront nihilism and pessimism, remain optimistic, and forego
ressentiment, then laughter and comedy are all the more necessary. With Thus Spoke
Zarathustra we come to see this laughter enacted in this character. Zarathustra, as a
historical figure of Persia, was the first to introduce the distinct notions of good and evil
in the West. These moral tenets gripped thinking, argues Nietzsche, until his time. The
tragedy is that they are beginning to lose their grip on culture. Nietzsche believes they are
dissolving and he recognizes this fulcrum of world history in which all previous values
are becoming devalued. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, through laughter, comedy and parody,
will attempt to teach “higher men” the need for these qualities if life is to be not only
bearable but joyful. In other words Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is a precocious character.
Unlike the vast majority he addresses in this work, he is conscious of the tragic outlook.
Learning to laugh, that is, to attune oneself so that one is able to locate laughter at the
intersection of good and evil, where it was previously forbidden, allows for a movement
beyond good and evil. The task is to be the figure who can disclose to others—especially
the learned—the tragedy that looms on the horizon of existence: a horizon that has
hitherto provided metaphysical comfort and meaning to countless peoples. This is why
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didactic as Zarathustra can be at times, he is also poetic. Through his own unique logos
he discloses a new perspective on existence, fulfilling the role of poet who attempts to
move “beyond good and evil,” that is, beyond the old order of things. As Higgins writes,
“The mission of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is not to pronounce and enforce moral
judgments on others. Instead, it is the on-going attainment and revision of insights, which
he does not dishonestly force into easy consistency with one another...”275 But most
notable to this task is Nietzsche’s insistence that Zarathustra not only speak in this work
(hence the title), but laugh. This pervasive laughter that takes many forms—scorn,
destruction, humor and so forth—even overflows Zarathustra himself. Many of the other
characters, such as the animals in this work, laugh as well. In the last analysis Nietzsche
invokes us to step back into a new perspective and laugh as well at the “eternal comedy
of existence.”
In essence, then Nietzsche’s literary-philosophical creation enacts a palimpsest on
the old, historical Zarathustra (from the Greek palimpsestos, “scraped again,” from palin
“again” and psen “to rub smooth”). Keeping in mind Nietzsche’s notion that knowledge
should be forward looking, that is, a will to new knowledge as opposed to a return to
some original in order that we copy it, Nietzsche appropriates the old historical
Zarathustra who introduced the world to good and evil so that he could create a new
perspective through his own palimpsest that looks towards the future even though there
might not yet be ears for such an untimely message. Thus begins, as Nietzsche has it, the
“wicked and malicious” parody.
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Chapter Three: Thus Laughed Zarathustra

“I am leaving Genoa as soon as possible and going into the mountains—this year I do not
want to talk to anybody.
Do you want to know a new name for me? The language of the church has one—I
am...the Antichrist.
Let us not forget how to laugh!”
~Nietzsche, Letter to Malwida von Meysenbug, 1883~

I. Zarathustra’s Laughing Call
Thus Spoke Zarathustra is perhaps the work of Nietzsche’s that is most different
from all his other texts. It is written mostly in the aphorism style, which is different from
most other philosophical treatises in which a subject is announced, problematized and
then defended one way or the other. However, the aphorisms contained within this text
exhibit a poetic and dramatic texture even unlike his previous works. This leads Gilles
Deleuze and Félix Guattari to proclaim, “Nietzsche’s aphorisms shatter the linear unity of
knowledge, only to invoke the cyclic unity of the eternal return, present as the nonknown
in thought.”276 As the title makes clear, Zarathustra indeed speaks but this speaking is not
limited to the normally privileged form of formal philosophic discourse, such as
dialectics. The Zarathustra who speaks, that is, who conveys his wisdom, does so in many
ways. Besides the use of language and dialogue that he has with others, Zarathustra also
at times sings and dances. However, included in all of these phenomena that constitute
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Zarathustra’s voice is laughter and, as we shall see, laughter and comedy abound in this
most idiosyncratic of Nietzsche’s work, helping to weave lightness amidst its profound
message.
To begin to see how laughter resonates in this text, we can think of its occurrence
along two axes. The first axis denotes who is doing the laughing. It is not always
Zarathustra. His animals are also his “followers,”277 that is, those he encounters along his
way who gather in his cave, who laugh on many occasions. Moreover, when Zarathustra
leaves his cave to commence “going down” (untergehen) the townspeople respond with
their own laughter. It is a laughter that provides Zarathustra with his first philosophical
challenge to his going under.
The second axis denotes the kind of laughter that occurs. In this text, laughter
takes on many different forms and textures and on no occasion is laughter simply
gratuitous. Thus laughter erupts on occasion as something provocative and even at times
scornful. Laughter may also occur as a form of affirmation that signals Nietzsche’s
willingness to harness what he sees as his task in and through his parody of the historical
Zarathustra (including the moral concepts of good and evil that he initiated) with his own
literary Zarathustra, preparing the way for a new future that affirms life in the face of
nihilism. In effect there are two voices of Zarathustra, one historical and one that parodies
the historical Zarathustra. To be sure, there are many more voices that emanate from this
work, as one of Nietzsche’s goals is to gather all the voices of the earth as if they were a
chorus because we are all, in a sense, subject to one another. For Nietzsche, parody is the
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prime comedic device that showcases the many layers and interconnections of
Zarathustra not only to the other characters but to wider, philosophical history as well. In
his book, The Multivoiced Body, Fred Evans makes clear this interconnection of voices:
Because the subject matter of this struggle is embedded in the linguistic
community, it reflects these other points of view from the beginning. Thus any
new utterance about this subject matter is already partially constituted by and in
contest with the other social languages of the community.278
Although Evans is using Dostoevsky’s novels as his example via Mikhail Bakhtin’s
notion of linguistic hybridization, nonetheless he lists “[p]arody, hidden polemic,
reverence” as examples of “dialogic overtones,”279 all of which are present in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra. Descending from his isolation in his cave Zarathustra is, to be sure,
embedded in the very community of human beings with their views and corresponding
voices that he wants to usurp.
There are of course many more examples. Suffice it to say that in terms of
laughter, a finely attuned hermeneutical lens is needed to navigate up and down the poles
of both axes in order to unconceal its significance. Zarathustra’s laughter often times
lacks subtlety and may appear as abrasive, even belittling, but its occurrence is never
frivolous and it is surely a sign of something deep in his teaching. However, before
beginning, a few short words ought to be made280 that attempt to frame the over-arching
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issue at hand in this distinctive work of Nietzsche’s so that we can best see how humor
and laughter play their key role.
There are three overriding issues at play in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The first two
involve Nietzsche’s pronouncement of the major metaphysical claims of the eternal
return of the same (the eternal recurrence) and the will to power. Although there are
many interpretations of the eternal return, mine is twofold. To begin we must recall that
Nietzsche first introduces the eternal return in The Gay Science and not Thus Spoke
Zarathustra. In the former work I argue that Nietzsche’s initial thought on the eternal
return revolves around a regulative fiction in the form of an existential calling. Nietzsche
is asking his reader to consider his or her life in terms of having to live it over again for
eternity. In other words, the existential imperative is to have lived a life in which you had
become who you are and fulfilled your highest aspirations or your “will to power.” Thus
he says:
What if some day or night a demon were to steal into your loneliest loneliness and
say to you: ‘This life as you now live it and have lived it you will have to live
once again and innumerable times again; and there will be nothing new in it
[nichts Neues daran], but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh
and everything unspeakably small or great in your life must return to you [muss
dir wiederkommen], all in the same succession and sequence.’281
The eternal return that Nietzsche speaks of here clearly indicates an existential
dimension, but in Thus Spoke Zarathustra there is a more refined effort underway by
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Nietzsche. He treats the eternal return as a metaphysical idea while still keeping its
existential overtones:
Behold, we know what you teach: that all things recur eternally [ewig
wiederkehren] and we ourselves along with them, and that we have already been
here times eternal and all things along with us....But the knot of causes [der
Knoten von Ursachen] in which I am entangled recurs—it will create me again! I
myself belong to the causes of the eternal recurrence. I will return, with this sun,
with this earth, with this eagle, with this snake—not to a new life or better life or
a similar life:—I will return to this same and selfsame life [gleichen und selbigen
Leben], in what is greatest as well as in what is smallest, to once again teach the
eternal recurrence of all things.282
Here, the stress is not on a metaphysics taken in its literal sense as that which is beyond
the physical, that is, as the positing and appeal to some supersensible criteria. Instead it is
the kind of metaphysics that constitutes the causes and repetitions of that which eternally
returns. Reflecting on the eternal return in Ecce Homo Nietzsche says, “The doctrine of
the ‘eternal return,’ which is to say the unconditioned and infinitely repeated cycle of all
things—this is Zarathustra’s doctrine.”283 We can understand the “unconditioned” here as
that which occurs without the imposition of form, in other words what eternally returns is
chaos. If the cheerfulness that beats at the heart of The Gay Science shows anything it is
that even though we are heirs of the past, nonetheless we are responsible for our time
now, which lies between the infinite expanse of the past and the infinite expanse of the
future. Babich links the eternal return with love stating:
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 178/“The Convalescent.”
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Amor fati is not the resignation of destiny but blessing wrought in the moment of
perfection. The consummation of love is to take them all together. Amor fati
affirms the past and the future turning like the path the walker traces on either
side of the lake at Silva Plana....The affirmation of the eternal return is a selective
benediction transfiguring everything with the same golden or silver glance.284
Nietzsche’s imperative is to refuse assimilation into what he sees as the weighty, serious,
transcendental oppressiveness of the morality of his time. Laughter and cheerfulness are
key characteristics envisioned for the psyche of the new artist-philosopher, which is
given in the voice and image of Zarathustra. His focus is of the earth which was, perhaps,
glimpsed in the Socrates of the Phaedo as the reborn “music-making Socrates.”
However, Nietzsche is still concerned about how meaning or value is generated
by human beings in light of this new existential condition: there is no eternal, pre-given
meaning especially the notions of good and evil which had until Nietzsche’s time “bookended” all moral discourse. So entrenched were they that Zarathustra says, “No greater
market place on earth did Zarathustra find than good and evil.”285 Now Zarathustra is at
pains to deconstruct (some might say “destruct”) and overcome these notions. In light of
this lack of any teleological, pre-established “ends” we must create our meaning. For
Nietzsche the eternal recurrence becomes two things. First, it becomes the illustration of
this meaningless (Nietzsche says in The Gay Science aphorism 341, “[W]ould you not
throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus?”
Zarathustra is in many ways this “demon” that heralds the eternal return). Second, it
becomes more importantly, the fertile ground, the chaos, that is always there from which
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one can confront nihilism by first recognizing it and then setting to work on creating
one’s soul within the freedom opened up by the eternal return.
It is important to stress that what Nietzsche is saying in terms of the eternal
recurrence is not that the same events will return over and over again. Nor does he mean
that all subjects will return over and over again eternally to live the same life. What
returns is chaos or, “the knot of causes” in which we are a part; “I myself belong to the
causes of the eternal recurrence” says Zarathustra’s companions the snake and eagle
when they formulate what Zarathustra might say of the eternal return (my emphasis on
“causes”). And what is another name for chaos if not what the young Nietzsche
“formalized” in his earlier work, The Birth of Tragedy—the Dionysian or that which is
without ground. The deep Dionysian chaos that Nietzsche describes in section four, as
“that which truly exists, the eternally suffering and contradictory, primordial unity,” is
antecedent to any manifest structure—individuals, systems, society, culture—and thus is
the primal unity of all things. Hence, if the eternal return attempts to establish anything,
then this “anything” is uncertainty.
The second over-arching issue found in this work is the will to power. Like the
eternal return, the will to power has various interpretations. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
Nietzsche treats the will to power as the mechanism or force by which we create meaning
for ourselves and also that which pervades all living things. He states, “Wherever I found
the living, there I found the will to power.”286 If the eternal return is the Abgrund that
always brings chaos, then the will to power is the force that attempts to organize itself out
of this primordial raw material so that we “become such as we are.”287 So, for example, a
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poet may enhance his or her feeling of power by disclosing a vision of the world in and
through the play of signs, semiotic systems and images. Indeed, their power may stem
from challenging the prevailing systems of the day.288
But Nietzsche is careful to delineate the will to power along two main paths. The
will to power can act as a nihilistic force. In other words it can, by virtue of its volition,
will nothing in the sense that it may continually say “no” to life. This will to power is
essentially reactive. Nietzsche stresses the need to overcome this tendency:
‘No deed can be annihilated [vernichtet]; how could it be undone through
punishment? This, this is what is eternal about the punishment called existence
[der Strafe Dasein], that existence must also eternally be deed and guilt again!
Unless the will were to finally redeem itself and willing became not-willing
[Nicht-Wollen]—;’ but my brothers, you know this fable song of madness!289
What is being stressed here is the same line of argument that Nietzsche makes in The
Birth of Tragedy when he addresses Buddhism (via Schopenhauer). What the Buddhist
seeks to overcome is desire and to do that one must stop willing or at least diminish one’s
will as much as possible. But for Nietzsche this is neither possible nor desirable—“man
still prefers to will nothingness, than not will...”290 he says at the conclusion to On the
Genealogy of Morality.
On the other hand, one can will in an active way. Again, On the Genealogy of
Morality best illustrates this notion of an active force. Nietzsche details in the first essay
the noble, aristocratic class that refuses the ressentiment of the reactive priestly class and
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their designation of good and bad into good and evil that has gripped morality and ethics.
The active force of those that see themselves as noble affirms life in all of its conditions,
which means affirming even suffering as well as chaos, which is essentially another name
for the Dionysian phenomenon.
But we must also keep in mind one more crucial point in terms of the will to
power and the forces that come to direct it. These active and reactive forces can be either
outwardly directed, that is, understood in terms of wider culture that seeks to organize the
chaos of nature or they can be inwardly directed as a struggle within an individual. For
example, Nietzsche argues that if reactive forces are to permeate a culture (one must keep
in mind that there is always an agōn at some level between active and reactive forces and
never a complete annihilation by one over another) then that culture will decline. But if
active forces are allowed to ascend and the instincts are given an outlet, then culture will
flourish. This Nietzsche makes clear in On the Genealogy of Morality, in the example
above of the aristocratic and priestly classes.
However, there is also an inward directedness of active and reactive forces. In this
sense, the living subject possesses its own will to power, which is to say that there is a
constant struggle within the individual of competing drives that are constantly changing
and shifting. Nietzsche wants the individual to harness active forces so that its will to
power becomes enhanced towards its own noble, value creating ends. This
outward/inward directedness of the will to power is illustrated by Nietzsche when he
states:
Development of mankind
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A. To gain power over nature [Macht über die Natur] and to that end a certain
power over oneself. Morality was necessary in order for man to prevail in the
struggle with nature and the ‘wild animal.’
B. Once power over nature has been gained, one can use this power to continue
freely shaping oneself [sich selbst frei weiterzubilden]: will to power [Wille zur
Macht] as self-heightening and strengthening.291
The will to power, then, is intimately connected to the eternal return.292 Gaining power
over nature means looking into and fathoming its depth without illusions and affirming
what one sees, which for Nietzsche is will to power. Then, in turn, one can declare, in the
spirit of the Homeric Hymn to Dionysus, “Once more, and again!” What we will see as a
feature of these staples of Nietzsche’s thought is the way in which laughter plays a key
role in their expression and attainment—laughter that is brought into play by Zarathustra
to help covey his wisdom.
The last over-arching issue in Thus Spoke Zarathustra concerns the nature of this
work, which is more of a poem or novel than a typical philosophical treatise. It can also
be defended as a song, that is, a “musical” work, that Nietzsche composes for his readers
because it possesses many of the characteristics of a musical score—its own refrain,
rhythm, intensity, speed and so forth. It is also musical in that it comes from that
Dionysian space that it wants to showcase to the world, a space that is antecedent to
language, as Nietzsche stressed in The Birth of Tragedy. Indeed Nietzsche claimed that
The Birth of Tragedy should have sung and not spoken. I believe that with Thus Spoke
Zarathustra Nietzsche is giving us his gift of song that he had hoped for in his earlier
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work. Both Sallis and Freydberg recognize Nietzsche’s stress on the musicality of a work
as well as the Dionysian and the irreducibility or synthesis of these elements. In his work
that examines Sallis’s thought Freydberg states:
Sallis points out throughout Crossings that the thought of The Birth of Tragedy
and of the Apollonian/Dionysian resists synthesis at every turn. He calls it a
“questionable, almost inaccessible, impossible” book on account of the strange,
foreign voice that sounds from it—“it should have sung, this ‘new soul’—and not
spoken!” But sung how? Not in a Wagnerian voice, nor—I suggest—even in a
Greek voice. Sallis’s final sentence: “Rather, a song to which one could dance, a
song of holy laughter,” a Zarathustrian song. 293
In this light, it is crucial to remember that as a work of this kind it is not only
important to keep in mind how this song is composed and sung but more importantly how
it is heard, how it (re)sounds in the mind and ear of the listener, how the song of holy
laughter resonates with those willing to affirm their ties to the earth and the other
elementals that are gathered by it, presuming of course that there are ears ready to hear
such a song.
Taken together, all of this showcases this work as something dramatic. This
dramatic structure, as Laurence Lampert maintains, includes many of the requisite
elements such as characters both human and animal, place, time as well as rising action
and dénouement. These elements come to dramatize Nietzsche’s views rather than
present it in the form of a logically defended position. Thus Lampert states, “the point of
the drama is to show how Zarathustra grows into the task required of the philosopher in
that destitute time that Nietzsche diagnosed as the terminal nihilism of Western culture,
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how he is educated to the task of a new founding.”294 In essence, then, when we read a
work such as Thus Spoke Zarathustra, we must let the themes of laughter and comedy
resonate in a way proper to this kind of dramatic composition: a reading that brings into
sharp focus the challenges that human beings face as they inevitably confront nihilism in
the postmodern world. In many ways, Nietzsche considers Thus Spoke Zarathustra to be
his crowning achievement as is evidenced by a look at the letters he wrote to his friends
and colleagues at the time and Ecce Homo as well.295 Still, he never lost sight of the fact
that folly resided at its very heart. As he wrote to Franz Overbeck in 1883 after
completing the first part, “This reminds me of my latest folly—I mean Zarathustra.”
Because the intersection of literature and philosophy becomes prevalent with
French postmodern thinkers296 and because Thus Spoke Zarathustra faithfully fulfills its
role as literature as well as philosophy, it would appear prudent then to see how this work
relates to contemporary thought. Many postmodern philosophers were influenced by
Nietzsche, prominent among them is Gilles Deleuze. We saw an overview of how his and
Guattari’s major work, A Thousand Plateaus, emphasized a non-traditional, nonhierarchical metaphysics. Instead of a metaphysics that posited a teleological goal (God,
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Forms, Spirit etc.),297 their metaphysics generates in perpetuity multiplicity through the
dynamic play of the plane of consistency with the plane of organization; multiplicity
being either what Deleuze refers to as “arborescent” with hierarchical elements or
“rhizomatic” that possesses diverse and diverging elements. For Deleuze and Guattari
both kinds of assemblages communicate with one another. However, rhizomatic
multiplicities by their very nature always maintain an advantage over their arborescent
counterparts. This is not because they necessarily dominate them in some way but
because, as rhizomatic, they are always already giving rise to new genetic lines of
development and expansion and thus are never totalized as a unity the way arborescent
multiplicities may appear.298 In addition, because their system is non-totalizing since
there is no single, stable transcendent principle under which all else is subordinated and
thus reality is constituted as pure immanence, I refer to it as a radical materialism.
Although there are indeed differences between Nietzsche and Deleuze’s
philosophical views, there is also a deep kinship. For example, Nietzsche speaks of
multiplicity on many different levels (a multiple interpretation of multiplicity itself)
including physiological drives, psychological drives, and the multiplicity of affects just to
name a few. Likewise Zarathustra says, “The body is a great reason, a multiplicity with
one sense, a war and a peace, one herd and one shepherd.”299 And even what appears to
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be the kind of metaphysics that describes reality itself, such as Deleuze and Guattari’s
notion of assemblages and absolute deterritorialization, Nietzsche says something very
similar:
And do you know what ‘the world’ is to me? Shall I show you it in my mirror?
This world: a monster of force [Ungeheuer von Kraft], without beginning, without
end, a fixed, iron quantity of force which grows neither large nor smaller, which
doesn’t exhaust but only transforms [verwandelt] itself, as a whole unchanging in
size, an economy without expenditure and losses, but equally without increase,
without income, enclosed by ‘nothingness’ as by a boundary, and not something
blurred, squandered, not something infinitely extended [nichts UnendlichAusgedehntes].300
In this same passage Nietzsche goes on to describe this eternal process of construction
and destruction as “multifarious” (vielfältigsten) and even “Dionysian,” which stays
faithful to our earlier analysis that the Dionysian is seen as non-rational, nonfoundational, that is, as an Abgrund. We will come to see how Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke
Zarathustra attempts to usurp the prevailing nihilistic tendencies of the West, most
importantly morality and its leveling influence, by facilitating its reterritorialization. If
Zarathustra’s message is meant to convey anything it is the importance of affirming life
within the world of becoming by authentically owning up to the tragic knowledge I have
detailed thus far.
These are the overarching issues in this work and they provide the framework
within which provocative laughter occurs. Because laughter is so ubiquitous in Thus
Spoke Zarathustra, I will examine those occasions where its impact is felt most deeply.
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We will see that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra laughs often because he sees it as his task to
affirm an ethos of affirmation; one that celebrates our ties to the earth in all of its and our
multiplicity.

II. Zarathustra and the Costumed Drama

We saw in the second chapter on The Gay Science that Nietzsche harbors a deep
appreciation for appearance (Erscheinung), especially appearance as beautiful Schein.
This is not only because appearance is what constitutes reality for us but also because the
aesthetic justification of life in which beautiful, shining appearance is disclosed is done
through appearing. This disclosing is one that privileges the eye and not one that
privileges the ego or “I” of the self-certain Cartesian cogito, which attempts to know
phenomena through calculation and clear and distinct ideas. Moreover, shining
appearance can take the form of the sublime or of the absurd in which “the eternal
comedy of existence” parades before us in a timeless play.
As unique a work that Thus Spoke Zarathustra is, we can use one of Nietzsche’s
comic examples from The Gay Science that we previously examined as a bridge to this
work. In The Gay Science the comedy of existence often times disclosed itself as the
comic appearance of famous men, most notably political leaders. The main emphasis was
on the kind of pathos of distance that Nietzsche advocates which lets us view the
otherwise serious issues of a political nature in a comic light. These included the kind of
“stage play” that famous men engage in as they utilize other people as props in order to
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present the type of appearance that is beneficial to them at any given moment. Of course
the comedy laid in the fact that this image-play, which most are not aware of, provided a
comic spectacle for the acute observer of appearance. The proper perspective—a
perspective that few have—allows the eternal comedy of existence that has “not yet
become conscious of itself” to play forth for them in its absurdity, even as those deeply
immersed in it perhaps believe it to be a pivotal moment in history in which they are a
key player.
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche revisits this same phenomena although this
time the spectator is Zarathustra himself. In the section titled “On Human Prudence” in
the second part, the polemic Zarathustra struggles with revolves around prudence.
Normally prudence—the ability to govern oneself and one’s affairs wisely especially by
use of reason—is understood and embraced by those seeking a solid, practical ethic. But
for Nietzsche, who is advocating for the ethic of the overman (Übermensch) and the will
to knowledge that happens “beyond good and evil,” prudence is at war with itself.
Zarathustra struggles with his commitment to mankind and his disciples and also to the
overman for which mankind is a bridge; “I bind myself with chains to mankind because I
am drawn upward to the overman.”301 Zarathustra’s prudence, which takes four forms in
this section, has allowed him to be committed to mankind in his project of overcoming.
In terms of action and speech, he has been able to project the proper intensity to his
listeners yet at the same time this prudence by its very nature has made him overly
cautious and shrewd to the point that the lightness of touch needed to ascend to the
overman has been stifled.
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What Zarathustra enacts at this point in his wanderings is essentially the prudence
of imprudence, that is, the necessity at times of being imprudent so as to allow his project
that paves the way for the overman to move forward. This play of prudence and
imprudence harbors its own comedic value, namely that at times prudence requires one to
be imprudent! Indeed the very nature of prudence with its cautious, guarded stance
requires in this instance imprudence or the abandonment of these principles. In other
words the play involves what is essentially a comedic giving over into opposites.
In the case of Zarathustra, prudence and imprudence plays itself out in his
closeness and detachment from mankind—the very people he is attempting to help. He is
aware that he is seeking ears for his message but that his message of mankind as a bridge
to the overman may not be suitable for all ears. Thus he must act imprudently at times in
his relationship with them, which is to say he must temper his showing of himself to
them. In essence, the play of prudence and imprudence really is the play of appearance or
with appearance, that is, the ability to know when to appear to mankind as well as when
to let mankind appear to him in its splendor. One of Zarathustra’s preferred means of
prudence involves the spectacle of vain people whom he admires, not necessarily for their
particular mode of vanity but for the appearance vanity itself provides as spectacle. Thus
Zarathustra says of the vain:
For life to be a proper spectacle, its play [Spiel] must be well-played [gespielt];
but for this good play actors are needed. I found all vain people to be good actors;
they play and want to be spectacular—all their spirit is focused in this willing.
They perform themselves, they invent themselves; in their proximity I love to be
a spectator of life [dem Leben Schauspiele]—it heals me of my melancholy.
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Therefore I spare the vain, because they are physicians for my melancholy and
keep me riveted to people as if to a play [Schauspiele].302
Most notable is the fact that Nietzsche characterizes this phenomenon of appearance as a
play that happens in life. Being “riveted to people” outside the formality of a theatre is to
say that the appearances that constitute the very texture of life become the comic venue.
In the case of the vain, the resounding excess they often exhibit remains faithful to the
resounding excess of the comically masked Dionysus. So, comparable to the play of
appearance of the famous men in The Gay Science, Zarathustra also recognizes the
playfulness of the vain.
However, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra there is marked difference. This time a
certain depth appears that the example of the famous men in The Gay Science only hinted
at. Nietzsche is attempting to confront the nihilism that he sees as beginning to grip
humankind by advocating a coming to grips with tragic knowledge that refuses to allow
any “meta” positions to condition life or provide it meaning. It becomes clear that
Zarathustra is that voice that attempts to achieve these goals. Moreover, in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, Nietzsche is not just engaged in detached observation of the phenomenon of
appearance as the section in The Gay Science treated above seems to suggest. Instead, his
Zarathustra is the appearance on the historical stage parodying the older notions of good
and evil in all their variety. This parody heralds an overcoming by the more-than-human
type of the overman. Thus Spoke Zarathustra then cannot be reduced to the text with its
plot and characters. It overflows the text into life itself in order to propagate its message
of the eternal return, the overman, and the coming to grips and overcoming of nihilism. If
this message is not tempered by Zarathustra in a nuanced way, so that his audience either
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fails to grasp it or becomes overly frightened and unwilling to be the ears for his
message, then he will have failed.
In this same section, this is exactly why Zarathustra muses to himself that his
fourth kind of human prudence requires a “secret laughter” because of its dangerousness
to ears that are not yet ready to hear his message. He says, “I do not allow my view of
evil ones to be spoiled by your fearfulness,” which is to say that what others (most
notably the “good and just” and “wise and knowing” ones as Nietzsche refers to them)
call and fear as “evil” or the “devil” are essentially small and petty things. “In you,” says
Zarathustra “there is much to laugh at [zum Lachen] and especially your fear [Furcht] of
what up till now has been called ‘devil!’”303 Nietzsche’s claim is that Zarathustra and his
message, although wise to ears that are prepared to hear his message, would nonetheless
appear as frightful to the supposed good, just, and knowing. Nietzsche says their
judgments about what is evil or demonic are small and petty compared to the profound,
honest but unsettling message of Zarathustra:
So estranged from greatness are you in your souls that the overman would seem
terrible [furchtbar] to you in his kindness! And you wise and knowing ones, you
would flee [flüchten] from the sunburn of wisdom in which the overman joyfully
bathes his nakedness! You highest human beings whom I have ever laid eyes
on—this is my doubt in you [Zweifel an euch] and my secret laughter [mein
heimliches Lachen]: I suspect you would call my overman—devil!304
The reason that Zarathustra’s laughter is secretive is precisely because he harbors the
kind of tragic knowledge that the “highest human beings” do not yet understand, have
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failed to recognize or, and this is a generous “or,” have failed to own up to if in fact they
are conscious of such knowledge. This is why Zarathustra’s pronouncement of the
overman, although an act of extreme kindness from the perspective of Zarathustra
because it is a gift to humankind, nonetheless would strike terror into the hearts of the
highest human beings who are the recipients of this gift thinking him a devil of some
sorts. “[A]ll great things, in order to inscribe eternal demands [ewigen Forderungen] in
the heart of humanity, must first wander the earth under monstrous and terrifying masks
[ungeheure und furchteinflössende Fratzen],”305 Nietzsche says in Beyond Good and
Evil. In this sense, Zarathustra, who is at play with appearance, is much like Dionysus
who wears the mask of both comedy and tragedy that conceals the monstrousness behind
it—the monstrousness as the death of god and the resulting nihilism in the West. For
Zarathustra to be prudent, so that he is able to disclose what many will take as a
monstrous message, he must practice imprudence, that is, he must engage in a careful
play of concealment/unconcealment of the truth he himself is aware of amongst the
many:
But I want to see you costumed [verkleidet], you neighbors and fellow human
beings, and well groomed, and vain, and dignified, as “the good and the just”—
And costumed I myself want to sit among you—so that I might not recognize
[verkenne] you and myself; for that is my final human prudence. Thus spoke
Zarathustra.306
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This costumed drama with its many players—those who still hold to the old valuations of
good and evil as well as Zarathustra who is a harbinger of the overman—is in part what
constitutes this secret and knowing laughter.
By casting this in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of assemblages we can
begin to see how far reaching Nietzsche’s thought is in this crucial work. To reiterate,
Nietzsche’s literary figure is a parody of the historical Zarathustra of ancient Persia. The
historical Zarathustra, (as well as Zoroastrianism) is the assemblage that, through its
expression and content, brought the notions of good and evil onto the world stage. Or one
might say that because the notions of good and evil are so pervasive in our morality, the
historical name “Zarathustra” really just suffices for Western morality and ethics in
general. Likewise, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is also an assemblage. It is one that utilizes the
comic device of parody in order to bring a new perspective to morality. One might say
that Zarathustra is bringing perspective itself, or an assemblage of perspective. And
because the position of perspectival thought says that it is not possible to know “the
whole” from a single perspective, the hegemony of this whole—call it God, the One,
Spirit et al—begins to strain and crack under the pressure of infinite multiplicities and
perspectives that have always been at play in history, even though not always apparent.
But how exactly is this so?
The arborescent assemblage “Western morality,”307 if we may call it that, always
had as its final, teleological signifier something transcendent. It was the phenomenon that
stood outside of the sensible world. In ontological terms this signifier always possessed
unity as part of its Being in that it is always the self-same and unchanging as opposed to
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the world of becoming in which chance and change are at play within pure immanence.
Throughout history becoming and the beings in it have always been constituted as
something derivative of Being, such as “the intelligible realm” or “the watchful eye of
God.” If Nietzsche’s thinking has shown us anything, it is that he wants to invert the
Being/becoming paradigm. He wants to twist free from it altogether in a grand aesthetic
turn to the shining sensible. Because we are here as beings in the world of becoming,
then any attempt to transcend this, any attempts to posit supersensible criteria such as
“otherworldly hopes” constitutes a nihilistic impulse.
When we consider Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, which is to say when we think of the
character of the text but also when we consider the text “Thus Spoke Zarathustra” itself
as an assemblage, what we have is a rhizomatic assemblage in an agōn with an
arborescent assemblage.308 The assemblage “Nietzsche’s Zarathustra” has arrived on the
world-historical stage to confront and hopefully diminish the influence of the historical
assemblage “Western morality” (the historical Zarathustra), and what Nietzsche sees as
its corrosive influence as nihilism. In other words, through mimetic parody there is
Zarathustra vs. Zarathustra, with the stakes being either the continued dominance of the
prevailing tendencies of the West or, if Nietzsche is successful, allowing chaos, the
indefinite, the Dionysian a presence through their own expression and content to be a
recognized part of shining reality. The comic device of parody is supremely important
because it presents us with images, in this case comic, laughter provoking images.
The idea that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra must provoke his audience through laughter
is important. Nietzsche is well aware that if he is to present a remedy to Western nihilism,
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then he cannot do so by simply positing his own “meta” criteria, that is, a transcendent
reference that stands outside the aesthetic forms of space and time. He would be violating
his own “rules” by replacing one meta position with another, thus keeping him engaged
in the overly simplistic binary thinking that he wants to avoid altogether. If Zarathustra is
to succeed he must, appropriating Otto Neurath’s metaphor of a sinking boat at sea, repair
the “sinking ship” only using other parts of the ship as material to fix it. By using parody
he is able (hopefully) to turn Western thinking in a new direction because parody shows
ourselves to us. We can behold ourselves in our folly so that we (“we” as individuals and
as parts of groups) may undergo our own organic transfiguration so that amidst the tragic
knowledge, indeed because of it, we can become a “laughing animal” once again.
We can focus even more in terms of Deleuze and Guattari and say that because
the planes of consistency and organization are always engaged in a dynamic interaction,
then the rhizomatic assemblage “Nietzsche’s Zarathustra” is attempting, through means
that include parody and provocative laughter, to disrupt or dismantle the already situated
arborescent assemblage “Western morality” within the striated space of the plane of
organization. According to the function of the plane of consistency, Nietzsche’s
Zarathustra is a pure intensity, which is to say, it is either at rest or in motion in relative
proximity amongst other elements. Moreover, Zarathustra as a pure intensity and a
haecceity309 will, in the manner of a palimpsest, begin to inscribed or code itself by way
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of absolute deterritorialization onto the plane of organization and this deterritorialization
often times erupts as provocative laughter that says, “we are no longer impressed!”
As we just noted Nietzsche is well aware of two critical things. First is the danger
his Zarathustra possesses to those who hear his message because many will believe it to
be a grave transgression against what the people that make up the arborescent assemblage
“Western morality” see as their permanent values. Second is the time it may take for the
kind of paradigm shift he desires to take full effect. The kind of inversion that
promulgates a turn to the aesthetic will not happen rapidly although the speed of which it
will happen is an unknown. With these two critical things in mind, we can say that
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is, in Deleuzian language, a “pure intensity” who must carefully
navigate the striated space of the plane of organization. His tact must include knowing
not only when to appear and to whom, but also the mode in which to appear to others.
This is why many of Zarathustra’s interactions with other human beings are done under
the guise of a “costume drama” in which he is at play with appearance, that is, at play
with how he appears to others and how others appear to him. It is as if both of these pure
intensities—Nietzsche himself in his particular time and place and his Zarathustra—are
on a reconnaissance mission with their own modes of expression and content which often
includes provocative laughter to seek out and find cracks, to find fatigue in the
assemblage “Western morality.” Hence their prudence consists in not being exposed or
caught by the totalizing elements that would in turn de-mask them.310

To be sure Nietzsche titles one of his sections in Twilight of the Idols, “Skirmishes of an Untimely
Man.” Moreover many of the friends he corresponded with warned Nietzsche of a possible backlash
because of the transgressions inherent in his writings, reminding me of atheist David Hume who also
received similar counsel from many of his friends.
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It is also precisely the reason Zarathustra refers at times to his laughter as “secret
laughter” as opposed to simply just laughing at others who reject his overman. When we
say that the assemblage “Western morality,” with all of the characteristics Nietzsche
attributes to it, has dominated the world historical-philosophical stage, what we are
saying is that this assemblage exists on the actual plane of organization, that is, it has
already undergone its own absolute deterritorialization from the virtual state on the plane
of consistency. But because the two planes are constantly interacting, what exists on the
plane of organization is never rendered permanent. Its existence means that it is always
already undergoing its own reterritorialization, the speed of which is variable—its
reterritorialization can happen quickly or it may take millennia.311 The secret laughter of
Zarathustra is thus a cautious laughter. Because Zarathustra cannot outright offend, lest
he lose the humanity he wishes to save, he must temper his message according to the
particular milieu he is in at any given time. Thus his interaction with the saint will be
different than his speeches to the human beings he has descended to.
At this point in Nietzsche’s work, Zarathustra’s laughter is secretive for the
reasons just mentioned. However, there was initially an opposite phenomena that
occurred in which Zarathustra was the target of derisive laughter. This occurs in
“Zarathustra’s Prologue.” Normally being the object of derisive or scornful laughter is
hardly a pleasant experience, however for Zarathustra, it is an essential moment in his
own awakening in terms of the project that he has readied for humankind, which he hopes
to bring the eternal comedy of existence in its full shining to the world.
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Nietzsche is clear in the prologue the necessity of folly and laughter. Human
beings need to recognize that many of their endeavors contain an element of folly at their
heart because we are human and as such we are always given over to a measure of
opacity in our affairs, even the most serious affairs. This is also true for Zarathustra who
desires to leave his cave in order to “go under” (untergehen), that is, initiate the
movement from man to overman. Thus one of the first things Zarathustra utters is
wanting “to bestow and distribute [verschenken und austheilen] until the wise among
human beings have once again enjoyed their folly [Thorheit].”312 We see that Zarathustra
stresses the connection of folly to wisdom as opposed to a disassociation between the two
which Nietzsche believes has gripped ethics, morality, and philosophy in general.
The gravity of Zarathustra’s project becomes evident in the second section of the
prologue. As Zarathustra is descending from his cave to make what will be three
speeches to the people, he meets the saint. This meeting of the saint and Zarathustra is
symbolic of the deepest parting. For even though there is a coming together of these two
wise human beings it essentially marks that transition in history that Nietzsche desires:
the kind of transition that we saw with “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable”
in which the sun that has reached its zenith is beginning to descend and bring light where
there is darkness.
To the saint Zarathustra appears transformed, like a child ready to begin a new
playfulness with humankind (this image of a child and the innocence of child’s play will
reoccur again, most notably in “On the Three Metamorphoses”). The saint is skeptical of
Zarathustra and his project, believing human beings “too imperfect.” This is why the
saint has chosen to lead a cloistered life in the forest because he has grown weary of
312
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human beings and thus only wants to revere God. “With singing, weeping, laughing and
growling I praise the god who is my god,”313 says the saint. The saint laughs at
Zarathustra who is descending to human beings whom the saint believes are no longer
worthy even of the kind of going under Zarathustra is attempting.
For Zarathustra, however, the saint has failed to grasp a crucial event, perhaps the
crucial event of the time—the death of God. “Could it be possible! This old saint in his
woods has not yet heard the news that God is dead!”314 exclaims Zarathustra to himself.
This meeting of the saint and Zarathustra, is a meeting of the untimely. Nietzsche had
previously characterized his thinking in Untimely Meditations as untimely, that is, his
thought was ahead of its time and without ears ready to hear what he had to say. By the
time he has completed Thus Spoke Zarathustra, it appears as though he thinks that there
might now be ears for Zarathustra’s message or that human beings at this time in history
are on the cusp of hearing, or possibly embracing such a message. Hence Nietzsche
believes that his Thus Spoke Zarathustra is that critical eruption in history balanced on
the fulcrum between past and future. And speaking more narrowly in terms of
Zarathustra’s own voice, he “goes down” because he believes there might finally be ears
for what were his previous untimely thoughts.
On the other hand, the saint is also untimely but in a critically different manner.
One might say that the saint’s time has come or come to pass. Through his own
admission, the saint says there is no longer an audience for his teachings and more
importantly that the saint has not yet recognized let alone come to grips with the fact of
the death of God, which represents Nietzsche’s point of departure in Thus Spoke
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Zarathustra. Thus the saint is untimely in the opposite sense of Nietzsche’s untimeliness
in that the saint’s allegiance is or was to the past and not towards the future. These two
notions of the untimely mark the critical intersection of past morality and Zarathustra’s
project of the future that along with the eternal return, places the most emphasis on the
future.
But something additional marks this critical divergence of the saint and
Zarathustra and the two notions of untimeliness. It is laughter that marks the very
departure between man and god. For after the saint asks Zarathustra what gifts he bears,
he tells Zarathustra that he praises God even by way of laughter. But Zarathustra shortly
thereafter parts from the saint with these words:
When Zarathustra had heard these words [diese Worte gehört] he took his leave of
the saint and spoke: “What would I have to give you! But let me leave quickly
before I take something from you!”—And so they parted [trennten], the oldster
and the man, laughing [lachend] like two boys laugh.315
This laughter is a laughter that separates. It is the laughter of a schism, laughter that in
and through its very eruption is that schism. The saint’s laughter arises from his belief
that human beings are no longer worthy of god nor any teaching that Zarathustra might
bring to them. Zarathustra’s laughter is, again, a laughter of the secret knowledge of the
death of god—a terrible knowledge the saint is not yet aware of—as well as the
knowledge of the overman and the eternal return that he will attempt to reveal to
humankind. We might say that laughter is the symbolic phenomenon that clears the space
of all older values based on good and evil so that human beings can once again create life
affirming values. To be sure, Zarathustra’s laughter at this point is not one of disrespect
315
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or scorn aimed at the saint himself. We must bear in mind the saint is laughing as well
although from the perspective of not yet being conscious of what Zarathustra is aware of.
Zarathustra’s laughter simply signifies that in he is no longer impressed with morality
based upon the distinction of good and evil.316
In postmodern thinking, Michel Foucault best encapsulates this kind of moment: a
disquieting moment that severs us from our supposed familiarity of things in the stream
of time so that we are immersed again in chaos:
[T]he death of God—or, rather, in the wake of that death and in a profound
correlation with it—what Nietzsche’s thought heralds is the end of his murderer;
it is the explosion of man’s face in laughter, and the return of masks; it is the
scattering of the pro-found stream of time by which he felt himself carried along
and whose pressure he suspected in the very being of things; it is the identity of
the Return of the Same with the absolute dispersion of man.317
Foucault’s point is that “the explosion of man’s face in laughter” is intimately tied to the
death of god as well as those responsible for his murder, namely us. It is as if Foucault is
saying that the game and the time needed to play it is up and now the once “pro-found
stream of time,” which is to say the understanding of time as a linear directed flow that
supposedly carried us all along to our otherworldly ends, has now exploded. Man is laid
bare or, as Foucault says above, “dispersed” and left without essence except for his own
freedom...and many masks.
Foucault does not refer to it here, but there seems to be at least some parallel
between the death of god, at the hands of his murderers, and Dionysus who was,
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according to the myth, chased down in ancient forests and torn to pieces. But Dionysus,
as Nietzsche states, “will eternally be reborn and come home out of destruction,”318
which is a way of saying that what will return is the same, the same being chaos. In
addition, if we consider Foucault’s remark about “the return of masks” along the same
Dionysian lines, then one of these masks is certainly the mask of comedy worn by
Dionysus in order to conceal his monstrousness. What we have then in this crucial
section of Thus Spoke Zarathustra is nothing less than a comedy of grand proportions. It
is the simultaneity of order and destruction at the moment of their divergence, a
divergence that is marked by nothing other than the laughter of the saint and Zarathustra.
If one were to characterize this simultaneity of order and destruction along the lines of
the social body it might best be expressed as chaosmos, the term Evans uses to describe
the agonistic but creative interplay of the many voices within a society that are, on the
one hand, their own singular voice, yet on the other hand are shot through with all of the
other voices as well. Chaosmos then is a hybrid of both chaos and cosmos and because of
its perpetual production of difference is never reducible to either term.319
In accordance with Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking, the meeting of Zarathustra
and the saint causes absolute divergence with laughter as the phenomenon that best traces
out this critical departure. As we saw earlier the rhizomatic assemblage that I referred to
as “Nietzsche’s Zarathustra” is in a struggle with the arborescent assemblage “Western
morality.” Nothing captures this divergence of Zarathustra and the saint more aptly than
Zarathustra’s surreptitious laughter, in the sense that Zarathustra possesses his “secret
knowledge” and also because he is aware of the tragic knowledge that is only beginning
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to dawn on the rest of humankind. However, we must take into account this notion of
divergence and convergence and ask, “Is Nietzsche’s philosophy one of absolute
divergence at the expense of convergence?” If not then, “How is this divergence marked
by the simultaneous laughter of the saint and Zarathustra to be understood?”
On the one hand Nietzsche, the philosopher who “philosophizes with a hammer,”
wants to deconstruct if not destruct those philosophical systems he deems unworthy. If
we retrieve the kind of Dionysian terminology that he is fond of, it might appear as if
Nietzsche’s goal is absolute divergence as that which undermines the established order of
things. And because Nietzsche’s thought and language is so abrasive to many, it appears
as if divergence is posited as a goal in itself in which convergence is absolutely excluded.
On the other hand, we must also keep a few things in mind for balance. While I
argue that Nietzsche wants what we can call absolute divergence from hostile systems
and their propagators—systems that through dissimilation seek to protect the kind of life
descending values he wants to reverse—nonetheless the goal is always to maintain a
healthy tension that, by definition, requires philosophical adversaries. This we saw above
in the first chapter with his agōn with Socrates.
Moreover philosophical systems rarely, if ever, appear as if they arose from a
vacuum, that is, detached from a specific historical place and time. Philosophical systems
can either build upon previous thought or challenge previous thought but they all, in one
way or another, must recognize previous thought. Nietzsche’s philosophy, as untimely
and radical as it is, is no different. This becomes most evident when we consider the very
nature of language itself, especially as it relates to the particular way in which he uses
language (in all of its forms, including parody and laughter) in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
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With this said, convergence rests on a much deeper premise than the simple need
for philosophical adversaries or as a response to the philosophical tradition. It rests on the
very foundation of consciousness and its nexus to language. Language is what binds all
of us, delivering us by default to the intersection of communication with others.
Nietzsche himself is clear about the link between language, consciousness and
communication when he insists in The Gay Science, “consciousness in general has
developed only under the pressure of the need to communicate;....[It] is really just a net
connecting one person with another,”320 Convergence, then, is inevitable. To demonstrate
this, we can take a fruitful detour to Mikhail Bakhtin’s account of language in terms of
dialogic relationships. This detour will allow us to see how language not only binds us to
one another in the present but also to the past and future. Moreover Bakhtin, much in the
manner of Nietzsche, is keenly aware of language’s power as a legislating, value creating
force.
Bakhtin’s major premise is that all language acts possess a vivacity and force, a
perpetual kinetic function as opposed to being a stagnant, closed system of signs and
signifiers that never change. As such, there is always an inherent tension within any
particular socio-linguistic community (as well as a tension between socio-linguistic
communities) because of the multitude of heterogeneous forces that interact within it. In
Bakhtin’s words, this tension results from, “the co-existence of socio-ideological
contradiction between the present and the past, between differing epochs of the past,
between socio-ideological different groups in the present, between tendencies, schools,
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circles, and so forth, all given bodily form.”321 In other words, language, performatively
speaking,322 is never a complete unchanging universal phenomenon but a hybridization of
“two semantic and axiological belief systems” competing within it, and it is always
predisposed toward the production of difference.323
In The Dialogic Imagination, Bakhtin elaborates on this hybridization of language
that explores these tensions. With hybridization, we see how language constantly changes
due to its inherent make-up of multiple impulses and perspectives (what Bakhtin calls
“‘languages’ of heteroglossia”) that take up a particular “understanding” of the world. As
a particular perspective, a tension is inherent in that this perspective is almost always
competing against other perspectives. Moreover, hybridization entails the very notion of
the other’s language already appropriated in our own voice and vice versa, even if we
may think that we are the exclusive executors of that language and value system.324
One of the many manifestations of hybridization that Bakhtin examines is
comedic parody. Parody, says Bakhtin, allows an author to speak “in someone else’s
discourse” and “parody introduces into that discourse a semantic intention that is directly
opposed to the original one.” Moreover, the voice “having made its home in the other’s
discourse, clashes hostilely with its primordial host and forces him to serve directly
opposing aims.”325 The thrust of Bakhtin’s point is that parody, as an example of
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intentional hybridization, has within it a tension between two viewpoints: one of which
seeks to usurp the other.
What begins to emerge is a close kinship between Nietzsche’s thoughts on
language—its evaluative function, its designating quality, its “truth” function—and the
competing elements within Bakhtin’s hybridization of language. And thus far we have
seen that comedy, in the form of parody,326 is one of the ways Nietzsche challenges other
philosophers and philosophical history. For example, Nietzsche is clear, in “On Truth and
Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” that dissimulation through language is nothing but the
attempted preservation of the individual who tries to evaluate and signify the world so as
to claim the mantle of fixed truth. In Nietzsche’s words:
For that which is to count as ‘truth’ [Wahrheit] from this point onwards now
becomes fixed [fixirt], i.e., a way of designating things is invented which has the
same validity and force everywhere, and the legislation of language
[Gesetzgebung der Sprache] also produces the first laws of truth [Gesetze der
Wahrheit], for the contrast between truth and lying comes into existence here for
the first time.327
Nietzsche is clear; language is used by individuals as a legislating force that attempts to
designate truth. However, this drive towards universal truth is always only a particular
perspective on the world, one that always plays the role of preserving the individual that
uses it. Moreover, this impulse of preservation found in discursive practices has already
326
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appropriated within it the linguistic referential intentions of others.328 As such, language
overflows its intended semantic boundaries. The result, similar to Bakhtin’s “languages
of heteroglossia,” is often a crossing of, or a struggle among, competing value systems or,
to use Deleuzian language, antagonistic assemblages.
In terms of philosophy, Nietzsche’s point is that this same dynamic of the
legislative quality of language is also at work especially as it relates to our
epistemological constructs. In the following example Nietzsche doesn’t explicitly
reference Kant and the schematism in the Critique of Pure Reason but the schematism’s
function in this work bears at least some similarities:
Everything which distinguishes human beings from animals depends on this
ability to sublimate [verflüchtigen] sensuous metaphors into a schema [Schema],
in other words, to dissolve an image into a concept [ein Bild in einen Begriff
aufzulösen]. This is because something becomes possible in the realm of these
schemata [Schemata] which could never be achieved in the realm of those
sensuous first impressions, namely the construction of a pyramidal order based on
castes and degrees, the creation of a new world of laws, privileges,
subordinations, definitions of borders, which now confronts the other, sensuously
perceived world as something firmer, more general, more familiar, more human,
and hence as something regulatory and imperative [das Regulirende und
Imperativische].329
In other words, the immediate, rich, individual sensual metaphors (what would be
appearances conditioned by the intuitions of space and time) become sublimated to more
See Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 202.
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and more universal designations in and through language. This is because the schematism
works as a homogenizing procedure that is able to link the first sensual impressions of a
given object to what are otherwise heterogeneous categories radically cut off from objects
in intuition. The process of the schematism, then, which itself is powered by the force of
imagination330 come to “shape” objects of intuition so that judgments are possible (one of
Kant’s examples is the concept “dog” or the rule by which the schematism powered by
imagination can “trace the shape of such a four-footed animal in a general way.”331) In
turn, these judgments in the form of universal designations take on a legislative, juridical
force as they are appropriated consciously or not by subjects and their use within the
intersubjective social body. In the wider scope of philosophy, these universal forms might
be Plato’s eidē (forms), the God of some scholastics, or Kant’s categorical imperative
based in pure reason. But it is these “sensuous first impressions” and appearances within
becoming that Nietzsche wants to stress as being more fundamental and important. As
Babich succinctly has it:
Apart from Nietzsche’s epistemologically bold style, he merely reminds us that
empirical reality (i.e., “nature”) ought never be identified with the ideal or
metaphysical world of Platonic truth. The real world has its closest family
resemblance to the world of becoming or change first recognized by the Ionian
philosophers. This empirical reality remains incommensurable with the Eleatic or
Platonic ideal of truth.332
For Babich (and myself), Nietzsche recognizes the fact that science is unable adequately
to bridge the divide between the intelligible, that is, Being and the sensual world of
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A141/B180.
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becoming. A satisfactory ground can never truly be established to include language in its
attempt to reconcile these two realms. Again as Babich has it:
Because reality is in flux away from what has been and toward what is not yet,
reality—that is: empirical nature—is always change. It is, like ourselves, part of
that species of being hostage in time to the immutable reality of the dynamic
mode of becoming—as both what is and what is not. Because of the “stone” fact
that no fact is stone, the supreme law of philosophic knowledge lacks any
purchase on the empirical world because what is is never beyond change or
time.333
This cleft between Being and becoming is a schism that Nietzsche often exploits and he
does so on in terms of honesty (Redlichkeit) and its transgression. And this transgression
often takes the form of provocative laughter.
Returning to parody, we see that Nietzsche utilizes this comic device to call into
question those philosophical systems that attempt to signify the whole, that is, to
homogenize heterogeneity. This surely has parallels to Bakhtin’s understanding of parody
and its far reaching power when he asserts, “one can parody superficial verbal forms, but
one can also parody the very deepest principles governing another’s discourse.”334
Laughter, too, is also a form of communication, albeit in a much different mode
than language, possessing its own intrinsic pragmatic function that allow for a diversity
of expression. Most notable about laughter, though, is that when we consider
Zarathustra’s pervasive use of this phenomenon coupled with Nietzsche’s turn to the
shining aesthetic, it seems faithfully to fulfill its function as something that moves
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beyond the usually privileged modes of conventional, logical, or philosophical discourse
such as dialectic. Bakhtin too is clear on laughter’s relationship to reality:
Laughter is a specific aesthetic relationship to reality, but not one that can be
translated into logical language; that is, it is a specific means for artistically
visualizing and comprehending reality and, consequently, a specific means for
structuring an artistic image, plot, or genre. Enormous creative, and therefore
genre-shaping, power was possessed by ambivalent carnivalistic laughter. This
laughter could grasp and comprehend a phenomenon in the process of change and
transition, it could fix in a phenomenon both poles of its evolution in their
uninterrupted and creative renewing changeability: in death birth is foreseen and
in birth death, in victory defeat and in defeat victory, in crowning a decrowning.
Carnival laughter does not permit a single one of these aspects of change to be
absolutized or to congeal in one-sided seriousness.335
Bakhtin presents us with an apt image and one that resonates with what is perhaps
Nietzsche’s goal (Deleuze and Guattari’s as well). The “goal” is, in a sense, an anti-goal
in that no single phenomenon ought to exist that ossifies itself above all others for all
time. In other words, the goal is the acknowledgement of multiplicity and becoming. The
carnival, and its attendant “carnivalistic laughter,” is in a sense a microcosm of the world
of becoming with all of its settings, characters, beauty and absurdity. In Rabelais and His
World Bakhtin speaks of laughter’s transformative power in terms of multiplicity, what
he calls “ambivalent wholeness,” when he asserts:
Laughter purifies from dogmatism, from the intolerant and the petrified; it
liberates from fanaticism and pedantry, from fear and imitation, from didacticism,
335
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naiveté and illusion, from the single meaning, the single level, from
sentimentality. Laughter does not permit seriousness to atrophy and to be torn
away from the one being, forever incomplete. It restores this ambivalent
wholeness.”336
A brief detour to Beyond Good and Evil sheds light on Nietzsche’s insight that the
present age is an age of costumes and concealment but one that is ripe for the kind of
parody and laughter that frees. The same carnival laughter that Bakhtin maintains affirms
our becoming in time is used by Nietzsche as a platform from which to project a parody
of world history which is to say, a parody of transcendent Being dressed in a multiplicity
of costumes:
We are the first age to be educated in puncto [with respect to] “costumes,” I mean
of morals, articles of faith, artistic tastes, and religions, and prepared as no age has
ever been for a carnival in the grand style (zum Karneval grossen Stils), for the
most spiritually carnivalesque laughter (Fasching-Gelächter) and high spirits, for
the transcendental heights of the highest inanity and Aristophanean world
mockery. Perhaps it’s that we still discover a realm of our invention here, a realm
where we can still be original too, as parodists of world history (Parodisten der
Weltgeschichte) or buffoons of God, or something like that,—perhaps it’s that,
when nothing else from today has a future, our laughter (unser Lachen) is the one
thing that does!337
Written in 1886, this aphorism encapsulates Nietzsche’s project of Thus Spoke
Zarathustra. Zarathustra is the costumed one among the people who may not yet be ready
Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2009), 124.
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to hear his message. Amidst this costumed age of tragedy and morality, Zarathustra
enacts his parody ensuring that if anything has a certain future in this time of nihilism that
he alone discerns it is laughter.
Zarathustra’s setting also takes place among many characters and places.
Zarathustra’s laughter, like carnivalistic laughter, finds itself in the in-between of the past
with its absolutist moral dictums of good and evil, and a future free of such
pronouncements. Because Zarathustra refuses to replace one moral system with another
(Zarathustra never demands obedience to a moral system) his laughter is that aesthetic
phenomenon that clears the space of all absolutes so that all can laugh once again. Thus
carnivalistic laughter is an image of humanity free of the weight of moral heaviness. It is
a humanity that finds itself in a new aesthetic reattunement to existence—it is humanity
at play. Given all that we have seen thus far, there is hardly a philosopher who fulfils the
potential to communicate the most serious issues in and through the use of comedy and
laughter than Nietzsche.
What we can conclude, then, about the relationship Nietzsche’s thought has to
divergence and convergence is that on the one hand, he wants to contribute to the
absolute divergence away from those thinkers who promote what he views as life
descending values. In this sense, all forms of Nietzsche’s language—poetry, the
aphoristic style, provocative laughter—act as subversive agents, as pure intensities ready
to act within the philosophical tradition in order to destabilize and topple it so that chaos
can be recognized.
But the divergence from such (totalizing) systems is one that returns the
philosophical project back to the freedom that is unleashed from their collapse. When we
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recognize and come to grips with tragic knowledge and nihilism, a knowledge that is
surely frightening, we can in turn embrace the resulting freedom. And this freedom by its
very nature is one that engenders multiplicity as opposed to totality. Unlike domination,
multiplicity restores a healthy tension that perpetuates many genetic lines of
communication and development that occur on the margins of any assemblage—even
those that appear to be permanent. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is at war with the arborescent
assemblages that have held sway for so long on their nomadic edges, where the
expression and content, that is far from its center, starts to dissolve, lose force, and meet
the laughter that eventually deterritorializes it. But before this grand usurpation by
Zarathustra, he must first overcome a species of laughter itself. It is one that is directed at
him as it has been directed at many philosophers for millennia.
The difficulties that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra faces are no different. Zarathustra’s
secret laughter is countered with laughter of a very different sort when he initially
descends to the people to make his three speeches on the overman, going under, and the
last man. If the shared laughter of him and the saint signaled the kind of radical
divergence explored above, then the laughter of the people whom he has descended to is
uni-directional—it is directed at him. The cause for Zarathustra’s need of three speeches
instead of one is that he is misunderstood in his first two speeches (although
misunderstood is once again a very generous appraisal). His first attempt to explain the
overman as the meaning of the earth appear not to be understood at all. Even at the close
of Zarathustra’s second speech the human beings laugh, demanding to see the tightrope
walker, failing to grasp his deeper significance as that which hovers between man and
superman. For them, he is only a performer to provide a spectacle for their comfortable
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lives. Hence at the beginning of his third speech Nietzsche states, “When Zarathustra had
spoken these words [heralding the overman] he looked again at the people and fell silent.
‘There they stand,’ he said to his heart, ‘they laugh [lachen sie], they do not understand
me, I am not the mouth for these ears.’”338 Zarathustra and his message have now become
the object of scornful laughter that presents a challenging hurdle to him and his teaching.
But before broaching this particular episode in Zarathustra’s going under, a detour by
way of the ancients will help shed light on this particular phenomenon of scornful
laughter.
To be sure, this notion of scornful laughter had its comedic and philosophical
precedent long before Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. We can look to the ancients
to see this particular phenomenon on display in the works of Plato and Aristophanes. In
both Lysistrata and The Assemblywomen we see this phenomena of scornful laughter
directed at the women of these two inspired comedies.
Both Lysistrata and Praxagora represent a threat to the normative conventions of
ancient Athens, especially patriarchal power. Lysistrata is motivated by a noble endeavor,
which is to end the Peloponnesian War and bring peace. To achieve this she and the other
women agree to withhold all sexual intercourse with their lovers and husbands. Of course
the men returning from war are looking forward to the “release” of their sexual energy
only to realize that the painful abstinence they are being subject to is due to Lysistrata
and her condition that peace be restored. The men are flabbergasted (to say the least!) but
we as comic spectators revel in this laughter provoking scheme and the scorn and
contempt the men have, at least initially, for this ploy against them.
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Praxagora, too, seeks change. In The Assemblywomen, the change she seeks is a
new form of justice in the Athenian polis. Justice here, though, is of a very different and
comedic kind than the men of Athens are accustomed to. Believing that she and her
followers can administer justice much better than the men, Praxagora initiates changes
that are more socially distributive. For example, before a man can sleep with an attractive
young woman, he must first have intercourse with an older, less attractive woman. Once
again we as spectators of Aristophanes’ genius find these situations laughter provoking
even though many of the characters within the comedy, most notably the men, can
respond only with scornful laughter at the attempt by the women to usurp their social
privileges.
These images are certainly absurd, which is to say that as paralogos they are set
apart from formal logos. No such ploy by the women of ancient Athens ever happened—
let alone succeeded—in ending a war. Nor did the political apparatus ever fall into the
hands of women, facilitating a change or inversion of social norms deeply entrenched in
this ancient society. Yet, in the very absurdity of these comic images lies the deepest and
most profound philosophical import. In fact, because of the scornful laughter they
produce amongst the characters—the Magistrates and Blepyrus’ of Aristophanes’
imagination—we are brought face to face with the seriousness of the issues themselves.
Indeed, the shining appearance of this comedy is a testament to the philosophical issues
and not an escape from them providing us with vicarious images of ourselves.
Philosophy, too, harbors its own comedic value. Generally speaking, laughter and
playfulness abound in Plato’s Republic. The particular type of scornful laughter we are
examining here plays a key role at multiple points in the Republic. But there is one
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example from this particular work that presents itself as a supreme example of this type
of laughter and its implication for the philosopher’s endeavor. Just as Zarathustra has to
surmount the scorn of the human beings he has descended to, in the Republic it is
Socrates who has to grapple with the scornful laughter of the overbearing Thrasymachus.
When Thrasymachus appears in the dialogue, he responds to Socrates’ supposed
inability or reluctance to answer the question about what the just is. Thrasymachus, who
surely represents an instinctual Dionysian type that Nietzsche admires, demands the
question to be answered by Socrates; “answer yourself and say what you assert the just to
be.”339 Socrates responds that if he and Polemarchus have made any mistakes in the
consideration of the arguments, they are unintentional. Exasperated by the nuance that
dialectic often requires, Thrasymachus responds in the following way:
He listened, burst out laughing very scornfully [anekanchase te mala sardanion],
and said, “Heracles! Here is that habitual irony of Socrates. I knew it, and I
predicted to these fellows that you wouldn’t be willing to answer, that you would
be ironic and do anything rather than answer if someone asked you something.340
Thrasymachus’s scornful laughter is indicative of two major things. First, the usual Greek
word for laughter is gelōs, the infinitive verb being gelaō “to laugh.” Here, however,
Plato uses sardanion which, as a species of laughter, partakes in its own precise meaning
according to the particular social milieu in which it is expressed. The word sardanion,
meaning “scornful laughter,” is derived from a type of plant from Sardinia that when
eaten “caused facial convulsions resembling those of sardonic laughter, usually followed
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by death.”341 This kind of scornful laughter, then, is allied with Thrasymachus’s contempt
for Socrates and the dialectical method. Thrasymachus wants a direct answer to the
question about what is the just. He becomes exasperated at Socrates who refutes the
answers only of those who have proffered a response to the question. Thrasymachus’s
exasperation, then, is aimed at the very dialectic that will, if one comports oneself
properly to its questioning, disclose the truth or at least bring one closer to it through its
essential questioning. We can say then that his scornful laughter is an attempt to rout
philosophical logos from the space being created for it by Socrates. It is not letting
philosophical logos clear the space for truth or its search. In this sense Plato’s
appropriation of this particular kind of scornful laughter (sardanion) originating from a
far away land is indicative of the kind of foreignness that Thrasymachus’s exhibits as an
interlocutor in the dialectical exchange of the Republic. Thrasymachus’s logos is alien to
the true sense of justice that Socrates is attempting to disclose. This notion of scornful
laughter will gain more significance momentarily at the conclusion of Socrates’ dialogue
with Thrasymachus.
The second significance revolves around irony. Thrasymachus asserts that
Socrates is being “habitually ironic.” But Thrasymachus’s understanding of irony
represents a marked difference from true Socratic irony. For Thrasymachus, irony means
that Socrates is unwilling to answer when asked by another interlocutor even though he
could answer. In other words he believes Socrates to be deceptive. Socratic irony
however, like dialectic, partakes in much finer distinctions. Socratic irony is saying one
thing although meaning another but always for the sake of moving the dialogue forward
See Online Etymology Dictionary, s.v. “sardonic,” http://www.etymonline.com/. Also see entry for
sardanion in Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, revised and augmented by H. Jones (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996).
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as well as providing a “cushion” to those who offer accounts of their own that ultimately
fail. Socratic irony then is used with other interlocutors so that they will hopefully follow
the lead of dialectic to a more enlightened account. Thrasymachus, however, believes he
has exposed Socrates’ motivations and therefore will not succumb to his cross
examination. But Thrasymachus ends up unknowingly investing himself in the very
dialectic he seeks to avoid, thus succumbing in the end to true, Socratic irony.
Although here is not the place to litigate the twists and turns of Socrates’
interaction with Thrasymachus concerning justice, nonetheless recall that Thrasymachus
is advocating that the just is “nothing other than the advantage of the stronger”342 so that
the laws governing a city will inevitably favor the rulers. Socrates, however,
demonstrates that surely those who rule will on occasion make laws or rules that are not
to their advantage so that when the ruled obey them the rulers will have acted against
their own self-interests. Moreover, Thrasymachus believes that the teaching of rhetoric to
those who are to rule should be the norm. Thrasymachus is more interested in what
sounds good than Socrates’ pursuit of what is the good. This presents its own level of
irony in that Thrasymachus is used to teaching and giving long persuasive speeches (for
large sums of money) in order to persuade the audience and potential rulers. But here
Thrasymachus, first, is unable to give a sustained account of justice to even one person,
or to Socrates himself and, second, he has made it clear to Socrates that he wants Socrates
to answer not only quickly but decisively—as if the question of justice in the polis were
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trivial enough to be answered in such a way. When Socrates repeatedly counters
Thrasymachus’s definitions of justice, it is Thrasymachus who attempts to flee.343
Socrates inevitably shows why Thrasymachus’s definition of justice falls short.
He is merely prescribing justice (that the strong should rule) and not providing the
essence or form of justice. But in terms of the scornful laughter that Thrasymachus
directed at Socrates (keeping in mind the etymology of sardanion) a poignant event
transpires after Socrates shows how “the just man is like the wise and good, but the
unjust man like the bad and unlearned.”344 An inversion happens in which Trasymachus
appears to undergo the symptoms of the scornful laughter he impulsively directed at
Socrates moments before; “Now, Thrasymachus did not agree to all of this so easily as I
tell it now, but he dragged his feet and resisted, and he produced a wonderful quantity of
sweat, for it was summer. And then I saw what I had not yet seen before—Thrasymachus
blushing.”345 To be sure, it is at this moment that Thrasymachus senses fear although the
source of this fear is far from any brute, physical threat. It is from Socrates’ logos whose
strength simply lies in the truth that it discloses.
Just as Socrates demonstrates that the just are happier and stronger than the
unjust, we see that the very scornful laughter directed at Socrates in order to mock him
has now reversed and found its target in the one doing the mocking. The blood rushing to
the face when blushing is similar to a wound. In this sense then it mimics scornful
laughter and the symptoms of the one who ingests the poisonous plant from Sardinia.
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Moreover, when we attend closely to the layered definition of elenchus and its verbal
forms we come to see that this Socratic way of questioning means, among other things,
“to disgrace, put to shame”346 exactly the way Thrasymachus’s blushing from shame
indicates. As we saw in the Introduction, Aquinas will describe centuries after the ancient
Greeks that sardonic laughter or scornful laughter, is a physiological phenomenon, its
locus the face. Even the throat from which it erupts—the throat functioning as the
physiological manifestation of language—is the cause of something pre-linguistic and
antecedent to true philosophical dialectic. Just as death results from the ingestion of the
Sardonian plant, Thrasymachus’s scornful laughter initially directed at Socrates in order
to make him blush ends up signaling his own defeat. Like Plato’s use of the foreign
sardanion as opposed to the more well known and conventional gelōs, Thrasymachus and
his account of justice is itself foreign to a truly just polis. Indeed, Thrasymachus’s
account presents a real danger to the polis and the subjects who would constitute it. As
one of the strong and unjust Thrasymachus’s “death” occurs because of the very Socratic
dialectic he sought to avoid and quell. In the long quest for justice that the Republic
pursues, Thrasymachus’s red faced scornful laughter becomes indistinguishable from his
red faced blushing signaling his own undoing.
What all of these examples of scornful laughter demonstrate (and there are many
more), is that the philosopher more often times than not will experience his or her own
aporia in terms of his teaching. Scornful laughter then is indicative of dangerousness and
transgression. For the many (hoi polloi), the philosopher often times appears threatening,
even contemptible because he usually attempts to introduce new teachings or different
perspectives to others who are comfortable with a given tradition and its attendant power
346
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structure derived from the discursive practices of that age (or any other practice). Or, if
they are in positions of power the philosopher may appear as a danger to that power
because he facilitates a new consciousness of the human situation. Nietzsche’s
Zarathustra is no different. So it is his task to navigate the opposition he faces in the form
of scornful laughter in order to convey his wisdom.
The similarities between the kind of scornful laughter directed at Zarathustra and
the scornful laughter directed at Socrates ends here. Socrates is engaged in dialectic, that
is, he is engaged with those who are willing to participate honestly in its mechanics.
Dialectic, in its broadest sense, is that which is made manifest through logos, thus
seeking the best account through question and answer.347 In the Republic the question is,
“What is justice?” Socrates and his interlocutors explore this question. Nietzsche’s
Zarathustra, on the other hand, at least in terms of the people he descends to, is not
engaged in dialectic. Zarathustra does not seek the kind of back and forth in logos that
dialectic requires. He is there as a herald in order to proclaim the overman as the meaning
of the earth. The pertinent question for Zarathustra, his audience, and as us readers of
Thus Spoke Zarathustra is, “Are we ready to hear and accept his teaching?”
But what if we were to examine this phenomenon of scornful laughter from the
opposite direction? Instead of looking at instances taken from the ancients, instances that
no doubt disclose their own particular wisdom, what if we pivoted towards the future
where the signs and symbols of dialectical thinking, which have shaped philosophy for so
long, have come under scrutiny? This is relevant especially in our present era where
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dialectical thinking, at best, is seen as only one type of discourse among the supposed
throng of endless discourse that characterizes postmodernism.
As we saw with Deleuze and Guattari, Nietzsche’s thinking is given a voice
through Zarathustra. This voice constitutes a rhizomatic assemblage that attempts to
deterritorialize the kind of philosophical thinking best characterized as arborescent and
whose assemblage attempts to assimilate, to make “the same,” what is other. Zarathustra
is a voice, but it is one voice among many. Zarathustra’s voice is attempting to emphasize
a perspective that calls into question all previous, totalizing systems that imposed, in
either a direct or indirect way, a compulsory allegiance to or tacit recognition of their
supremacy. Previously attempted divergence from these assemblages could bring
rejection, ostracism, and even death (for example, the supposed apostates of natural
science whose work and discoveries challenged the authority of their day). When we look
at the scornful laughter directed at Zarathustra many things begin to emerge in terms of
expression and content on the plane of organization. Zarathustra begins to emerge as an
abstract machine seeking to disrupt these supposed ossified edifices through the
deterritorializing effects of laughter. Evans describes Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of
expression and content this way:
The form of expression is a semiotic system, whether we are talking about the
genetic code on the level of genes or the language and coded practices of a group.
The form of content is that to which the form of expression is related, whether we
are speaking of genetic material, or the members and surroundings of a group.348
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The laughter of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, including the scornful laughter of the
townspeople to whom Zarathustra descends, also finds its place among the expression
and content of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy.
First, the scornful laughter of the people already exists on the plane of
organization in that it has its origin in the people who direct it at Zarathustra’s speeches.
Thus in terms of content (which itself is made up of form and substance), the people who
laugh, which is to say those embodied subjects who gesture at Zarathustra with their
laughter, compose the substance part of content. The form is composed of the multitude
of these bodies that coalesce in Zarathustra’s particular time to form a particular
community. Nietzsche writes, “When Zarathustra came into the nearest town lying on the
edge of the forest, he found many people gathered in the marketplace, for it had been
promised that a tightrope walker would perform.”349 However, what we must always
keep in mind is that for Nietzsche community here would not mean a singular, topical
place, a “town on the edge of a forest,” but would entail humankind itself, that is, the
community that is the world. Metaphorically speaking it is a town as a microcosm of the
world on the edge of a forest, the forest being symbolic of the unknown and what is alien.
Nietzsche believes human beings exist on the edge of this wilderness of the unknown or
what was described above as an inversion of all that is familiar and its attendant loss of
all previously ascribed values.
Second, expression that also has the division of form and substance constitutes the
“semiotic systems” of the human beings as they respond to Zarathustra. In other words,
the form that expression takes is the language that they employ in response to
Zarathustra’s provocative message such as their calling out for the tightrope walker, that
349
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is, to witness his danger as opposed to “living dangerously” themselves. The substance of
Zarathustra’s audience (again, the town and townspeople are a metaphor for humankind)
would be all of the symbols and icons that the people employ in terms of their discursive
practices (religious symbols, signs, logos and so forth). In light of Deleuze and Guattari’s
system of absolute deterritorialization, how ought laughter be understood? In this
particular case what role does the scornful laughter of the townspeople play? The
question is pertinent because it calls into question laughter itself.
The enactment of laughter appears not to be language proper. It is not a word
among words in a discourse, thus it seems as though the laughter of the townspeople does
not quite fit within the semiotic systems of expression. However laughter, as we have
seen, does communicate. It is on the one hand a physiological phenomenon of our body
(face, throat, larynx, diaphragm etc.) and as a gesture, a physiological gesture, it is
closely allied with the content that is the body. But even though the act of laughter itself
is not a word, it is an expression nonetheless, even though it appears to lie in the inbetween area between actual content (an embodied person) and expression (language). As
communication, it does signify many things. Perhaps Nietzsche is communicating to us
that, at this point in history, the townspeople and potential “last men” either refuse to
respond or unable to respond in the kind of elaborate linguistic, philosophical discourse
to Zarathustra’s message of the Übermensch as the meaning of the earth. They can only
offer their scornful laughter and we can see that it indicates two main things.
First, the scornful laughter of the people signifies that they either do not
understand Zarathustra’s message, or that they understand it but are not willing to accept
it, or a combination of both. Zarathustra seems to suggest the later, saying of the people,
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“they do not understand me, I am not the mouth for these ears.”350 The advent of
Zarathustra on the philosophical scene, whether within the drama of the text or outward
as a herald of a return to the earth and its fundamental meaning of the Übermensch, is
going to meet with resistance, although a resistance that makes up much of the kind of
tension Nietzsche approves of.
Second, the scornful laughter of the people expresses their comfort with the kind
of assemblage which protects a way of life they have become accustomed to. We can say
that the expression of this assemblage is the kind of language that evolves along with its
institutions. For example, there is the Judeo-Christian language of the church, such as the
Ten Commandments, or Immanuel Kant’s language of duty in the form of the categorical
imperative that “sublimates sensuous metaphors into a schema”351 of pure reason of
which we are to be irrevocably bound. The human beings that constitute Zarathustra’s
audience (which in essence are we who are Nietzsche’s actual heirs and readers), are not
willing to surrender their semiotic systems that protect a certain way of life they have
become accustomed to.
This is why laughter, whether the people’s or Zarathustra’s, signify a fault line
that runs along the expression of both assemblages as they come into contact. The
assemblage of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is novel compared to the entrenched assemblage
of Western morality. It is just coming into its own being. This is why Nietzsche, as well
as his Zarathustra, must temper his powerful message to the people who, as he quickly
learns, are unassailable in the beginning. Thus Zarathustra needs to first find companions.
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This is also why Thus Spoke Zarathustra is the kind of work that it is, namely an inspired
dramatic work as opposed to the kind of philosophical “position paper” one might expect
from a philosopher. Poetry, especially the kind that flows from the pen of Nietzsche and
the mouth of Zarathustra, allows for a playfulness that in the end will hopefully help
undermine the rigid, arborescent assemblage known here as “Western morality.” And we
can also see that Nietzsche’s own lived bodily experience with its pervasive pain, his
nomadic wanderings, his devotion to close friends—in essence what would be the content
in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s thought in A Thousand Plateaus—have allowed his
expression to take this experience and poeticize it into the form that it is. Evans, in
accordance with Deleuze and Guattari, refers to this interaction of content and expression
as “reciprocal presupposition,” stating:
[P]erceiving (as content) can move ahead of saying (as expression) in what it
reveals of our surroundings—even disrupting or transforming the particular
discourse in play at the time; discourse can affect what we do and are able to
perceive, often opening up a space for new perceptions. An experience, for
example, twists the poet’s idiom into a new expressions; a new way of speaking
about things reveals dimensions of reality we had not previously noted.352
Nietzsche’s philosophy in general and his Zarathustra, in particular through their
provocative laughter and poetic style, attune us to just these new ways of thinking and
perceiving.
Returning to Zarathustra’s third speech to the human beings he has descended to,
he realizes that he must somehow address the scornful laughter that is targeted at him, a
laughter that betrays the unwillingness of humankind to accept his teaching if in fact they
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even understand his message. In order to do this he gives a speech on the last man.
Zarathustra says that the last man is the one who is truly contemptible; “Thus I shall
speak to them of the most contemptible person: but he is the last human being.”353
Why, though, is the last man contemptible? Zarathustra says it is because the last
man has pride. This pride however is not contemptible in the normal moral sense, such
that it is an over-abundance of hubris. It is contemptible because they possess pride
without reason to be prideful. Rejecting the overman and using language proper to the
kind of messenger that he is, Zarathustra reveals that they are essentially content living
according to the conventions of the past, of what has been prescribed for them in their
education. The language that Nietzsche uses here denotes a sort of unhealthy contentment
in which the last men no longer possess the kind of chaos that would stir their souls into
going under to something more human than human, namely the overman. Hence
Zarathustra says of them:
Beware! The time approaches when human beings no longer launch the arrow of
their longing beyond the human [über den Menschen], and the string of their bow
will have forgotten how to whir! I say to you: one must still have chaos in oneself
[Chaos in sich haben] in order to give birth to a dancing star.354
In essence Zarathustra is trying to convey that the last men are those who are
contemptible and thus should be the object of scornful laughter. But this epiphany can not
happen unless the last men recognize it, which is to say that they have to image
themselves, that is, see themselves as the last human beings otherwise change is
impossible. This is why the image of the tightrope walker is of great significance to
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Nietzsche. The tightrope walker is not only a profound symbol of that which hovers
between man and superman, he also symbolizes in his very deed the need to live
dangerously in order to tread this path. And the dangerousness here is precisely the
message Zarathustra hopes to convey in terms of a new founding. However, this
dangerousness is lost on the people. They do not yet understand his message of nihilism
and the need for the overman and moreover the last men equate comfort with happiness
and not danger; “‘We invented happiness’—say the last human beings, blinking.”355
At the end of Zarathustra’s final speech an aporia is reached. Zarathustra realizes
that he has failed to persuade humankind of the need for the overman. If he is to succeed,
he must first find the ears for his message not in the great mass of people but in a few
creative companions like himself.356 The scornful laughter directed at him by the people
is indeed the symbol of this aporia. In other words, the aporia is marked by their scornful
laughter. Just as we saw at the beginning of his third speech when the people laugh at him
and fail to understand him, the same occurs at the end of this speech ensuring the need to
continue “going under.” Zarathustra whispers to himself, “And now they look at me and
laugh, and in laughing they hate me too. There is ice in their laughter.”357 To be sure this
scornful laughter provides the bookends to Zarathustra’s initial foray from his cave into
the world.
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III. Lions, Laughter, Affirmation.

Perhaps the greatest image of laughter that Nietzsche presents to us in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra is not Zarathustra but instead the lion. The roaring laughter of the lion is
emblematic of noble instincts and life affirmation. As such, it stands in stark contrast to
the leveling kind of scornful laughter that was directed at Zarathustra by humankind in
the prologue. Instead of laughter of contempt aimed at his teaching, the laughter of the
lion symbolizes first and foremost a response to Western reason and morality. It says,
better yet, it roars “I am no longer impressed!”
The image of the lion is first introduced in the prologue as part of Zarathustra’s
first speech to humankind where he implores them to accept the overman as the meaning
of the earth and forego “otherworldly” hopes. At this early stage Zarathustra is trying to
convey the contempt they should hold for the things they have held in the highest esteem,
such as their moral systems or epistemological pursuits based in reason. For example he
says, “What matters my reason? Does it crave knowledge like the lion its food? It is
poverty and filth and a pitiful contentment!”358 Zarathustra says that reason craves
knowledge the way the lion craves food. I interpret this to mean that if reason is to be of
any value then it must be a reason that works towards new knowledge as that which
affirms life as opposed to a return to an origin such as a Platonic original, or more
generally anything that is posited as essential but lies outside the scope of life itself. In
other words, reason ought to devour the old the way the lion devours its prey. In order to
demolish reason as it has been understood and used until now requires courage and the
ability to laugh at what formerly was held in the highest esteem.
358

Ibid., 7/“Zarathustra’s Prologue.”

238

This requires a deep scrutiny of reason itself, raising serious questions about its
use and purpose. Does Nietzsche call for the abandonment of reason in life or is reason
simply to refocus itself and crave something new? As I maintained in the first chapter,
Nietzsche does not embrace the abandonment of the Apollonian in favor of the
Dionysian. And in the second chapter it became clear that he doesn’t want to disavow
science and logic either. The same is true here. It is less an “either/or” proposition—
either reason or not—but more of the proper role of reason. Mindful of the notion of limit
and transgression, Nietzsche wants to say of reason that what began as an unbounded
optimism has now not only run its course, but has delimited its own limits and thus led to
the kind of pessimism and resignation that is fatal to life. For Nietzsche, the history of
philosophy from Plato onwards has been the hegemony of reason and as such has worked
against life. This culminated in the thought of Schopenhauer who professed, like Kant,
that the thing-in-itself was unknowable and that life as will in-itself can only be
unsatisfied desire.359 In turn this lack of certain knowledge that ensures a constant
desiring could only relegate life to despondency, even suffering. For Nietzsche, the blind
adherence to reason can only by its very nature, lead to pessimism and skepticism, unlike
his eternal return that says “yes” to life and wills it “once again.” Laurence Lampert
writes of reason’s decline at its own hands:
In this symbolic way, the old tradition slays itself: the tradition that has mastered
the world with its rational gravity in search of eternal security and that now lies in
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the ruins of its necessary pessimism, is finally “stoned” to death by the thought
that life as it is emerges eternally out of the enigmatic whole.360
What Nietzsche wants to call attention to actually preserves a good measure of reason by
showing that if it is understood as not supported by “the webs of any cosmic spider,” that
is, if it is understood to have limits “then reason itself can be reasonably employed to
support the ideal that is the opposite of world denial.”361 The key once again is twofold:
first, to recognize what Nietzsche sees as the fundamental irrational genesis of the
rational impulse and two, to exercise the kind of intellectual honesty (Redlichkeit) that
allows for this recognition. As he puts it in Daybreak, “How did rationality arrive in the
world? Irrationality, as might be expected: by a chance accident. If we want to know
what that chance accident was we shall have to guess it, as one guesses the answer to a
riddle.”362 Nietzsche’s phrasing, his use of guessing the “chance accident,” suggests that
in guessing we assume a similar stance as if one were answering “a riddle.” This alludes
to tragedy and tragic knowledge itself, similar to Oedipus’s guessing of the riddle of the
Sphinx which led to his demise. So in essence, it is not the vanquishing of science or
logic that Nietzsche prescribes but, as Babich maintains, “Since science cannot critique
itself, since the problem of science cannot be posed on the ground of science, Nietzsche
proposes the perspective of the healing power of art.”363 If science is to be of any value
then it must serve life and to do so it must be seen, as he asserts in The Birth of Tragedy,
“through the prism of the artist.”364

Lampert, Nietzsche’s Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 167.
Ibid., 166.
362
Nietzsche, Daybreak, 77/123.
363
Babich, “The Culture of Science as Art,” in Nietzsche, Theories of Knowledge, and Critical Theory, 9.
364
Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 5/Section 2 of the preface to the second edition.
360
361

240

If we understand this in a historical context, Nietzsche might also have in mind
that if our reason is in service to life, then the knowledge it ought to pursue should find
its impetus in that which is unhistorical. History should be used only as a springboard
forward and not something to be simply revered and ossified into facts, events, and rituals
or as something we blindly copy. Thus it appears that we need to unlearn much if we are
to acquire the kind of knowledge that serves life and the future. The image of the lion
works in favor of this unlearning, in that as an image of consumption, it devours its prey
just as Zarathustra wants to unlearn much that has been handed down from history to the
present.
One of the most notable images of the lion occurs in the first part of the section
titled, “On the Three Metamorphoses.” Nietzsche uses the lion image once again to
illustrate the kind of spirit needed to throw off the old values of good and evil. Coming
after the camel, who is a “carrying spirit” since it has bore the weight of the past, the lion
for Nietzsche is more a metaphor for freedom than anything else. For this reason he says,
“To create new values—not even the lion is capable of that: but to create freedom for
itself for new creation—that is within the power of the lion. To create freedom for oneself
and also a sacred ‘No’ to duty: for that, my brothers, the lion is required.”365 The lion,
whose nature is predatory and prideful, is the kind of spirit that clears the space for the
formation of new values. The values created in this novel space of the freely open happen
through the spirit of the child—an innocence that plays freely because as new it has no
memory and can affirm only its creations in a “sacred yes-saying.”366
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The freedom of the lion can also be understood in terms of time. For Nietzsche,
time is not to be understood as simply linear. Instead, time marks out the space of that
which returns eternally and what always returns is chaos and the moment that continually
needs to be refined, overcome, and affirmed. Thus the space-clearing freedom of the
laughing lion is akin to the Dionysus myth. Like Dionysus, who was pursued, tracked
down, and torn to pieces only to be eternally reborn, the laughter of the lion is one that
affirms the eternal return of chaos, that is, the eternal return of the same so that within
this space of freedom chaos will be given form and then perish.
In the second part in the section, titled “On the Famous Wise Men,” the lion
image reappears. Here Nietzsche is deconstructing what is taken for wisdom and the
supposed wise who wield it. He asserts that the famous wise men are famous only
because they cater to the herd who, in turn, justify them as rulers: “The people you have
served and the people’s superstition, all you famous wise men!—and not the truth! And
precisely on that account you were accorded respect.”367 Normally the wise are those who
create values in the manner and spirit of the lion and child as understood in “On the
Three Metamorphoses,” which is to say out of freedom and necessity. But here Nietzsche
calls their bluff by exposing their motivations, which are linked to the plebian masses or
what Nietzsche often refers to as the herd or herd mentality. How exactly does he do this?
By inverting the image of the lion. A few stanzas later his Zarathustra states, “And now
you famous wise men, I wish you would finally throw off the lion skin completely!”368 In
essence Nietzsche is exposing a comedy and one that is much in line with the kind of
comedy of appearance we saw earlier with the famous men (most notably politicians) in
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The Gay Science. The lion skin understood here presents an image. But unlike the image
of an actual lion, this image, like a mask, is an image of concealment. It conceals the true
motives of the famous wise people who are not truly wise because, according to
Nietzsche, their “wisdom” is validated through the revering masses who are reflected in
them. Keeping with the image of the lion Nietzsche says the truly wise want the “godless
desert” which is to say, “Hungry, violent, lonely, godless; thus the lion-will wants
itself.”369
Moreover Nietzsche believes he is also exposing something fraudulent. By
wishing for the lion skin to be pulled away thus exposing the fact that the supposed wise
do not really seek the truth in the manner of his Zarathustra, this constitutes another
laughter provoking moment that is coupled with the highest seriousness. Just as we laugh
at Aristophanes’ Praxagora and her cohorts who masquerade as men in order to trick
them and bring about a more equitable change in the polis, we also laugh at Nietzsche’s
comic view of the philosopher presented here. Keeping in mind that regardless of what
method philosophers may utilize, they all in the end hope to unconceal the truth or
something essential. For this they may gain a following and are often times revered.
However, when Nietzsche’s hammer finds its target in these famous wise men the result
is both shocking and comic. It is shocking because if we accept Nietzsche’s major
premise of the tragic view of life, which calls on us to recognize ourselves as finite,
earthbound beings, then we may come to realize that all of the “wise men,” whose
thinking we held in the highest esteem, whose commandments and prohibitions for so
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long helped shape the arc of history, are only “asses” that pulled “the people’s cart.”370 It
is shocking because this unconcealing reveals to us the nothingness, the nihilism that both
philosophical and moral systems concealed. Yet, the image that Nietzsche paints here, of
wise men, lions, lion skins, asses, and humankind, erupts amidst this tragedy as if it were
a comedic cushion to help soften the blows of this hard truth. This is precisely why (as
Higgins has shown) Nietzsche’s use of Zarathustra is done in parody. If the old, historical
Zarathustra was responsible for introducing good and evil into human consciousness,
then Nietzsche’s Zarathustra by parodying this historical figure heralds a new beginning,
one that affirms our earthbound life here with its many perspectives.
Nietzsche’s use of the lion image reaches its fruition at two other critical moments
in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In the section titled “On Old and New Tablets” of the third
part, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra has reached a crucial moment in his journey. It is crucial
because he finds himself in the time between the old and new, which is to say between
the collapse of valuations based on good and evil and the potentiality for the will to new
knowledge and the overman as the meaning of the earth: “Here I sit and wait, old broken
tablets around me and also new tablets only partially written upon. When will my hour
come?”371 Although the “old broken tablets” could refer to any number of codified laws
that helped shape past civilizations—Sumerian tablets, Egyptian tablets, the Code of
Hammurabi—given Nietzsche’s antagonism to Christianity in general it is most likely
370
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that he has in mind the tablets of the Ten Commandments, commandments that were
supposedly “written in stone” for eternity.
But Zarathustra’s question, “When will my hour come?,” affirms his locus in this
crucial in-between time where he yearns to “go under” to mankind once more. In order to
discern the right moment of time, that is, the moment when Zarathustra’s going under tips
the scale towards the future, Zarathustra says he needs a sign. And this sign is the
laughing lion; “This is what I wait for now; signs must come to me first that it is my
hour—namely the laughing lion with a swarm of doves.”372 Again, the lion is
representative of pride and freedom. The lion itself does not create, which is left to the
creative innocence of the child bound to nothing other than its own play. The laughing
lion then is the cue Zarathustra is waiting for, a sign that mankind is prepared to hear his
message and take up the freedom that is necessary if one is to live as an authentic, value
creating voice. The laughing lion is also an affirmation of the tragic view of life. This is
why the laughing lion is accompanied by doves. The doves are a symbol of lightness and
the willingness to own up to tragic view so that one does not flee in the face of nihilism
but affirms oneself as a value creator in the very midst of nihilism’s greatest and only
gift—freedom. Thus, it is only when the lion roars with laughter that the pendulum
swings and the time is ripe for the overman. In essence we may say that the laughing lion
signals this very usurpation. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra says a few lines later when he came
to mankind:
I told them to overthrow [umwerfen] their old professional chairs wherever that
old conceit had sat; I told them to laugh [lachen] at their great masters of virtue
and their saints and poets and world redeemers. I told them to laugh [lachen] at
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their gloomy wise men and at any who ever perched in warning, like black
scarecrows, in the tree of life. I sat down alongside their great road of graves and
even among carrion and vultures—and I laughed [lachte] at all their yesteryear
and its rotting, decaying glory. Indeed, like preachers of repentance and fools I
screamed bloody murder about all their great and small—that their best is so very
small! that their most evil is so very small!—I had to laugh [lachte]. Thus my
wild longing cried and laughed out of me [lachte also aus mir], born in the
mountains, a wild wisdom surely!—my great, winging, roaring longing. And
often it swept me off my feet and up and away, in the midst of my laughter
[Lachen]...373
It is evident the way in which laughter plays a pivotal role for Nietzsche. Zarathustra does
not say to “engage in dialectics” with the old masters or even try and refute the old
masters. Zarathustra’s call is not about creating a teaching that is logically sound, or
about positing additional, supersensible criteria that all ought to be bound. Zarathustra’s
call is to laugh because the audible explosion of laughter is the first act of a will that says,
“No!” to what has held sway for so long. The laugh is a “No!” that shatters the same in
order that chaos returns. The laughter of the lion and the laughter that Zarathustra
implores us as potential Übermenschen to initiate is a laughter of disruption, even of
transgression. It is laughter that says one is no longer impressed by previously ascribed
beliefs and that one is taking up their freedom and authentic possibilities in the laughing
moment of inspiration.
In the fourth and final part the laughing lion appears again. When Zarathustra
returns to his cave in the section titled, “The Welcome,” he finds all of those he
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encountered in his going under gathered together at his cave. Although he addresses them
as higher men and accepts their company, he tells them that they are not those he has
been waiting for in the mountains. For Zarathustra the higher men are “mere bridges” that
still higher people will “stride across.”374 Once again Zarathustra affirms that what he
waits for is that human being that will affirm its mortal ties to the earth and the joy that
the moment has as if it were eternity, that is, as if it were to eternally return. This human
being is, above all, characterized as laughing and cheerful:
Not for you do I wait here in these mountains, not with you shall I go down
[niedersteigen] for the last time. You came to me only as an omen that higher
ones are on their way to me—not the people of great longing, of great nausea, of
great surfeit and that which you called the remnant of God.—No! No! Three times
no! I wait for others here in these mountains and will not lift a foot from here
without them,—for higher, stronger, more victorious, more cheerful ones
[Wohlgemutere], those who are built right-angled in body and soul: laughing
lions [lachende Löwen] must come!375
For Nietzsche and his Zarathustra the crucial element missing from the authentic higher
man, who has yet to appear or in other words who is a “not yet,” is cheerfulness and
laughter. Although those gathered at Zarathustra’s cave have heard his teaching,
nonetheless the way to the overman is not a simple matter of executing some instruction,
if indeed Zarathustra’s teaching can be called “instruction” at all. Zarathustra’s appeal
aims more at a change of perspective, that is, a turning of thought from the way one is
oriented in the world as a product of what has come before to seeing the human being as
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a bridge forward and the vehicle for the will (to new knowledge). This turning of
consciousness that Zarathustra hopes will occur is facilitated by the very act of laughter
itself. For Zarathustra laughter is the linchpin that tips the scales in favor of the future, in
favor of the overman to come. But how exactly is this so?
Consider laughter itself as a phenomenon. Laughter is a phenomenon of the face
or head. Unlike language that is tied to thought it originates in the body, more specifically
the throat thus it is to a large extent a physiological phenomenon. Whereas language’s
physical manifestation is the tongue, mouth, lips, and lungs that articulate a particular
voice or thought, and so is already on the way to representing something in concreto.
Laughter, on the other hand, is not a representation. It is an act that affirms, denies or, in
the case of Nietzsche’s laughing lions, achieves both at the same time. The eruption of
laughter from the prideful lion at once says “yes!,” which is an affirmation of the human
being as a bridge to the overman. At the same time this laughter says “no!,” aiming itself
at mediocrity, at ressentiment, at “thou shalts,” at that which has held sway and
commanded dutiful action. It is the “no” in “no longer impressed.” In a word, it is a “no!”
to nihilism. As a “no” to nihilism the eruption of laughter affirms chaos as our amor fati
(love of fate) so that duty’s only command now is to celebrate—a negative becomes a
positive. Thus the use of laughter by Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a
phenomenon that often times encompasses opposites; “yes” saying and “no” saying, past
and future. Many of Nietzsche’s pronouncements in this work surely transgress the rules
of argumentation such as the principle of non-contradiction as we saw above. But
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra revels in the inconsistencies and contradictions of life and these
are always best expressed in laughter, his and others. Its plentiful occurrence is, in a very

248

ironic sense, of the utmost seriousness that marks out the intersection of the past and the
future.
This plea for laughter is given in an admonition a few sections later when
Zarathustra says to the higher men:
How much is still possible! So learn to laugh over and past yourselves [lernt doch
über euch hinweg lachen]! Lift up your hearts, you good dancers, high! Higher!
And don’t forget good laughter [Lachen] either. This crown of the laughing one
[Krone des Lachenden], this rose-wreathed crown: to you, my brothers, I throw
this crown! I pronounced laughter [Lachen] holy; you higher men, learn—to
laugh! [lernt mire—lachen].376
Thus it is clear that Nietzsche sees laughter and its role of affirmation as the critical
element that, in a word, lightens the mood, and the body in order to prepare it for dancing
and graceful movement. Just as great comedy harbors its own serious, philosophical
moments, Nietzsche with his Zarathustra is attempting to retrieve the lost playfulness he
believes ought to be intrinsic to life. Thus his Zarathustra helps link philosophy and the
philosopher back to buffoonery and laughter. Parody itself helps achieve a cheerfulness
that erupts from the text into life so as to bring back gaiety to the brooding thus helping to
pave the way for the overman.
The passage above from “On the Higher Man” is also echoed in the second
edition of The Birth of Tragedy (1886). The preface utilizes a long quote from this same
section in which laughter abounds. But for Nietzsche, laughter in the mouth of
Zarathustra is no ordinary laughter. It takes on the overtones of one who prepares the
way, giving hints of what is to come: “Zarathustra who speaks the truth [Zarathustra der
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Wahrsager], who laughs the truth [Zarathustra der Wahrlacher], not impatient, not
unconditional, one who loves leaps and deviations: I myself set this crown on my
head!”377 As the translator (Ronald Speirs) makes clear, Nietzsche is playing on the
German word wahrsagen which means “to prophesy” by creating neologisms such as
Wahrlacher or one who “laugh’s the truth.” Hence the will of Nietzsche’s “Dionysiac
monster”378 is always future directed, as opposed to a return to an origin, and is
manifested as such by laughter. In the last analysis laughter essentially acts as the force of
a new beginning.
The gravity and weight that Nietzsche lends to laughter and cheerfulness is
perhaps best illustrated in the very last section of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. “The Sign”
occurs after the Roundelay refrain and, much in the manner of a musical score, is itself a
refrain of the beginning of the work where we find Zarathustra high up in his cave, to
which the sun must climb. While the higher men are asleep in Zarathustra’s cave he is
awake with his eagle and snake above. But he muses, “I still lack the proper human
beings!” It is at this point that a sign is revealed to him in the form of being descended
upon and surrounded by countless doves. As he reaches around him to ward away “the
affectionate birds” he also “reached unwittingly into a thick, warm tangle of hair, and at
the same time a roar sounded around him—a soft, long lion’s roar.”379
The laughing lion is not only a sign, that is its own semiotic play of signs, but also
an indicator of things to come. As the lion lies at Zarathustra’s feet Zarathustra declares,
“The sign is coming” and “My children are near, my children.” Akin to the lion and child
in “The Three Metamorphoses,” this last section links the lion and his pivotal laughter—a
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laughter that frees thinking for the future—to the child-philosopher who commences his
play.
But Nietzsche also links this final image of Zarathustra and the laughing lion with
the elemental earth and the vaulting trajectory of the sun. In the final lines of the work
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra says:
Well then! The lion came, my children are near, Zarathustra became ripe
[Zarathustra ward reif], my hour came—‘This is my morning, my day is
beginning: up now, up, you great noon! [herauf nun, herauf, du grosser
Mittag]’—Thus spoke Zarathustra and he left his cave, glowing and strong, like a
morning sun that emerges from dark mountains.380
Just as the last section of Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a refrain of the first section with
Zarathustra back at his cave and the sun rising to him, it is also a foreshadowing of one of
the most well known passages Nietzsche will use later in 1888 in “How the ‘True World’
Finally Became a Fable” in Twilight of the Idols. When we put this crucial piece of
Nietzsche’s thinking in its perspective we can begin to see that “How the ‘True World’
Finally Became a Fable” is being enacted by Zarathustra in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
Because this enigmatic work by Nietzsche is itself an eruption into history, a laughing
eruption into history, attuned ears that hear its message can turn out of the text into their
time and hopefully to a new beginning, just as Zarathustra is poised to do with his lion at
the close of the text.
The laughing lion is Zarathustra’s sign that his teaching is ripe and that his
morning and day are just beginning. He exclaims, “up now, up, you great noon!” But this
is more than an exclamation, it is an affirmation that looks towards the future, that is,
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towards the overman to come. It is also an affirmation that even the future type
“overman” will itself sink into the horizon from its great noon when and if it has
exhausted its greatness. Thus it is an affirmation of a new time—one of the eternal return.
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra and lion are there, as laughing witnesses to the irreducibility of
the world and life to any system or synthesis. They are there as witnesses to the tragic
view of the world, to the aesthetic shining of appearance and the elemental earth assisting
in the transition from nihilism to the overman—INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.

IV. Conclusion: Resenting Seriousness, Laughing at Ressentiment

What does laughter disclose in this most enigmatic work of Nietzsche’s? Why is
laughter for Nietzsche so significant? Laughter abounds so much in this work that to
address its every occurrence would be a work in its own right. This chapter however
distills a few crucial insights.
The first is that when reading Thus Spoke Zarathustra we must be vigilant about
who is laughing and why they are laughing. This is because Zarathustra is not the only
character who wields the power of laughter. As we saw, laughter is even directed at him.
We saw this phenomenon in Zarathustra’s initial descent from his cave when the people
focused their laughter on him, thus presenting Zarathustra with his first obstacle to the
overman. Moreover, we saw the many forms that laughter takes in this work as well.
Thus the laughter of the townspeople is best characterized as scornful laughter that at one
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time wills the last man and at the same time resists Zarathustra’s call to overcome
themselves and move from human to the overman.
In addition to the many forms of laughter, we saw how laughter intersected with
the eternal return and the will to power, the two overarching themes of this work. For
Nietzsche, the will to power’s importance is always connected to the enhancement or
furtherance of the subject’s affirmation of life. Thus the will to power serves the subject
by enhancing the feeling of power it feels in its creative deeds. Hence, the poet’s will to
power is enhanced by creatively disclosing the world through his or her particular voice.
The phenomenon of laughter as well can act as an enhancement of one’s will to power
through its simultaneous “yes saying” and “no saying.” Zarathustra knows his task is an
arduous one. He is asking people to reorient themselves with the world that they think
they know; a world whose values have been handed down to them for millennia. Better
still, we might say that Zarathustra is asking them to reorient themselves in the world of
becoming as opposed to some posited, supersensible criteria. However, freeing others (as
well as himself) from illusions and falsehoods is no easy task. Thus he is often times told,
for example by the saint in the first part, that his task is a hopeless one. Yet Zarathustra
sees this task as the very enhancement of his will to power and so he laughs, affirming it.
Another key issue is that Nietzsche must not allow his Zarathustra to fall prey to
the kind of ressentiment he conceived in On the Genealogy of Morality. Ressentiment is a
reactive, value creating force that says “No!” to everything that is outside and different
from it. Instead of affirming multiplicity, ressentiment wants the same, that is, it wants
assimilation. Although in On the Genealogy of Morality it was the priestly class who
Nietzsche characterized as the prime example of ressentiment, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra
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the last human being appears faithfully to fulfill this less than honorable role. Rejecting
Zarathustra’s call that the “overman is the meaning of the earth,” the last human being
desires comfort and the will to nothingness and so it is an image of homogeneity,
dilution, and leveling down. Zarathustra implores them that the chaos of a dancing star is
much more preferable than the so-called happiness of the last human being. But
Zarathustra’s admonition to the people goes unheeded.
Yet, Zarathustra refused to succumb to ressentiment, that is, he refuses to blame
the blamers as seen in the phenomena of scornful laughter expressed by the people who
cried out for the last human being and happiness. In essence, this laughter, although an
obstacle that Zarathustra subsequently strove to overcome throughout the rest of his
journey, also played the role of a provocation in the deepest sense of the word. Laughter,
as we have seen, is a physiological phenomenon and a gesture. The provocative laughter
of the people who prefer the last human being is surely one that “calls forth” and
“challenges” Zarathustra.
Zarathustra’s refusal of the model of ressentiment showcases itself through the
fact that he never once refers to the townspeople as “evil,” as the priestly class did to
those not in their image in the first essay of On the Genealogy of Morality. Whereas the
priestly class sought a target outward, turning good and bad to good and evil, Zarathustra
sees his goal as a herald to a new way of life that is oriented to value creating as well as
the gathering of the earth and its people. It is a noble goal and to work toward it requires
an effort that sees all others as potentially worthy of its message. Zarathustra’s goal of a
reevaluation of all values is not easily achievable because ears are still lacking to hear it.
Still, for Zarathustra their skepticism is not a substitute for evil. Furthermore laughter,
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whether directed at him or from him (and on occasion Zarathustra even laughs at
himself), plays a significant role. Nietzsche knows that his Zarathustra attempts to
disclose the “eternal comedy of existence” to those who do not yet recognize that they are
its leading players. In this sense, Zarathustra like Nietzsche, is an untimely figure not just
as he appears to others within the text itself, but as an eruption within the history of
philosophy. It is from this perch in his thinking that he finds humor and laughter to play a
significant role, one that keeps him from reacting towards others in the form of
ressentiment.
With all of this said, especially concerning the post-reception of Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn is precisely the lack of
conclusion that Nietzsche’s work in general, and Thus Spoke Zarathustra in particular,
engenders. This was shown in the way that Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking is born out in
large part by Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Whether it is the meeting of the arborescent
assemblage of the people with the rhizomatic assemblage of Zarathustra and his teaching,
or the power of dispersion found in the laugh of the lion, in the end the heterogenetic
elements of multiplicity—the infinite masks and drives that are us—are always affirmed.
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, with its dramatic structure, poetic texture, and
provocative laughter at its core, is a work that exists on the periphery of the dominant
arborescent structures that have constituted philosophy for so long. It is a work that, like
guerilla fighters who are always outnumbered and under-resourced, raids these structures.
Zarathustra’s weapons are neither conventional, in the sense that he uses their same
modes of expression and content, nor unconventional as to not be recognizable that he
would be rendered a recluse only at home within his cave. Zarathustra, through his
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laughter and comedic parody, reflects the expression and content of the arborescent
structures back at it so that we can begin to laugh at ourselves. Instead of appearing
before a transcendent God or appearing as a dim copy compared to a perfect original, we
appear to ourselves as we are in all of our greatness and folly.
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CONCLUSION: The Eternal Return of the Eternal Comedy of Existence

“The day we can say, with conviction: ‘Forwards! Even our old morality would make a
comedy!’ we shall have discovered a new twist and possible outcome for the Dionysian
drama of the ‘fate of the soul’—: and he’ll make good use of it, we can bet, he, the grand
old eternal writer of the comedy of our existence!...”
~Nietzsche, Preface to On the Genealogy of Morality~

A conclusion is a time to reflect on what has been said. What can be said about
Nietzsche, comedy and laughter? Foremost is the close kinship that Nietzsche’s thought
has to these phenomena. Whether one agrees or disagrees about any particular point that
has been made, I hope above all that the reader is able to see, as I do, the levity that
resonates in Nietzsche’s work. If for no other reason, the levity inherent in his thought is
there to help compensate for the tragic knowledge that is unfolding. This notion of the
tragic as it relates to comedy and laughter have been paramount in this study. The tragic
limit of our knowledge and the resulting tragic wisdom are the necessary backdrop to the
eruption of comedy and laughter in Nietzsche’s thought, otherwise a study of these
phenomena would be merely anecdotal or incidental and thus never point to anything
deeper outside of the aphorism or section of Nietzsche’s work that contained them. The
importance of this cannot be overstated because if his thinking aims to achieve anything,
then it is to peel back, layer by layer, the motivation and illusions that human beings
employ in their existence. Illusions that are no doubt necessary although we have
forgotten that they are, indeed, fictions. And his sights are set on all of the areas that
provide the breath and scope of our being here—epistemology, morality, science,
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religion, culture are just a few of his philosophical targets. The exposing of illusions at
the heart of the most vital spheres that tell us who we are is, to many, unbearable let alone
never a reason to be even remotely cheerful. Yet, this is how Nietzsche, contra
Schopenhauer, asks us to comport ourselves in the face of this “knowledge” as we pursue
a meaningful existence justified “only as an aesthetic phenomenon.” The limits that we
are all given over to by virtue of the fact that we are only human, all too human are not
reasons for despair but present to us opportunities of affirmation that allow us to say
“yes” to life so that we may transfigure our state into joy.
Moreover we saw that for Nietzsche if truth means anything in the philosopher’s
quest one of its greatest allies is honesty (Redlichkeit). A young Nietzsche says as much
in a letter to his sister in 1865:
Is it then a matter of acquiring the view of God, world, and atonement in which
one can feel most comfortable? Is it not, rather, true that for the true researcher
the result of his research is of no account at all? Do we, in our investigations,
search for tranquility, peace, happiness? No—only for the truth, even if it were to
be frightening and ugly.381
He goes on to say that his quest, regardless if the outcome is monstrous, will nonetheless
be cheerful: “On this earnest foundation I shall now build—and the building will be all
the jollier.”382 Nietzsche’s foundation is not a set of metaphysical principles, at least not
the kind of principles he inherited in his time from the Western philosophical tradition. It
is honesty in terms of how we understand metaphysical principles. Is this not exactly
what the philosophical enterprise demands of us? And more often than not for Nietzsche,
Friedrich Nietzsche, Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. and trans by Christopher Middleton
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 7. Letter to Elisabeth Nietzsche, June 1865.
382
Ibid.
381
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honesty and dishonesty are the coordinates from which his provocative laughter erupts.
Those philosophers who fail to exercise intellectual honesty are guilty of the deepest
transgression and Nietzsche singles them out for ridicule and playacting in a comedy.
Further reflection hopefully yields for the reader of Nietzsche the insight that
laughter is not something frivolous or superficial. Whether it be his use of the laughing
wood god Silenus (a profound symbol of pessimism) in The Birth of Tragedy or the
laughing Zarathustra (a profound symbol of affirmation) in Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
when laughter occurs it is almost always done under the pretext of illuminating a crucial
philosophical point. Hence one should not conclude that the levity found in Nietzsche’s
writings and thought efface all of the serious issues he tackles. Indeed comedy and
laughter are coupled with the most serious issues in a way that disclose these issues so
that the urgency that calls for their thinking is not diminished but enhanced. It is our task
to think them in their coupling, that is, in their play.
Additionally we have seen that laughter works bi-directionally in his works. It is
easy to simply focus one’s laughter on others, that is, to make a spectacle of the other.
But to be honest, indeed to be authentic, one must also focus it on oneself and Nietzsche
does just that. As well as targeting others for laughter, Nietzsche often has laughter
directed at him. Perhaps best expressed in his character Zarathustra, the laughter directed
at him is something that illuminates a shortfall in his teaching and thus requires a “going
under” and an overcoming, a signal to take up a new perspective. What we find then
under this rubric is that Nietzsche never advocates that we act out of ressentiment, that is,
act in a way that simply gathers ourselves into the flip-side of the same coin in terms of
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those we disagree with. To be sure, laughter helps ensure that we never deny our own
action through the inaction of others.
There is a second reason Nietzsche levels laughter at himself. Nietzsche is keenly
aware that those “who have ears for his writings” are, for the most part, of the future and
not his contemporaries. In other words he is aware of his untimeliness. Thus he thinks
and writes in his time for the future, that is, for us today at this crucial time in history as
heirs of a modern-technical-scientific nihilism which he discerns, quite correctly, is
dawning on humankind.383 Nietzsche is aware that much of his thought, because it is
“dynamite,”384 will incite the sort of derisive laughter that one might resent to the point of
inaction, which is the same kind of ridicule leveled at Zarathustra who transfigures it into
his own laughing affirmation. Hence the laughter that resonates in his texts provokes us
to forego ressentiment and its crippling internalization. Indeed laughter can be seen as the
lion-willed gesture that says, “I am no longer impressed!” This shifting of perspective
often results in gaiety, allowing us to constantly refamiliarize ourselves—vis-à-vis the
footwork of dancing—within the great stream of becoming instead of the immobilization
that occurs within the rigidity of a singular stance, anchored in an unchanging,
transcendent principle that demands our allegiance.
There is also the constellation of the three characteristics that help define comedy
and its attendant laughter: measure, transgression, and self-forgetting. These three criteria
that more often than not work in tandem are always at work providing the threads that
weave an image of who we are not only within the domain of comedy but also within the
383

Considering the events that were about to unfold in the 20th century after his death in 1900, Nietzsche’s
writings and thinking prefigure the monstrous nihilism emerging and yet harbor the saving possibility of a
transfiguration of this fateful comportment to the world.
384
See Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, 144/Section 1 of “Why I Am A
Destiny,” in Ecce Homo. Also see section 44 of Twilight of the Idols.
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philosophical enterprise. This is why comedy and laughter present such a potent and
disclosive force in Nietzsche’s thought. In terms of measure, no one has emphasized its
role more than Bernard Freydberg who states in the conclusion to Philosophy and
Comedy, “In their own ways, the comedies, tragedies, and dialogues serve to draw human
beings vicariously into the most human of endeavors, namely raising the question of
measure, making the attempt to determine proper measure.”385 Measure invokes limit. A
limit provides a horizon in which things stand in relation to that horizon as well as to
each other. In all inspired comedy the generation of laughter almost always involves the
transgression of limit so that measure is exceeded. This is often done through the selfforgetting of great comic characters whether it be Aristophanes’ Strepsiades seeking the
“wisdom” of Socrates in order to shirk his debts in Clouds or Woody Allen’s Alvy
(played by Allen himself) in Annie Hall in which Alvy attempts to find love’s measure as
if love of all phenomena could ever be measured. Whatever the attempt, nothing but the
absurd was disclosed but an absurdity that profoundly shows us who we are. These same
themes are at play in Nietzsche’s thought as well, although here these elements occur at
the intersection of philosophy and philosophers and not necessarily on a formal stage or
screen unless one considers life itself a stage with us as characters as Nietzsche often
does.
Furthermore, Nietzsche shows the exceeding of measure most often happens in
light of the very phenomenon that is supposed to give to thinking the very measure for its
practice— ground. Nietzsche argues that the ground we often suppose our knowledge
rests on is less a firm metaphysical foundation and more of a “metaphysical faith” built
Freydberg, Philosophy and Comedy, 200. Although in this particular analysis Freydberg focuses on the
works of Aristophanes and their relationship to the Platonic dialogues, many of the same concerns arise
within Nietzsche’s thought as it relates to history, philosophy and its practitioners.
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on the constructs of grammar (“metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms” as he says
in “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense”), which when employed have always
already become distanced from any essence. The very enacting of ground as a measure,
as limit, as that which would supply a firm foundation ends up exceeding its own
function in its very positing. Nietzsche does not point this out because he is against
philosophy, science and logic and their practice, nor because he wants to eliminate those
endeavors but conversely; if science is to be viable it must recognize its limits, which is
to say that science must recognize the fact that the regulative fictions it employs are just
that, fictions. Science must come to grips with science.
Additionally, we must also content ourselves with the fact that science and
knowledge as a product of human beings can only work within the framework in which
they are situated, namely history and the stream of becoming. They must perpetually
reacquaint themselves within becoming using only what is manifest in this world, much
in the spirit of Otto Neurath’s boat metaphor where he asserts, “We are like sailors who
have to rebuild their ship on the open sea, without ever being able to dismantle it in drydock and reconstruct it from its best components.”386 If the philosopher’s epistemology or
the scientist’s method (and the two should not be separable) are to serve life nobly, they
ought never to forget the world to which they belong—that of change and becoming—
lest they become actors in the greatest of comedic transgressions. Nietzsche argues that
denying or ignoring these elements is not only a philosophical faux pas concerning the
most serious issues, it is also the justification for the kind of provocative laughter he
hopes will “reground” this sort of hubris or thinking run amok. It is the definitive kind of
comic self-forgetting. Nietzsche, the philosopher of Dionysian wisdom, invites us to shift
386

From Neurath’s Anti-Spengler (1921).
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our perspective away from supposed eternal, unchanging principles and instead celebrate
our bodies, sensate experience, chaos, art, madness, the earth, and all of the things that
constitute our being here.
For fear of pessimism, science post-Heraclitus has had the opiate-like effect of all
but vanquishing the chaos from which it arises. Philosophers and scientists have either
forgotten this chaos or, if they have not, have used illusions to protect a certain kind of
life, one of life descending values Nietzsche believes are the genesis of nihilism. In light
of this, Nietzsche’s provocative laughter is first directed at the knowers, that is, the ones
who ought to know better. Hence he wants to educate the educators first, showing them
that science and knowledge not only arise out of this chaotic element—often referred to
as the Dionysian abgrund—but that science itself cannot account for this element because
what is abysmal exceeds all measure. But Nietzsche’s claim reaches even farther. Not
only is science incapable of fully accounting for the chaos of becoming, direct
apprehension of its own ground remains veiled, even though it privileges this supposed
ground as the Archimedean point of all knowledge. This is precisely why, in the spirit of
the Kant of the Critique of Pure Reason, Nietzsche asserts that science can never get to
the thing-in-itself (Ding-an-sich); ground always betrays something unaccounted for,
something that cannot be delimited and something requiring the palliative affects of art to
which we can say “yes!”
In an ironic sense then, this is what measure, transgression and self-forgetting
mean in Nietzsche’s thought. On one hand, proper measure demands that science and
philosophy think their own ground—even if that “ground” be abysmal—and be mindful
of it in terms of truth claims. Anything in excess of this ground can only be dogma. On
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the other hand, Nietzsche is claiming that science, similar to the Ouroboros image in The
Birth of Tragedy,387 in its attempts to establish a foundation, reaches its own limit and can
go no farther. Scientific truth in search of measure can, in the end, only meet the
measureless. The “knowledge” that manifests itself, at the limit where measure and the
measureless appear to mix as opposites, is not the kind of proper knowledge grounded in
metaphysical principles, it is tragic knowledge. It is here, at the limit, that tragic wisdom
and art are necessary so that we can behold ourselves before ourselves in our true depth.
And this is exactly Nietzsche’s project, to reintroduce this depth that only the early
Greeks knew: “Nobody had ever turned the Dionysian into a philosophical pathos before:
tragic wisdom was missing.”388
Only with the recognition, indeed celebration, of tragic wisdom can we practice
what Nietzsche means by fröhlich Wissenschaft or “La gaya scienza,” that is, cheerful
science that does not seek to betray its abysmal origins. This is precisely why he seeks an
“alliance” between tragic wisdom and laughter:
Perhaps even laughter still has a future....Perhaps laughter will then form an
alliance with wisdom; perhaps only ‘gay science’ will remain. At present, things
are still quite different; at present, the comedy of existence has not yet ‘become
conscious’ of itself; at present we still live in an age of tragedy, in the age of
moralities and religions.389
This point provides an apt time to conclude our reflection. We have seen comedy
and laughter’s relevance embedded deep within Nietzsche’s thought in light of the three

Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 75/Section 15.
Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, 110/Section 3 of The Birth of Tragedy in
Ecce Homo.
389
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 27-28/Aphorism 1.
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texts I examined. In addition to tragedy, The Birth of Tragedy clearly delineated the role
that comedy can play as a counterforce to pessimism. Indeed comedy must be included
within the very art that Nietzsche proclaims is “the highest task and the true metaphysical
activity of this life.”390 The aim of The Gay Science was to introduce the kind of levity
into the search for knowledge in all the fields that constitute Wissenschaft. The
fruitfulness or not of levity for Nietzsche is always coupled to Redlichkeit (intellectual
honesty). Thus Spoke Zarathustra showcased comedy and laughter’s apex in Nietzsche’s
thought. These phenomena exhibited through Nietzsche’s Zarathustra are the fulcrum
between past and future. They provided a provocative challenge to all absolute “meta”
positions and the chance instead to tip the balance towards the kind of laughter and
affirmation that reorients us back to the earth.
In the last analysis the comedy and laughter in Nietzsche’s writings and thought
are there as provocations to rethink our relationship to each other and the philosophical
endeavors that bestow value and meaning to existence that is, at times, both tragic and
absurd. Until we come to grips with our science, moralities, and religion in terms of their
reach and measure, we will remain mired in the eternal comedy of existence, and the
joyful laughter of affirmation will remain a “not yet” and only a hope for the future. In
this scenario where the “comedy of existence has not yet ‘become conscious’ of itself,”
there is a one-sided spectacle391 in which Nietzsche and other free spirits observe the
appearances of humankind at play in their own unconscious comedy rooted in nihilistic

Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 14/Preface to the first edition.
Although coming from the perspective of Marxist critique, Guy Debord in The Society of the Spectacle
examines this kind of spectacle in which we have become alienated from one another, and from an
authentic existence, through commoditization and the modern means of production: “The spectacle’s
function in society is the concrete manufacture of alienation.” The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald
Nicholson (New York: Zone Books, 1994), 23/Thesis 32.
390
391
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practices. Yet this one-sided spectacle is exactly what Nietzsche hopes to overcome, what
Zarathustra in his “going under” hopes to transfigure with his bestowing virtue: “You
compel all things to and into yourselves,” says Zarathustra “so that they may gush back
from your well as the gifts of your love.”392 If, as Nietzsche says in The Birth of Tragedy,
life is justified “only as an aesthetic phenomenon” with art as humankind’s “highest
metaphysical activity” then we, one and all, are subject to and held forth into this
abysmal “ground” but one that also constitutes the very space where our inspired artistic
creations avow saying “yes!” to it. And in this space all voices may bestow their “own
gifts of love” as the “sparks of images” that burst forth from it. In this sense then the
aesthetic phenomenon that is now a one-sided spectacle has the potential to gather all of
us into this “highest metaphysical activity” where each unique voice that resonates with
all others can then constitute a great carnival of laughter where we become artworks and
each another’s audience. Art then, at the limit, calls us to witness. And what we witness
in all of our tragedy and comic absurdity is the sum of our shining—we are witnesses of
ourselves. Only when we learn the lion-willed laughter that affirms being here will we
laugh the Zarathustrian laughter of love. A laughter that roars beyond good and evil.

Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 56/“On the Bestowing Virtue.” Fred Evans also cites this passage in
The Multivoiced Body to convey the dynamic hearing of other voices that in part constitutes our own voice
that then flows back into the community as our gift (The Multivoiced Body, 197-98).
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